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PREFACE
After th© American colonies or Spain achieved inde* 
pendenee in the nineteenth century* their nature! resources 
were made accessible to foreign capitalists# Tim newly 
created countries of Latin America recognised the economic 
opportunities at hand? but without foreign assistance* they 
were unable to develop© their resources on a full scale#
Their need for outside aid can be attributed to one or 
several of the following conditions* lack of capital re­
sources* inadequate technical knowledge* indifference to 
industrial activities* and pre-occupation with other aspects 
of the life of their countries#
Of the Latin American peoples* however* Chileans were 
the ones most Interested in economic activities* Because of 
this trait* they have been termed the ^English of South 
America#n The early Peruvian nitrate capitalists could be 
included in this category as well* for in reality it was the 
citizens of these two countries who founded the nitrate 
industry# Although until 1870, Peruvians and Chileans owned 
most of the nitrate deposits * European engineers provided the 
technical assistance necessary in operating the nitrate 
plants successfully#
For Peru in the 1870*s and thereafter for Chile* the 
nitrate industry rose to a position of great Importance# The
iv
course ©f Its development not only affected th© economic life 
of these countries hut their politics and foreign affairs as 
mil# Adjacent Bolivia# too* felt the impact of nitrate 
developments# The conflicting economic interests of the three 
countries ©iBaeshed them in a struggle that led to one of the 
few major wars fought in Batin America after Independence# 
Known today as the War of the Pacific (1079*1303)* hut to 
many contemporaries as the "Hitrat© War,H the conflict re­
sulted in th© acquisition by Chile of the entire nitrate 
region# This gay# Chilean nitrate capitalists the oppor­
tunity to participate more freely in the development of the 
industry#
But opportunity for Chilean capitalists m s  oppor­
tunity for British capitalist© too# and the latter found 
occasion to establish their dominance during Chilean re­
organisation of th© industry* In th© years that followed a 
tremendous growth in nitrate production occurred, and the 
policy of Chile toward the industry was established# That 
policy closely tied the Interests of the Chilean government 
with th© prosperity of th© industry# However# the interests 
of nitrate capitalists and of th© government did not always 
coincide# Intermittent conflicts between the two occurred 
until a basis for cooperation finally was achieved at the 
beginning of the twentieth century*
This dissertation will consider th© developments 
outlined In th© above paragraphs# Although the present study
v
has been limited to a discussion ©f the nitrate industry In 
the nineteenth century, it has been necessary to carry the 
treatment slightly beyond 1900 in presenting statistics and 
in bringing certain developments to an appropriate conclusion.
For several reasons the turn of the century consti** 
tutes the end or one period of nitrate development and the 
beginning of another. In the first place# by that time the 
formulation of Chile*® nitrate policy had been stabilised 
on the principles of protecting nitrate revenues and pro** 
moting their gradual increase by augmenting productive ea«* 
pacity. Secondly# after 19OQ the government reversed It® 
antagonistic attitude toward activities of private nitrate 
interests and within the limits of its established policy 
sought to cooperate with private interest® for the common 
welfare. Thirdly, the attempts made by producers prior to 
1900 to control production In their own interests had proven 
to be temporary expedients, incapable of solving the basic 
problems of th© industry* A renewed effort by producers 
after the turn of th© century, in which the major faults of 
earlier efforts to control production were corrected and the 
support of the government won# achieved a seemingly permanent 
status. Fourthly, British dominance which was the chief 
characteristic of nitrate history prior to 1900 was defi** 
nltely on th© wane by that date, lastly, it was not until 
after 1900 that organised labor became a powerful factor In 
the nitrate Industry.
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Because of the scarcity of data* this study gives 
only brief consideration to th© technical* managerial* and 
legal aspects of the history of th© nitrate industry# More* 
over* definitive treatment of the subjects emphasised in the 
following pages has been impossible* since th© data necessary 
for such a study is widely dispersed or cannot be located#
The chief deficiencies lie in th© lack of files of Chilean 
newspapers (such as El Ferrocarrll* El Mercuric# and the 
Chilean Times)* and in th© absence of materials relating to 
activities of Chileans in th© nitrate industry# Records of 
th© Pelegacion do Salitreras (Bureau of Hltrate Affairs) and 
court records in Chile are other sources that have not been 
available for consult at lorn « An effort has been made* without 
success* to find the private papers of leading British par­
ticipants in the early history of th© nitrate industry#
However* the sources for a history of the nitrate 
industry found in United States libraries are numerous* The 
Library of Congress* Harvard College Library* Boston Public 
Library* and th© library of the University of Chicago all 
contain valuable materials for such a study* For the laws 
and decrees of Peru, Bolivia* and Chile that pertain to th© 
nitrate industry the best sources are the two compilations 
edited by Carlos E# Xbahes and Carlos Aidunate Solar re­
spectively# Compilations of statistics are found in th© 
reports of the Pele&ado de Salitreras# in th© appendices of 
various books such as those written by Br* Erwin Seî per and
vll
Dr* Michels and by Francisco Valdes Vergara* and in other 
statistical reports Issued by the Chilean government* Con­
temporary accounts of the nitrate industry are helpful but 
incomplete in their treatment • Of those available for use 
no better example could be cited than the studios published 
by Guillermo E* Blllinghurst, one-time consul in Jqulque and 
later president of the Republic of Peru*
fh© best English s o m e  for a history of the nitrate 
industry is th© South American Journal* but helpful too are 
the many financial journals published in England* A number 
of Englishmen who travelled or lived for a time in Chile have 
written accounts that include information concerning the 
nitrate industry* She two most worthy of not© were written 
by journalists, William Russell and Maurice Kervey* Publi­
cations relating to British financial activities* ©specially 
the Stock-Exchange Year-Book* possess considerable information 
about English nitrate companies* Some information is con­
tained in th© published reports of British and United States 
consular agents in Chile* Information obtained from the 
British consular records on deposit in th© Public Record 
Office in London indicates that they contain a wealth of 
material on the nitrate industry* Limited use of these re­
cords was made possible by employing a professional research 
assistant*
The writer wishes to express his appreciation to Dr*
J* Preston Moor© and Dr# Jan© D© Drummond for their invaluable
viil
suggestions and considerate counsel during the preparation of 
this study# Acknowledgement Is also due to Mrs* Mary B* 
Hartssog and to Miss Yvonne Toups* both of whom graciously 
performed indispensible services* and to my wife* Elizabeth 
Bogers Brown* for her constant encouragement •
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ABSTRACT
Although before 18?9 no *a&Jor deposits of nitrate 
were located in Chilean territory# Chilean Industrialists 
owned valuable nitrate properties# Their holdings were lo­
cated in the Peruvian province of Tarapacef, where the most 
Important deposits of nitrate lay* and near Antofagasta in 
Bolivia# In the decade of the 1870*©, however, Peru 
nationalised the nitrate industry In Tarap&ca and tried to 
gain control over the deposits in Bolivian territory# At 
the same time, Bolivia attempted to curtail the privileges 
she had previously granted Chilean nitrate interests# Be- 
cause of these actions Chilean nitrate interests suffered*
The government of Chile supported the interests of 
her industrialists by diplomatic action* A bitter contro­
versy between Chile and Bolivia ensued# The climax of this 
diplomatic struggle occurred in 1879 when Bolivia violated 
an agreement not to tax Chilean nitrate Interests# This 
action led to the War of the Pacific (1879~1®®3) I** which 
Chile fought Bolivia and Peru# Th© treaties that ended this 
war left Chile in possession of the entire nitrate region#
In 1880, Chile imposed a high tax on nitrate exports# 
This tax quickly became th© major source of revenue for the 
government* Other aspects of the nitrate policy of Chile, 
and especially th© policy of selling state-owned nitrate
x
lands, were designed to protect and Increase the revenues 
obtained from the nitrate export tax*
In returning the nitrate industry of Tarapaca to a 
system of private enterprise^ the government of Chile made 
possible significant investments by English capitalists In 
the industry* Actually, English capitalists dominated 
nitrates until the twentieth century* Of the English cap!** 
talists John Thomas North, nThm Nitrate King, 19 was the most 
prominent* He not only was responsible for the large-scale 
introduction of English capital into the industry during the 
1880 *s; but in addition, he almost achieved success in his 
effort to monopolise the nitrate Industry* North controlled 
the profitable Nitrate Hallways Company, which operated in 
Tarapaca, as well as many producing companies and other 
enterprises in the nitrate region* Much of th© credit for 
frustrating North1® nitrate monopoly plan can be given to 
President Balm&eeda (1886-189!)* Balmaceda also opposed 
British domination of th© nitrate industry#
Even though British nitrate capitalists supported the 
Congressionallstas who overthrew Balmaceda in the Revolution 
of I89I# the Chilean government continued to pursue an anti- 
British policy* Major aspects of this policy Included op­
posing production limitation schemes proposed by British 
producers, permitting the construction of competing railroads 
In Tarapaca, and encouraging Chileans to purchase state- 
owned nitrate lands*
3$1
Pop Chile the economic significance of nitrate &e~ 
velopments m s  quite great# Nitrate exports eventually 
comprised three-fourths of the exports of Chile and made 
possible a favorable balance of trade# Th© industry provided 
markets for Chilean agricultural products and jobs for 
Chilean workers# Above all* revenues derived from th© tax on 
nitrate exports provided the government with a large income#
xii
CHAPTER I
THE HISTORY 0F THE NITRATE INDUSTRY THROUGH THE
WAR OF THE PACIFIC
Nitrate has been discovered In only one area of the 
world in quantities extensive enough to allow large-scale 
commercial exploitation* This area, located In South America, 
lies between the Andes Mountains In the east and the coast 
range on the west, and extends from the eighteenth to the 
twenty-fifth parallel, south latitude# During the nineteenth 
century the more important deposits were located in the 
Tamarugal Pampa which encompasses the northern hall of th© 
nitrate region# The nitrate beds lie in the western portion 
of the Pampa where the terrain rises from the Pampa to meet 
the coast range# These beds are not continuous, however, 
since lateral mountain ranges cut the western section of the 
Pampa into many parts, each varying in elevation from twenty- 
five hundred to five thousand feet# Th© distance between 
the nitrate beds and th© sea varies from twenty to fifty 
miles# The coast range which lies between the deposits and 
the sea drops abruptly from heights of fifteen hundred feet 
and in some cases six thousand feet to the Pacific Ocean 
without leaving a coastal plain# Along the coast of this
1
2
r e g ion— *frequen tly called the Atacama Desert— -there are no 
good harbors#***
The nitrate beds have been the subject of numerous 
geological investigations% however* their origin has yet to 
be conclusively determined# The nitrate is found in an 
impure state in a substance called caliche# The beds of 
caliche vary in thickness from eleven inches to fourteen feet 
and may be found as far as thirty feet below the surface of 
the soil# The quantity of nitrate in the caliche ranges from
pten to seventy per cent#
Before the Spanish conquests in the Hew World*
Indians living In areas adjacent to nitrate fields utilized 
small quantities of caliche as fertiliser* but their method 
of refining* if one did exist* was too primitive to allow 
extensive exploitation# The extension of Spanish control 
over this region by the middle of the sixteenth century had 
little effect on the use made of these deposits* since the 
conquistadores failed to realize that wealth could be obtained 
by extracting substances other than precious metals and
•*-The best description of this region Is to be found in Isaish Bowman* Desert Trails of Atacama (Hew York:American G-eographicai Society*' #
survey of the various theories on the origin of nitrate deposits is made by William Koss* tfThe Origins of Hitrate Deposits*" Popular Science Monthly# LXXXV (Oct**I9II4.)* 134—lij-i? * and by W# 8# Tower* 1fTiie nitrate Fields of Chile*" Popular Science Monthly# LXXXIII (Se£fe*, 1913)* 209-230* For a diet ailed analy s Is of the deposits see Dr#Erwin Semper and Dr# Michels* La Industrie del Salitre en Chile* Trans• and Ed# by Javier GanSarlTIas and“ rlando GhigXiotto Salas (Santiagos Barcelona* 1 9 0 8)# pp* 6**30#
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valuable stones# Th© Spaniards did us© sons© caliche In th© 
manufacture of gunpowder, although this was discouraged by 
th© Spanish monarch® who reared that any development or this 
industry would reduce th© profits obtained from the royal 
monopoly on th© sale of gunpowder* At times* colonial offi­
cials permitted clandestine operations in the nitrate fields, 
yet th© lack of official sanction was a factor in retarding 
th© development of th© industry* Th© colonial period was
hnearing its end before permission to produce was granted*
Even if encouragement had been given, th© development 
of the nitrate fields would hav© remained meager because 
there was no adequate method of elaboration* Not until early 
in the nineteenth century was the technique of nitrate pro­
duction improved to the point where caliche could be trans­
formed in large quantities into a usable product# By 1810, 
this process had been adopted by the ten nitrate producing 
establishments--oficinas^--in the Peruvian province of 
Tarapaca7*̂
^Hoberto Cornejo, El Salltre (Valparaiso: Fisher
Brothers, 1930)# PP« 3-9*
^The word oficina literally means workshop or plant* However, when used in connection with the nitrate industry it refers to any bed of nitrate deposits on which there is machinery to transform caliche into a finished product*Oficlnas vary widely bothin plant capacity and in extent of deposits* They are given names sxach as Primitlva, Rosario, and Agua Santa*
^Gufllermo E* Bllllnglmrst, Los capitales salitreros de Tarapaca (Santiago; I6 8 9), pp* 1 0 ^ X 2 # -------- -- ---
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The wars Tor independence stimulated work in th© 
nitrate fields* and operations were considered essential by 
the revolutionists who controlled the area after the Spaniards 
were driven out of Chile# ̂ Independence did not bring about 
any marked changes in the industry since local consumption of 
nitrate as a fertilizer did not provide an adequate market 
and its use in the manufacture of gunpowder did not require 
expansion of productive facilities# Ultimately, the farms of 
Europe and th© United States came to be the chief consumers 
of nitrate; and while these markets were opened during the 
decade of the l8 3 0|s# the attempt to enlarge them did not 
gain great headway for at least half a century# Th© first 
successful shipment of nitrate v/as made in 1831 when a cargo 
shipped to Prance was sold# In the following year regular 
shipments to England begun*^
The gradual expansion of markets, chiefly in Europe 
but to some extent in the United States too, resulted in th© 
development of the nitrate properties In Tarapaca^ from which 
the entire supply of nitrate cam© -until 18?G# After 1850, 
Chilean and British entrepreneurs became active as producers 
along with the Peruvians, but the latter still constituted
othe largest group#0 The commerce connected with the nitrate
6Carlos £* Ibanez, Minas i Salitreras, Contiene las leyes, decretos supremos dl c ^ a & o TnrispmclencTa~ vi.lente sobre estas materials" (Santiago: La Lira, I90O ) , 1 ppVlTIpT*
^Cornejo, El Salitre, pp# 10, 25, 301#
8Ibid., p* [j_3; Billinghurst, Los capitales salitreros.PP* 13, 3T^3I# *--- -----
trad© , however, was largely controlled by Chileans whose 
activities centered in their port city of Valparaiso#
Because of this a steady increase in th© strength of Chilean 
nitrate interests, who were frequently associated with 
Englishmen, was not unnatural#*? in large part the desire of 
Chile to extend her boundaries northward grew out of this 
economic expansion as represented by the constant augmenting 
of Chilean economic interests in th© Peruvian and later in 
the Bolivian territories that stretched along th© Pacific 
coast# Not only Chilean entrepreneurs but Chilean workmen 
migrated to the region in significant numbers# The latter 
became an important segment of the population in Tarapaca and 
comprised the majority in the Bolivian littoral#*^
To retain the proper perspective concerning the eco­
nomic activities in th© nitrate region,it must be emphasized 
that the guano industry was the most important economic 
enterprise in Peru until 1872# The chief sources of the 
deposits were located on rocky islands off the Peruvian coast, 
principally on the Chincha Islands several hundred miles south 
of Callao# The iramense quantities of guano found there were 
frequently sixty to one hundred feet in depth? in addition, 
deposits of lesser importance were located along the coast of 
th© mainland# At no time before the decade of the l86o*s did
9Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile and Peru (Santiago: Universitaria. 1920), pp. 36ff.   *
1Qrbid.. p. i0 .
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th© nitrate industry ©merge from th© dominating shadow of th© 
guano enterprises that provided the main source of fertiliser 
for Europe, the largest profits for th© Peruvian government, 
and the chief incentive for th© Chilean policy of expansion 
northward#
Guano was known to and utilised by th© Inc a Indians 
and by their successors, th© Spaniards* Beginning in l81j.O It 
was Introduced into Europe where it quickly acquired a large 
market* So lucrative did Peru’s guano trad© beeora© that the 
government nationalised the industry; and from 1853 through 
1872 at least eight million tons of this highly valued fei>ti~ 
liser were shipped from the Chine ha Islands# Th© revenues 
from these cargoes enriched th© Peruvian treasury, gave that 
country excellent credit abroad, and encouraged the initi­
ation of a gigantic public works program# To finance this 
program, which was poorly planned and exceedingly costly, 
huge loans were contracted in Europe* As long as th© guano 
deposits remained plentiful, Peru’s revenues were equal to 
the burden imposed by this debt and signs of prosperity per­
vaded the land#1*’
Although th© nitrate Industry received little offi­
cial attention during Peru’s "Guano Age," the government 
followed a liberal policy in the disposition of nitrate 
deposits which permitted a steady expansion# Until late in
^Clements H* Markham, A History of Peru (Chlcar-o: Charles PI* Sergei and Co^, 18927,"' pp* 3 5 3, 1$GF#' Carlos Wiesse, Hiatoria del Peru (Lima: Francos© Cientifica, I939), pp* 55, 70.
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th© decade of th© i860*®* nitrate lands in Tarapaca war© open 
to free exploitation on th© basis of grants obtainable from 
the Peruvian government to individuals who discovered nitrate 
deposits. Each applicant received two ostacas of land or 
approximately twenty-four acres* Therefore* in order to 
obtain a large tract of deposits co-operation between Indi­
viduals* frequently within a family, was necessary* Under 
this policy a considerable quantity of nitrate deposits were 
acquired* but not all were brought into production immediately# 
However* in 1868 the making of grants was suspended by a 
decree dated November 30**^
The later imposition of a state isonopoly on nitrate 
sales and the subsequent expropriation procedures were 
measures that grew out of th© financial necessities of the 
Peruvian government and its plan to obtain added revenues 
through government control of the industry* Th© large reve­
nues Peru previously obtained by her control of th© expor­
tation of guano were no longer adequate to meet th© expenses 
of government* It proved to be impossible to revive th© 
industry because of approaching exhaustion of th© guano 
deposits and the increasing competition that fertilizer was 
encountering in world markets from the expanding nitrate
-^Gustavo Julian* wMemoria sobre la Esplotacion i Beneficio del Salitre i Yodo*w glaboraclon decalitre i yodo (Santiagot Nacional* I889)* pp*7I?| Julio miaBourgeois^—
1M t l M l m w i  d© Dereoho Miner© ghlleno (Santiago* JuridicaII, 320; Enrique Cuevas, fEeTltrate Industry (Hew Yorkt Wtai. S. Meyers, 1916), p. U T
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industry*3-3 A diligent search for new sources of revenue be­
came imperative* It was only natural that President Manuel 
Pardo (1872-1876) should turn to the nitrate industry.1^
Hot only was the use or the two products similar; but the 
supply of nitrate , like the guano deposits, was preponder­
antly under the control of Peru*
Initially the Peruvian government levied an export 
tax on nitrate in an attempt to augment its revenues; but the 
continued competition, th© persistence of the government * s 
financial difficulties, and th© desire of Peruvians to monop­
olise the revenues of th© industry âhlch were in part being 
siphoned off by Chileans, resulted In measures being adopted 
by Peru that culminated in nationalization* Thus, the 
Peruvian Law of January 18, 1873*established the policy of 
nationalizing the sale of nitrate* This action was th© first 
major stop In the process whereby ownership and control of 
the entire industry was transferred from private interests to 
the government*^
^Bulnes, Chile and Peru, pp* 0Off; Thomas J* Hutchinson, Two Years in Peru(London: Sampson* Low* Marston* Low and SearTST TZTTT,~H,~T7Z . » » »
l̂ -Pardo Is noted as the first civilian to become chief executive of Peru* Pardo promoted educational development, attempted to re-organize the governments finances on a more economical basis, and nationalized the nitrate industry* The Secret Alliance of 1873 with Bolivia was also signed during his presidency* On the whole, he strove to establish law and order and to steer a middle course between the extreme con­servatives and extreme liberals* See Wiesse, Peru, pp* 92ff*
3*5 Ibanez, Minas î Salitreras» pp* 282f •
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Uhder til© law state monopolisation or sales would ox*
tend for a period or two years with the legislature having an
opportunity at that time to review the policy in full* By
decree the initiation or the experiment was set for September*
1873* ^he government was to accept annually a quantity of
nitrate equal to that exported in the previous year--lour
and one-half million Spanish quintals— from private producers
each of whom was to be given a quota fixed by a commission
*f Aespecially appointed for that purpose# Producers were to 
be paid 2*14-0 soles per quintal and the selling price was to 
be established in order to assure the government a profit of 
twenty-five soles on each quintal marketed* But not all 
sales of nitrate came under government control as would 
appear from the law* Private export of nitrate was permitted 
to continue on payment of an export duty, and nitrate sold 
in this manner was derived mainly from oflcinas that did not 
have contracts to produce for the government*
Because the profits received by Peru did not reach 
the level anticipated, her financial problems remained
i AA Spanish quintal is equivalent to forty-six kilo­grams and equals approximately one hundred and one English pounds*
sol® is the Peruvian monetary unit that during this period was valued at forty-four pennies in sterling currency* In the Monopolization of Sales Law provision was made for lowering or raising the price paid producers to compensate for differences in tb© quality of nitrate sold to the state*
18Ibanez, Minas 1 Salitreraa, m>« 28"?-286: ftievnn.The Nitrate Industry, p. lTI
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unsolved# Peruvian leaders thought that the fallure of the
experiment was caused by inadequate government control over
production*Thus* toward the end o£ the expiration or the
Monopolisation of Nitrate Sales Law* Peru determined to
assume complete charge or the nitrate industry* The Law o£
Expropriation was enacted on May 28* 18?5# It authorised
compensation for the expropriated property up to the amount
of seven million pounds* with approximately four million
pounds of this sum to be expended to buy nitrate properties
and the remainder to be dedicated to purchasing the railways
20serving the industry*
The decree issued by President Pardo putting the lav/ 
into effect established the following conditions: those who
agreed to sell their nitrate properties would receive In 
return certificates redeemable in two years with an interest 
of eight per cent; if the seller desired* the certificates 
would stipulate the oficlna represented by the securities; 
or if no desire for the inclusion of this privilege was ex­
pressed, certificates issued would not represent any specific 
property# Should an owner wish to do so th© law permitted 
him to retain operating control of th© of iclna until full 
payment was mad© but certificates issued in such cases would
-^However, if the export statistics are correct* the sales made by the government accounted for eighty per cent of exports In 18?1|., the first full year of the law*a operation*
20Ibanez, Minas Salitreraa * pp# 2u6f #
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not b© t ransf ©rable* Those operators desiring to sell lor 
cash would consumwfcte with the government a promise-of-sale 
agreement« They would be allowed to continue producing and 
exporting without restriction but would be required to pay 
an export duty which Initially was £ if toon soles per quintal 
but was later raised considerably* The increase was intended 
to make private exportation unprofitable and hence to pro­
mote the rapid completion of the monopoly* However, the 
final sale price received by those who chose this alternative 
plan was to be reduced one-half of one por cent per month*
The reduction was justified on th© grounds that exploitation 
of the deposits diminished the property’s value and that 
permission to sell privately might constitute an advantage*^
The decree also contained provisions concerning the 
financial transactions involved in the expropriation process* 
An association of Peruvian banks was empowered to handle 
nitrate sales for the government and to pay interest to cer­
tificate holders* By virtue of modifications made in a later 
decree, the net profits accruing from nitrate sales on the 
government’s account were to be used by the banks to pay 
interest installments, and if such funds proved inadequate 
to meet these obligations, part of tho export duties would be 
available to meet tho deficit*^
21Ibid., pp. 287f£.
22Guillermo E* Billlnghurst, Legislacion sobre salitre y bdrax en farapaca (Santiago: C e r v a n t e s , pp* klijf •
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The commission appointed to determine the value of 
the nitrate lands began its work in 1876* Apparently the 
valuations they mad© were based almost entirely upon des­
criptions of the properties submitted by the owners who fr©** 
quently exaggerated their value or made Inaccurate reports 
in other ways* For Instance, the method of delineating 
boundaries was extremely rudimentary and unsatisfactory# 
Boundaries were marked off by digging a furrow around the 
property; the furrow could easily be and often was changed 
to the disadvantage of the state#^3
Based upon the commission* s reports , Peru had by the 
start of the War of the Pacific In 1879 issued certificates 
to the amount of 1 9*2 0 5 ,2 5 2 soles* including 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 soles 
in certificates for the Patillos railroad still under con­
struction# At the rate of exchange then prevailing the 
value of these certificates expressed in pounds sterling was 
3,520,962# More than one hundred and twenty major properties 
and a large quantity of lesser lands were acquired by the 
issuance of these certificates#^*
23cuevas, The Nitrate Industry# p# 12; Julian* "La Esplotacion del SaTItr^‘rr’'
^Francisco Valdes Vergara, Memoria sobre la Adrainlstracion de Tarapaca^ (Sant iago s Republic a, XTJcTL̂) , Appendix No# 1, pp * XSo-l^♦ In no two sources does the list of properties for which certificates were issued agree in detail* Billinghurst, Los capitales salitreros, p# 3 9  states that the amount emit eel equalled S 20,339, 20'3# ’A later esti­mate by an English source placed the valuation at fe 3,622,000 Jg-^nal of Finance (London), Ed* by 3* F# Van Oss, II (lo97), 1̂ -5 •
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However, the process of buying nitrate lands had not 
been completed* At least twenty ofIclnas and probably more 
remained unsold, and these were ovaued chiefly by Europeans 
and Chileans* Negotiations for nineteen properties valued 
at 1 ,6 1 7 ,6 0 0 soles, or h 3 0 5,3o0 , had been mad© but final 
approval by the government was pending* This sum, when added 
to the value of certificates issued, brings the valuation 
of the nitrate works in Tarapaca in 1679 to h 3 ,6 2 6,32 2* ^
The security for the nitrate certificates included 
not only those properties represented by issued certificates 
but also all unexploited lands, abandoned lands, and other 
properties under the jurisdiction of th© state fiscal agent 
in Iquique*^
Under the original plan the railway that served the 
nitrate region was to be expropriated also, but nothing had 
been done to accomplish this by the outbreak of the war* In 
proceeding with the entire operation the government of Peru 
faced many difficulties* The chief obstacle lay in th© ina­
bility of Peru to obtain a foreign loan# Th© plan had been 
to retire the certificates within two years# To accomplish 
this the original expropriation law had authorised the
25Valdes Vergara, Admlnistraeion tie Tarapaca*Appendix Ho# 1, pp* Semper and Michels, Industriadel salitre, p# 263 lists twenty-nine such properties*Twonty-two, for which X'iguros were given, had a combined value of S 1,538,000#
2^BillInghurst, Legislacion sobre sal lira, p* l{lj)j«
Ilf
president to contract a loan In Kurop© Tor seven million 
pounds* but European financiers would not co-operate*
Although th© nitrate properties did constitute sufficient
collateral* Perufs large outstanding foreign debt contracted
P7in previous years had dried up th© market Tor her bonds* *
/The status of nitrate property in Tarapaca in 1879 
can be represented by th© following categories s lands the 
state held title to and represented by certificates; lands 
in the promise-of~sale group; unclaimed and unexploited 
state properties; lands that reverted to th© state because 
they had not been under production for eight months; and
p/3lands remaining in private possession*^ Nitrate lands could 
also be classified according to whether their production was 
sold under contract to Peru or whether it was sold privately* 
3y 1879* there were at least twenty-six nitrate establish** 
ments producing under contract to Peru* Most of the others 
were shut down*^9
The nationalisation of nitrate lands in Tarapaca 
gave Peru a virtual monopoly over the industry, but not a 
completely secure one* Th© action quickened th© rate at
2?V7iesse, Peru, pp* lOOf*
pP /^uBillinghurst, Legislation sobre salitro* pp* 26lf , if!2f* Reversion of unop o rat © d 1 and s to the s t; at'e resulted from a decree issued in 1876* Involved were some sixty properties, a list of which can be found In Semper and Michels, Industria del salitre, Appendix No* 10, pp* 281jf*
29vaid/a Vergara, Admlnistraeion d© Tarapaca* pp*17 of *
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which nitrate lands in non-Peruvian territory to the south 
were being developed since Chilean producers who sold out to 
Peru shifted their activities to the fields of Aguas Blancas 
and Taltal in Chile and to th© deposits that lay near 
Antofagasta and Tocopilla in the Bolivian province of Atacama* 
The economic development of the Bolivian littoral— which was 
geographically closer to Chile than to Bolivia— was dominated 
by Chilean capitalists* Thus , while most of the deposits 
were located in Bolivian territory, th© initiative in devel­
oping non-Peruvian nitrate deposits cam© chiefly from Chile*
In addition, most of the labor was Chilean* These factors, 
of course, strengthened the growing sentiment in Chile for 
annexation of th© Bolivian littoral*
Peru became apprehensive about th© growing competi­
tion in nitrates and the threat of Chilean control* Her 
leaders sought to devise ways to overcome these problems*
Their concern was solely with the Bolivian bods since de­
posits In Chile were considered inconsequential at that time* 
Yet Peruvian attempts to curtail If not control nitrate pro­
duction In Bolivia were in effect as antagonistic to the 
interests of Chile as the nationalization laws in Peru had 
been. Moreover, the process by which Peru hoped to minimize 
future competition with her monopoly of nitrate is intimately 
connected with the political and economic relations existing 
between Chile and Bolivia* Their relations were marked by 
sharp differences that converged In a boundary dispvito, which 
grew in seriousness from Its Inception in 18I|̂ *
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Th© lack of a clearly defined boundary between Chile 
and Bolivia provided the occasion for the controversy between 
these two countries concerning the limits of their respective 
jurisdictions. Their dispute, however, was not an unusual 
one. The republics of South America wore plagued by boundary 
problems, most of which wore caused by the failure of Spain 
during the colonial period to define her political juris-* 
dictions# These colonial territorial divisions were accepted 
informally by the newly independent Spanish-American re- 
publics as the basis for their boundaries# Yet in many 
instances regions situated on the outer edges of Spanish po­
litical divisions were thinly settled if at all# Since these 
regions were unimportant at the time, there was little oc­
casion for the exercise of authority in them and no need of 
delimiting political jurisdictions precisely# The disputed 
area falls in this category#
The boundary controversy provoked by Chile in iGijft 
constituted an attempt to extend her political limits beyond 
the line commonly assumed to be her northern boundary and 
into an area where Bolivian authority had been exercised# 
According to an official map of the colonial boundary be-
ftween the province of Potosi (Bolivia) and the Presldencia 
of Chile, the territory of the latter extended only as far 
as the Salado Hiver, approximately th© twenty-sixth parallelj
^william j# Dennis, Documentary History of the Tacna- Arica Dispute (Iowa City: PubiTshod by' the UniversTty, 1^2777 University of Iowa Studios in the Social Sciences. VIII.N o . 3 , p . 3^7------------ - ------------- ---- - --
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and official and unofficial reports from American and British 
representatives confirm that Chilean authority extended no 
farther north than th© port of Paposo, on the twenty ••fifth 
parallel#31 Because they are so indefinite regaining bounda­
ries, th© constitutions of both Chile and Bolivia fail to 
provide a basis for judgement of the boundary line*32
Thus, when in 181*2 President Manuel Bulnes (with the 
support of Congress) claimed th© twenty-third parallel as 
the northern boundary of Chile, th© northward expansion of 
that country had taken an important first step* This claim 
was made with the expectation that guano would be discovered 
in the region and with the hop© of sharing in th© wealth and 
revenues such deposits would produc©*33 j3Ut no such develop­
ment occurred for many years and then only on a small scale.
The Bolivian government consistently rejected Chilean 
claims, and no actual extension of Chilean authority oc­
curred until 1857* At that time the landing of Chilean 
forces at Mejillones, just south of the twenty-third parallel,
33-ibld*, pp. 30, 32-31*., 38-1*0.
32xbid», pp* 36-3 8*
33Bulnes, Chile and Peru, pp* 2-7% The claim was mad© shortly after large guano™™d!eposTts wore discovered In Peru­vian territory* The text of th© presidential message in which the claim was mad© can be found in Dennis, Tacna-Arica Documents, pp* 1*1 * In this same work, pp* 30-l|3, the ref©-"" vant documents pertaining to the boundary disput© are tran­scribed* They clearly show that the Chilean claim did not rest upon historical precedents*
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brought the boundary question to a critical stag©# War 
seemed Imminent until th© crisis with Spain developed# That 
crisis, during which both Chile and Bolivia co-operated with 
Peru against the mother country, drew th© two together suf­
ficiently to make possible a partial settlement of the 
boundary d i s p u t e # ^ *  Negotiated as the Treaty of 1 6 6 6 ,  th© 
agreement established a provisional boundary at th© twenty- 
fourth parallel, provided for the sharing of export duties on 
guano and minerals in the disputed area, allowed citizens of 
both countries equal rights to work in the area, and required 
mutual agreement on the export duties to be levied# In 
addition, the treaty provided for the establishment of a 
customs house at Mejillones, north of Antofagasta, to be the 
only one authorized to receive these duties, and permitted 
the Chilean officials to oversee the operation of the customs 
house*^
It soon became apparent that the treaty did not lessen 
the difficulties# Disagreement arose over the Interpretation 
of the treaty and dissatisfaction with the treaty was wide­
spread In both countries# The occasion for th© controversies 
lay in discoveries of nitrate deposits in the disputed region* 
The most important discoveries were made north of the pro­
visional boundary in the area around Antofagasta# South of
3^*Bulnes, Chile and Peru, pp# 6-10#
^Dennis, Tacna-Arica Documents# pp# ij.9f for the text of the Treaty of Xooo#
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the boundary nitrate deposits were round in the areas of 
Tait&l and Aguas Blancas, but these were of lesser desira­
bility because of their low-qu&lity caliche and the dlffi- 
culties encountered in transporting the product to the 
coast#36
Bolivia regretted the concessions previously granted 
to Chile and sought to regain complete freedom of action at 
least in th© territory north of the provisional boundary*
In order to win independence of action in matters affecting 
the exploitation of nitrate deposits, Bolivia asserted that 
nitrate did not come under the provisions of th© Treaty of 
1866 sine© it was not classifiable as guano, mineral, or 
m e t a l # T h e s e  three words wore the only ones used to desig­
nate the resources coming under treaty regulations^ therefore, 
from a strictly technical point of view the claim was justi­
fiable# However, lack of precision in the use of terms in 
the treaty permitted Chile to contest the Bolivian interpre­
tation* It was argued that since the words "minerals" and 
"metals" were used interchangsbly, it was unreasonable to 
exclude nitrate deposits from coming under the stipulations#
A second major controversial question involved the 
article of the treaty that required the establishment of a 
Bolivian customs-house at Mejillones and restricted exports 
to that institution# This limitation would not have
^Bulnes, Chile and Peru, p# 13# 
37Ibid# m pp# llff#
21
adversely affected the guana trade Tor which, it was designed 
because no important deposits or guano were discovered in 
Bolivian territory outside that region# But it did seriously 
imped© the exploitation of nitrate since th© natural port 
for that trad© was Antofagasta# Bolivian refusal to es­
tablish facilities for collecting customs duties at that port 
rested upon th© strict language of th© treaty# yet it natu­
rally appeared to Chile as an unfair and toe strict reliance 
upon treaty terms#
tension between th© two countries over this situ­
ation reached alarming heights from 1872 to l87if* What 
appeared to Chile to be Bolivian violation of the letter and 
spirit of the treaty was viewed by Bolivians as Chilean ex­
pansionism and a threat to continued Bolivian rule in her 
increasingly valuable coastal region* Th© interests of Peru# 
too# were intimately involved in the boLindary controversy 
which occurred at a propitious time for that country* It 
was to her interests to prevent Chilean expansion northward 
and to forestall the development of competition with the 
Peruvian nitrate monopoly* Since Peru and Bolivia both 
vigorously opposed Chilean expansion# there existed a basis 
for co-operation between the two#
At the height of th© crisis in 1873# Peru and Bolivia 
signed a secret mutual defense treaty that stiffened Bolivia’s 
attitude and prevented her ratification of an agreement 
signed with Chile in 1872 designed to resolve the controversy
22
over the Treaty of 1866 *3 6 basic aim of Peru was to aid
in maintaining the claims of Bolivia and in return for such 
support to obtain Bolivian co-operation in preserving her 
own nitrate monopoly# Had the position of Bolivia been suc­
cessfully maintained, later events indicate that Peru would 
have received th© co-operation she needed# However, th© 
Bolivian determination to oppose Chilean demands quickly
weakened# Political instability and the inauguration of a
/new president, Tomas Frias, who desired a pacific solution 
to the controversy, were factors that promoted the change in 
policy#39 But the adamant stand of Chile, reinforced by the 
arrival of new naval vessels,may well have led Peru and 
Bolivia to a more careful consideration of the implications 
of their policy# -̂0
Within a few months after the signing of the secret 
treaty a settlement was reached between Bolivia and Chile# 
Known as the Treaty of l8?î , it was ratified by the Bolivian 
legislature only after heated debate revealed strong oppo­
sition to it* Chilean capital and enterprise in th© now
•i p description of this controversy may be found in Ibid*, pp# 18-20; Dennis, Tacna—Arica Documents, p# 57;For th© text of the Tro aty~oF‘T87Tge e "Ibid# , pp # 57-59#
39^0mas Frias became president of Bolivia in 18?̂ . and served until 1876 when he was overthrown by his Minister of War, Hilariop Daza# Both before lie became president and afterwards, Frias served M s  country as a diplomat#
^Dennis, Tacna-Arlca Documents* p* 6l#
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fully recognized Bolivian area north of the twenty-fourth 
parallel was to be protected from the imposition of addition** 
al taxes for a period of twenty-five years# For her part, 
Chile renounced any claim to share in the custom-house reve­
nues which were made payable at Antofagasta as well as at 
Mejlllones#^- This treaty gave full satisfaction to Chilean 
demands#
The strong position maintained by th© Chilean govern­
ment in her controversy with Bolivia was based in large part 
upon the desire to protect the interest of Chilean nitrate 
producers in the disputed area# The development had been a 
rapid one beginning in 1866 with the discovery of nitrate 
deposits by th© Chileans Francisco Puelma and Jose* Santos 
Ossa#^ In th© same year the discoverers obtained from 
Bolivia a concession to work their find, th© Saiar del Carmen, 
nine square leagues In extent, in return for building a mole 
at Antofagasta#43
Based upon their concession, Puelma and Ossa formed
fthe Companla Bxplotadora del Desierto do Atacama which In
h^-For text of Treaty of 187^ see Ibid#, pp# 62f; See also Bulnes, Chile and Peru, PP* 30-36#
^Jose Santos Ossa played a loading role in th© early economic development of northern Chile and the Bolivian littoral# See Samuel Ossa Borne, "Don,Joss' Santos Ossa," Bevista Chilena de Historia y Geo&rafia* LXIX, I86-21I4. and UCXII,178—228#
^Bulnes, Chile and Peru, pp. 36f; Chile, Minisfcerio de Hacienda, La Industrie del salitrora de Chile (Sairbiar-o;La Kacion, 1935)7T T ^ I -----------------------
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negotiations with Bolivia in 1868 obtained additional con­
cessions* By virtue of this agreement of 1868 the company 
received the exclusive privilege of working nitrate deposits 
in Atacama, exemption from taxation tor fifteen years, and 
grants ot approximately fifty additional square leagues of 
land* Their sole obligation was to build a railroad between 
their lands and Antofagasta some twenty-two leagues away—
which by necessity the company would have built anyway*
/Shortly afterward, the Compania Bxplotadora was reorganized 
with the aid of the great Chilean financial house, B1 Banco 
Edwards, and a wealthy English guano and nitrate investment 
firm, Anthony Gibbs and Company, into Melbourne Clark 
Ciia.̂ 4 Realizing the extent of their concession, th© new 
company strove to preserve its privileges in the face of de­
mands by discoverers of new deposits and adverse public o- 
p ini on in Bolivia* Heavy investments were mad© by this 
company yet indefiniteness regarding its privileges mounted*
Political instability in Bolivia x>rolonge& 'uncer­
tainty of the company as to th© permanence of its privileges* 
Revolution overthrow th© government of the notorious dictator
^Ibld* % Bulnes, Chile and Peru, pp* 37f 3 Melbourne Clark was one of the few EngXi’sISon lio’' work in the nitrate fields of Peru prior to 186£># Anthony Gibbs and Company of London established commercial houses in Peru and Chile in 1826* This company was until I86i|. the exclusive agent for Peru in marketing guano* Beginning in 186£, the firm became important as investors and merchants in the nitrate industry*
Melgarejo who had originally granted the concessions.^ 
Several years later in 1 8 7 2* a new government restricted th© 
company * s grants by reducing to fifteen square leagues its 
territory and by annulling its exclusive privilege# But this 
action was short lived, for in the following year compen­
sation for rescinded concessions was made by granting th© 
company an additional fifty estacas in th© nearby Salinas 
region and by affirming th© fifteen years exemption from 
taxation* The agreement of 1873 also laid down rules for th© 
operation of th© company railroad, for tax exemption on im­
ported railroad equipment, and for th© appointment by the 
company of an agent to reside in Antofagasta* In return the 
company agreed to pay to Bolivia 2,000 bolivianos annually*
The final status of the company, which had again re-
/organised as the Compania de Sail tree y Ferrooarril de Anto­
fagasta, gave to it th© advantages that its owners felt 
necessary in order for Bolivian nitrate to compete with the
^Mariano Melgarejo who ruled Bolivia from 1861$. to 
1871 was, perhaps, the worst ruler that misruled country ever had* In two boundary treaties (on© each with Brazil and Chile) he alienated lands over which Bolivian claims were strong, and by debasing the coinage and selling Indian communal lands he disrupted Bolivia*s economic life* Vain, bloodthirsty, and debauched in his personal life, he seems to have had no redeeming characteristic#
iu6 '*^RuIz Bourgeois, Per echo Mlne.ro Chlleno* p# 321; Bulnes, Chile and Peru, pp* 39^50;~ Wrl^os^^Aidiinate Solar, Leyos, Decreto1T"f Documontos Helativos a Salltreras (Santiago! iJervahtVs, ItyOY),"Bolivian '3'ection, pp. 23*,£>» 33-41.
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more cheaply produced nitrate or Tar&p&ca*^'^ Although th© 
company eventually fell under "tine control of its British 
investors, many prominent Chi loans held stock in th© enter* 
prise* It has been asserted that these Chileans everted f,an 
undue influence on the government of Chile, * 1 in th© company1 a 
behalf#^
Development of the nitrate deposits In th© Anto­
fagasta area and in the Chilean areas of Taltal and Aguas 
Blancas continued throughout th© decade of th© seventies*^ 
Th© major new addition, however, lay north of Antofagasta in 
the area known as Tocopilla* While Tocopilla was to surpass 
in production the fields of Tarapaca^ a half-century later, 
its development in no way threatened the Peruvian monopoly 
since it came under Peruvian control# That control was &c- 
quired indirectly by an arrangement between Peru and John G, 
Meiggs*^ In 1 6 76, Meiggs leased from Bolivia most of th© 
deposits in Tocopilla, free from taxation, for a monthly 
rental of 10,000 bolivianos# Th© contract expressly per­
mitted Meiggs to engage in arrangements with foreigners
b?ibid# # p* 37*
^Dennis, Tacna-Arica Documents* p# $1*
^Aldunate Solar, Pocuxaentos Relatives a Salitreras, Bolivian Section, p* 2Jj bhows" That"Boll'via "grantedother concessions in the Antofagasta area# See also Bulnes, Chile and Peru* pp* 38, 1|3«
*n
50John (am Meiggs was associated with his more famous brother, Henry, in the letter’s railroad construction pro­jects in Peru* They were citizens of the United States#
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concerning th© us© of His concession# Within © Tow months 
his lease had been transferred to Peru whose policy in r©gard 
to these deposits did not* however, prevent son© exploitation 
since portions of the Tocopilla properties were re-leased by 
that government#^ But the provision for alienation in the 
original contract and th© rapidity with vhich Peru obtained 
control of th© deposits show conclusively that Bolivia was a 
willing partner In Peru*s monopolization schemes#
In spite of Peru’s efforts during these years her 
monopoly of nitrate production had not been fully realized# 
With th© failure of Peru and Bolivia to co-operate closely 
in the period from 1873 to 187^ the expansion by Chilean 
nitrate interests continued In following years# Later in the 
decade when th© Irresponsible Bolivian, Hilarion Baza, ac­
quired dictatorial power, Peru was afforded another oppor­
tunity to gain support from Bolivia#^ Daza’s pronounced 
anti-Chilean attitude, his need for immediate revenues, and 
Chilean involvement In a boundary dispute with Argentina 
were circumstances that augured well for a successful move 
designed to reduce and perhaps eventually eliminate compe­
tition from nitrates produced by Chileans# Thus, with th©
^Aldunate Solar, Documentos Relatives a Salitreras* Bolivian Section, pp# 93f % Suiz bburgooT^V L_Chlleno# p# 323# — ~
^Hilarion Baza stands next to Molgarojo as Bolivia’s worst ruler# Almost as intemperate as his predecessor, his stubborn and blundering diplomacy precipitated the War of th© Pacific# As a result, Bolivia lost not only her portion of th© nitrate region but also her only outlet to the soa#
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assurance that if needed,Peruvian support would be available , 
D&za decreed on February llj., 18?8, the imposition of a tax 
of ten centavos on each quintal of nitrate shipped from 
Bolivian ports#-*3
This was a conscious and premeditated violation of 
th© Treaty of I8?lj. which mainly affected the privileges of 
th© Antofagasta Nitrate and Railway Company* Th© agent of 
this company, Georg© Hicks, protested th© action and refused 
to pay the tax, while th© owners exerted their influence to 
obtain diplomatic support from C h i l e T h a t  government 
willingly and vigorously supported th© position of the com­
pany, but these efforts were to no avail# For almost a year 
th© controversy raged, operations of th© company ceased, and 
the agent fled Antofagasta to avoid arrest# Bolivia declared 
the company *s concessions null and void, confiscated its 
property, and announced an auction of them on th© grounds of 
non-payment of taxes* However, on the day designated for 
the auction naval forces of Chile took possession of Anto- 
fagasta#^ This 3 measure, deemed necessary to protect Chilean
Bourgeois, Derecho Minero Chlleno, p. 322; Aldunato Solar, Document os Re'lativo s a ̂ alitreras, Bolivian Section, p# 1|8# **“
agent, Georg© Hicks, was lator associated with the important English nitrate investor, John Thomas North*See william Ii* Russell, A Visit to Chile and the Nit rat o Fields of Tarapaca {Londons Tf* S* Virixxe ul Co*,
p V  Iff.
^Aldunate Solar, Documentos ftelativos a Salltroras, Bolivian Section, p* I4.8; Bui nos, dxiil~and PeruT pp* lOl̂ -iOo*
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interests, was later regarded by a renowned Chilean historian, 
as warranted sine© Chile1© ^legitimate economic expansion 
was being cheeked in a shameful and humiliating manner#
Actually, the Peruvian government was reluctant to 
participate in hostilities because both its army and navy 
were in a state of unpreparedness* Her efforts to mediate 
the differences between Chile and Bolivia not only proved 
fruitless, but also revealed a hostile attitude in Chile 
toward Peru* Both of these factors along with the war senti­
ment in Peru and the obligations of the secret alliance made 
the early entrance of Peru into the conflict unavoidable.^?
Even though the war lasted for four years, a victory 
for Chile was made certain in half that time* The landing 
of Chilean troops in Antofagasta was followed by the complete 
acquisition of the Bolivian littoral* By the end of the 
year 1879* fck© seas had been swept clear of the Peruvian navy 
and the flag of Chile waved over th© nitrate province of 
Tarapaca! Decisive Chilean victories over th© allied armies 
in i860 and early in 1881 brought to an end active Bolivian 
participation in the war and brought about Chilean control 
of a large part of Peru, including Lima* Even though desul­
tory fighting in Peru continued, the supremacy of Chile on
^Luis Galdames, A History of Chile, Trans* and Sd* by I* J, Cox (Chapel Hill: ~TOF# oFHorfii"'Carolina Press,
19^), p* 32 5*
^Ibid*, p* 326; V/iesse, Peru, pp* 102ff*
30
th© west coast was assured***®
Chilean war aims were not clear-cut at the outset of 
the war5 however# as the dominance of Chilean arms became 
apparent# her terms of peace became more stringent* At first# 
Chile demanded the annexation of th® Bolivian littoral and 
an indemnity from Peru for the restoration of peace*^9 with 
her occupation of the coastal province# Chile sought to 
assure th© defeat of Peru by breaking the alliance of 1873*
To accomplish this design Chile proposed Bolivian acceptance 
of territory from the Peruvian coastal area to compensate 
for her lost littoral if Bolivia would denounce her ally and
/ ajoin with Chile in fighting Peru*
The first indication of this design came in April#
8l1879* and an official proposal followed in May* However# 
it was rejected by th© Bolivian president Hilarion Da&a*
Still# Chilean leaders continued to discuss among themselves 
the advisability of establishing a Bolivian corridor out of 
Peruvian territory north of Tarapaca* Besides providing 
compensation to Bolivia# the security of Chile would be
^Caldames# History of Chile# pp* 327-335*
^9see the 11 Chilean v/ar Circular#" in Dennis, Tacna- Arica Documentsa pp* 83ff # and ?fOpinion of Minister Osborn on Chilean Objectives in the War#" on p* 83*
6oibid.. pp. Girr.
^Xbld. . pp. 102f.
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strengthened by a third power lying between herself and 
Peru*^
Th© attitude of Chile in favoring the acquisition of 
territory north of Tarapaca^ by Bolivia indicates her in­
tention of annexing Tarapaca* The proposal of May* 1879# 
did not specify annexation; however* that was strongly hinted 
at by the inclusion of an article requiring the nitrate works 
as a guarantee for Peruvian indemnity* But it was not long
before Chilean views crystallized on this matter* A letter
/ /*written by Chilean Minister Jose Santa Maria on November 20* 
18?9# when Peruvian forces were being expelled from th© 
nitrate province states: wWe can say that Tarapaca^is ours#"
After discussing the military situation h© more pointedly 
declared* ffWe##*are owners of Tarapaca*"^ By the middle of 
1880* annexation had definitely become one of the major war 
aims of Chile*^* Actually* the failure of the mediation 
efforts of the United States In the fall of i860 can be at­
tributed to Chile1 s determination to retain the nitrate 
province and Perufs refusal to treat on this basis
^Jbid#* pp* 138f*
6 3 i b l c U ,  p #  H 7 f *
^^Herbert Millington* American Diplomacy and the War of the Pacific (How York: Columbia UniV# Pr©VsT XqTlQTT"
p T  7 X 7
6%bid** pp* 71ff* Senate Documents, 14.7th Congress* 1st Session* IV* Doc# No# 79f Pp7 l̂ OB-Î o#' Millington*s account is a thorough study and presents an authoritative account of the role of th© United States in the War of the Pacific#
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Later onf Chilean war aims expanded to include the 
annexation of th© territory beyond the nitrate province known 
as Ariea and Tacna* Not only did Chile want to establish a 
buffer region between herself and Peru but sh© hoped to find 
additional sources of nitrate in this area* This extension 
created a serious diplomatic problem which was to plague th© 
Americas for the next fifty years*
In large measure the fat© of Tarapaca determined th© 
future economic status of both Chile and Peru* Loss of th© 
province by Peru seriously impaired her public finances al­
ready damaged by the decline of the guano industry* Faced 
with an immense foreign debt contracted in the Guano Age* 
Perufs ability to satisfy her obligations rested upon th© 
growth of revenues derived from the developing nitrate 
industry*^
Chile, on the other hand, had experienced a serious 
depression during the decade of the 1870*s* As a result of 
the acquisition of the Tarapaca nitrate fields, these diffi­
culties were overcome*^® In this respect, the significance 
of the bar of the Pacific has been stated as follows;
The victor would gain a source of revenue that Insured a steady income to its government, and thus taxes would be reduced; the loser would
A Au For a summary of the controversy see Dennis, Tacna- Arica Documents* pp* 11-29*
^Millington, American Diplomacy  ̂p* 9*
^Galdames, History of Chile, pp* 319*321*
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b© forced to seek other measures fox* raisingmoney and would remain a poor country#
Not only was th© disposition of Tarapaca of importance 
to the warring states; foreigners also had an interest in th© 
matter# Because the economic interests of North Americans 
in Peru and Chile were slight* the welfare of capitalists of 
the united States was not seriously affected by the war or 
its outcome* European interests* however# had significant 
holdings in these countries* Tliese foreigners wore repre­
sented mainly by Peruvian bondholders; and nitrate certifi­
cate holders, although not nearly so important financially# 
constituted another catagory whose interests were at stake 
in the conflict*^ European interests can be classified in 
the order of their importance as British* French# and German# 
They# along with several groups in the United States# at­
tempted to influence the decision regarding the fat© of 
Tarapaca#
The loss by Peru of the nitrate province would make 
the redemption of Peruvian bonds difficult# if not impossi­
ble, for Europeans# That is, unless Chile accepted responsi­
bility for the bonds along with the province# But Chile 
persistently refused to accept responsibility#*^ Thus, many
^Henry C# Evans* Chile and Its Relations with the United States (Durham: DukeTlJhiv# Pross",_"T9"2!7T$ 'JpV^f7#
?£lbid♦* p# 100; Billington# American. Diplomacy#PP# 33#
7^Sen# Docs.* lj.7th Congress* 1st Session* IV, Doc#No# 79* pp#
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bondholders, particularly th© French, tried to prevent Chilean 
annexation of Tarapaca# They formed an organisation for th© 
specific purpose of forestalling annexation by th© neutrali­
sation of Tarapaca under the protection of th© United States# 
Called the Credit Industriel* th© group devised a plan which 
they claimed would protect the interests of the warring states 
and the creditors of Peru#^ Their scheme involved the cre­
ation of a monopoly for the sale of guano and nitrate which 
it would operate# The profits derived from the monopoly 
would be used to redeem both th© Peruvian bonds and the 
nitrate certificates, and to provide annual payments to Chile 
as well as to Peru# The proponents of this plan reasoned 
that the distribution of nitrate profits in the manner de­
scribed above would satisfy the legitimate demands of all 
interested parties#
The promoters of the Credit Industriel realized that 
Chile would oppose their scheme and that its acceptance could 
by achieved only by the intervention of th© United States# 
Since the North American republic was apparently sympathetic 
toward the cause of Peru, th© Credit Industriel held high 
hopes of obtaining her co-operation# Nevertheless, efforts 
made by agents of the company to gain the support of the 
United States for their plan were unsuccessful* *3
72Ibid«. pp. LfiO-lg2.
7*31 -'Millington, American Diplomacy* pp, 97ff#
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The failure of the scheme of the Credit Industriel 
was due In part to lack or support from th© United States# 
Other factors which contributed to its downfall were opposi** 
tion from British bondholders and th© government of Chile# ̂  
Furthermore, President Pierola of Peru, who succeeded 
Mariano Prado, reversed the policy of his predecessor and 
vigorously opposed the scheme of the organ! z at ion#
British bondholders followed a more practical course 
of action# They entered into agreements \fith th© Chilean 
government, who controlled the guano deposits during th© war, 
that permitted a portion of the profits made from guano 
shipments to be paid to the b o n d h o l d e r s # ^  Early in i860, 
the Chilean Minister of Public Works noted that the creditors 
of Peru (probably including the nitrate certificate holders 
as well as the bondholders) ”have been a powerful lever in 
Europe to prevent the Peruvians from securing war elements 
and to create for us a beneficent atmosphere in th© opinion 
of those peoples • • #”^  He referred to a meeting of these 
creditors which supported 11 the annexing of farapacaT by Chile,”
^^Sen# Docs#, IfTth Congress, 1st Sees#, IV, Doc# No# 79, PP* 70T5T7
^Ibid## pp# Dennis, ffacna-Arica Documents#pp# 131f#
^Ibid#, p# l6 0j Millington, American Diplomacy#
P* kl*
^ Ibld# # p# lj.7 #
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and th© reference undoubtedly referred to a meeting held by 
British creditors in London early in i860*
Th© foreigners among th© nitrate certificate holders 
wished to recover their properties or were apprehensive about 
receiving payment for their securities from th© Peruvian 
government* These dispossessed owners included, in th© main, 
Chileans and English although some German and French interests 
were represented* While they did not agree as to the best 
course of action for th© protection of their interests, some 
of them apparently favored Chilean acquisition of Tarapaca* 
Probably they felt a greater confidence in the ability of 
Chile to make the payments on the certificates or els© hoped 
that the industry would be returned to private enterprise by
t h a t  c o u n t r y *
Th© English comprised the largest group of Peruvian
creditors* Early in the war Chileans became fearful lest
the English government Intervene to protect her investors
from severe losses when it was declared in Parliament that
British interests would be protected* However, th© United
States Minister in Santiago reported that he had been assured
by the British Minister that the policy meant only to pro-
80vide what was considered normal protection* American
^Dennis, Tacna-Arlca Document a j  pp* 133f*
79lbid* m p# 61̂ *
80Sen* Docs*, Itfth. Cong*, 1st Sess*, IV, Doc* Ho* 79,pp* 87f«
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diplomats believed England, Prance, and probably Germany 
favored Chilean annexation of Tarapaca# However, th© 
possibility that these countries were responsible for Chilean 
annexation is slight# The commercial interests of England 
probably inclined her toward a policy favorable to Chile5 
yet th© interests of British bondholders were allied with 
the fortunes of Peru# The French interests were similarly 
situated# French bondholders actively attempted to promote 
the cause of Peru, whereas those who owned nitrate certif1** 
cates might well have been in the group desiring th© trans­
fer of Tarapaca to Chile#
American economic interests uniformly favored the 
frustration of Chilean expansion during the War of th© 
Pacific# Some support from capitalists of the United States 
had been given to th© scheme of the Credit Industriel# and 
two other groups requested help from th© State Department 
during the war in an effort to make good their claims against
opPeru# ^ One of these was th© notorious Peruvian Company#
Its interest was based upon an early guano claim of Alexander 
Cochet which had been determined by congress in l86l to be 
"vd*thout foundation#"®^ ^ second was th© claim of J# T# 
Landreau#®^ Both of those claims wore originally of French
®^Ibld# # pp#




origin, and their importance in determining the issue of the 
cessation of Tarapaca lay in the damage they did to American 
diplomatic efforts to mediate the quarrel#®
The ratification of the Treaty of Ancon by Peru and 
Chile in 1883» and the signing of the Truce Pact between 
Chile and Bolivia early in I88ij. brought the war of the 
Pacific to a close#^ As a result of these agreements, Ghile 
gained possession of the entire nitrate region# While title 
to Tarapaca was accorded Chile at Ancon, Bolivia steadfastly 
refused to cede her littoral permanently* To Bolivia access 
to the Pacific Ocean was a necessity, and her government was 
willing to grant Chile title to the Antofagasta region only 
if another outlet was provided. In 189£, Chile formally re­
cognized Bolivia*s right to an outlet, but it was not until 
I90I4. that the two countries agreed upon details* Only then 
did Bolivia surrender to Chile her title to th© coastal 
province#® heritage of the War of the Pacific, however,
®Ibid*, p# 11 2̂#
BÂDennis, Tacna-Arioa Documents, pp# 221-227 gives the text of the two agreement's*
Q7Ibld., p. 232.
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continued to disturb relations between Chile and her former
R8opponents#
^Sinee 190l{-, Bolivia has kept alive her aspirations for a corridor to the Pacific Ocean* Peru and Chile were involved in a serious dispute until 1929 over th© provinces of Tacna and Arica# Although the Treaty of Anc<ih had left Chile in temporary possession of both areas, provision was made for a plebiscite to be held in l89lj-* Disagreement over the method of conducting the plebiscite prevented it from being held# The dispute continued until 1929 when a settle­ment was reached* As a result of the treaty ratified in that year, Peru regained the province of Tacna and Chile kept Arica*
CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CHILEAN NITRATE POLICY
Prior to th© War of th© Pacific* th© nitrate policy 
of Chile was designed to promote th© rapid exploitation of 
the deposits under her control and to create conditions 
that would allotv those deposits to produce In competition 
with th© more favorably situated producers in Bolivia and 
Peru* Because of that aim no taxes wore imposed on th© indus­
try* This policy* formulated in full with th© issuance of 
the last of a series of decrees on July 28, 1877# facilitated
-Ithe acquisition of nitrate deposits by Chilean capitalists* 
Discoverers of deposits were permitted to lay claim to lands 
up to three hundred hectares in extent, but each new claim 
had to be located at least ten kilometers distant from any 
previously existing claim* The decree also stipulated that 
if within one year the recipient gave evidence that the de­
posits were being worked he was to receive final title to 
the property# This requirement could be fulfilled by prov­
ing the existence of nitrate producing equipment on th©
-̂ Ibanez, Minas i Salitroras* pp* 168-170, 175»A1 dimate Solar* Docxmiontoa ReiatIvos a Salitroras, Chilean Section, Ho. 2, pp.' U Yaobre salitro, pp# 397~399* ip-9 % Semper andTicHeTsi industria del rJalitre* pp* 128, 13 0#
ko
ill
property or th© achievement of a production rate of one 
hundred metric quintals per month* To the last mentioned 
requirement an exception was made in 1881* Producers in 
Taltal and Aguas Blancas wore relieved from fulfilling that 
condition because lack or rail transportation In the region 
hindered rapid development or th© deposits* Finally, the 
decree stated that the Intendent in each province was ©ra-* 
powered to administer the provisions of the decree and to 
grant a six months extension or the production rule in the 
event special circumstances warranted the privilege* But in 
spite or 01110*3 liberal policy, her nitrate fields did not 
give serious competition to the older Bolivian and Peruvian 
fields*
When Chilean authorities acquired control of the 
Bolivian and Peruvian nitrate fields late in the year 1879, 
the status of the industry and the relation of Chile to it 
were completely altered* The new situation required a 
thorough revision of the nitrate policy of Chil©| however, 
for many months no steps in this direction were or could b© 
taken because of the indefinitoness of her control and her 
preoccupation with military affairs* Then too, Dihen 
Tarapaca was occupied Chilean authorities were baffled by 
the complex arrangements Peru had established in th© prose­
cution of her scheme of monopolization**^
At first the transfer of the province to Chile
/''siaTP'n
i UBKmkY ml f »rAdmlnifflbraolon do Tarapaca, p* 12
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resulted in a sharp drop in production# This occurred be­
cause most operators reared that should they continue oper­
ations under Chilean rule* Peru would institute reprisals 
if she regained control of the province# Their apprehension 
was justified, since on December 6 , 1679* a decree pro­
mulgated by th© Peruvian government prohibited shipments of 
nitrate from Tarapaca and warned that fines would be imposed 
on violators of this directive* Others, whose sympathies 
were with Peru, hesitated to aid the war effort of Chile#^
On November 2ij., 1879, the Chilean Minister of War attempted 
to allay the feeling of insecurity among nitrate producers 
of Tarapaca#^* He stated that both commerce and industry 
would be given every encouragement and that property owners 
would receive protection in the enjoyment of their rights#
But the statement was too general to achieve its purpose#
While it did mark the initial statement of the intentions of 
the Chilean government, actually, Chile was not in a position 
to announce a settled nitrate policy# Without one, of course, 
she could not gain the confidence of the producers# Moreover, 
the war was still being fought5 and although. Chile was in con­
trol in 1879, the final status of th© nitrate region remained 
doubtful#
%illinghurst, Degislacion sobre salitre, pp* 25\5fs Daniel Mariner, Es tudio de ii^itlea comorcTal~"cliiIona e historia economica nacTonal f£f antj a/so 2 Hniv'eraXtarla» T9 2 3), ii, Miliington, toerican Diplomacy, pp# Ifj6f#
tel 11 incurst, Dogislaoion sobre salitre, pp# 2ljlf*
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Meanwhile, Chile hoped to obtain revenues from the 
export of nitrate from Tarapaca to aid in financing the i$ar* 
She sought to stimulate exports by gâ anting permission for 
private export with the payment of a tax of $1#£>0 per Spanish 
quintal (§3*26 per metric quintal)«^ However* producers 
failed to respond to th© opportunity for the reasons previ* 
ously cited or because they thought the tax might soon be
Areduced# Failing in her effort to gain revenues in this 
manner, Chile deemed it necessary to revert to th© Peruvian 
policy of selling nitrate on the government's account# A 
decree issued in February, i860, directed all who had con** 
tracted to deliver specified quantities of nitrate to Peru 
to fulfill their obligations by delivering their quotas to 
Chilean authorities*? While this arrangement brought almost 
three million pesos to the Chilean treasury and government 
sales of nitrate exceeded all other sales for the year i860,
Athe policy proved to be temporary#
Since Chile now occupied militarily and later annexed 
the entire nitrate producing region, she had it in her power 
to achieve the monopoly Peru had tried so long to establish*
%bid., p. 21*2.
°See the letter written by Agusto Matte, Chilean Minister of Public Works* dated Feb* 6 , 1880 in Dermis, Tacna-Arica Documents, pp# 133f♦
?Valde7s Vergara #/ Admini&tracion de Tarapaca, p* I4.; Billinghurst, Legialacion"Tobre salitre, p* 'S^# “ *
6Xbid*, pp# 2lf7ff* 26 9#
However, she did not do so# It was not until later that many 
Chileans had cause to regret the decision— mad© in 1381—-to 
discontinue the Peruvian policy# Discontinuance, when it was 
instituted, seemed necessary Tor several reasons: tre­
mendous war expenditures made expropriation appear to be a 
financial impossibility; heavy demands placed upon officials 
in the prosecution of the war made administration difficult; 
and the Chilean government was disposed to give her influ­
ential entrepreneurs the opportunity to manage the industry# 9 
Realizing the advantages as well as the necessity of 
forming a concrete nitrate policy, the government initiated 
studies and surveys in an. attempt to discover the proper path 
to follow# In January, 1880, the first Comiaion Consultiva 
de Salitre was appointed to review conditions In th© nitrate 
fields and to offer recommendations# This committee worked 
for several months collecting data, hearing testimony, and
touring the northern provinces, before presenting its findings
10to the legislature# It made two major recommendations: 
first, to return the control of nitrate properties and commerce 
to the system of private enterprise; and secondly, to obtain 
a share of nitrate revenues for the public by the imposition 
of an export tax which it recommended to be $2#20 per metric 
quintal#^
^Martner, Politics comercial chilena, II, 38Ij.-88# 
i0Billingliurct, hegislaclon sobre salitre# pp# 26£, 1|*3 2# 
11Ibid.. pp. 2 7 2-276.
The report or the .first Comision Consultiva met with
a varied reception* Producers accepted both proposals in
principle* yet displayed considerable opposition to th© high
rate at which th© tax had been set* On the other hand, the
administration of President Pinto refused to commit itself
to return the industry to a system of private enterprise,
12although it strongly supported the tax recommendation#
Sine© the initiative in the implementation of these 
proposals lay with the government and because the Pinto ad­
ministration was chiefly interested in acquiring additional 
revenues, the tax on nitrate exports became the focus of 
controversy# It was th© amount of the tax and not the tax 
per se that provoked outspoken opinions on the subject in 
the Chilean press and caused heated debates in the legislature 
where the issue was finally decided# Producers in the nitrate 
fields of Antofagasta, Aguas Blancas, and Taltal raised 
vigorous objections to the imposition of a duty that would 
apply to them equally with the producers in Tarapaca# An 
Antofagasta newspaper that voiced the opinions of nitrate 
producers outside of Tarapaca published numerous petitions 
objecting to the proposed duty# In an editorial severely 
critical of th© tax recommendation, it assorted that such a
^Anibal Pinto (I82j?-1881j.), Chilean diplomat and man of letters, entered political life in 1062 and rose to im­portance as Minister of War In the administration of President Errazuriz# Elected to th© presidency in I8 7 6, Pinto’s term of office was marked by serious financial difficulties and the momentous War of tho Pacific# See Gal&amos, History of Chile, p# 506*   * —
proposal could be made only by a government that did not 
understand th© status of th© industry#^ In all probability 
producers In Tarapaca and nitrate merchants In Valparaiso 
held similar views# Producers in Tarapaca, who believed 
the existing tax of $3#26 to b© exorbitant, opposed th© levy 
too; and the nitrate trading firms feared an excessive tax 
would lessen commerce in nitrate and thus reduce their profit 
Even though such strong opposition to the tax was manifested, 
the view of the administration, at first, remained unchanged# 
It upheld the level of the impost as reasonable, and in an 
attempt to justify it the Finance Minister declared that the 
$2#20 rate was requested in the interest of th© war effort#^ 
It proved to be a difficult task for the government 
to resolve the differences that had developed over th© amount 
of the export tax# Nitrate interests received effective sup­
port in the legislature inhere opposition to th© tax recom-
n Anendation was strong#  ̂ An effort by the president to con­
ciliate the opposition by proposing a reduction to $2#00  
failed, and the most the executive could obtain from th© 
legislature was authorization to impose a tax of §l#6o silver
~̂ Sl Pueblo Chileno (Antofagasta), May 19, 1080#
^^his trend of thought is illustrated by quotations from the Chilean Times (Valparaiso) and El Comoroio de Valparaiso pufcTisheet in El Pueblo Chileno# May 17,' ‘itfBo#
^Billinghurst, Leglslaclon sobre salitro, pp# 282f•
l6 Itaid., pp. 279-281.
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Tills law* passed on October 1* 1880, did not automatically 
^PPly to Tarapaca# Until 1881̂ , the authority of the Chilean 
legislature did not legally extend to that region since Chile 
did not have formal possession# There th© tax was placed 
into operation by presidential decree# ^
Th© report of the first Com!sion Consultlva and the 
legislative action based upon it left pending vexing problems 
that required additional consideration by the government#
Even the tax law of 1800 was not accepted as final by pro­
ducers who still hoped for a reduction; thus, there existed 
a need for further study of th© nitrate situation# For that
purpose a second Coz.il si on Consultlva was created on April 9# 
181881# The new commission was especially charged with the 
consideration of how to bring Chilean policy into harmony 
with the concessions made in th© nitrate regions when Bolivia 
and Peru had been in control* This involved a study of th© 
obligations Chile should accept arising from jp©rufs expropri­
ation policy# The agenda also provided for a reconsideration 
of the question of taxes# ^
Apparently, the deliberations of this committee were 
not as extended as were those of its predecessor, yet its
x7lbld** pp# 279^286, 292, 29 6; Aidunat© Solar, Document os BeTativos a Salitrer&s, Chilean Section, p* 71*
^Chile, Ministerio do Hacienda, La industrla salitrora (Santiago: La Hacion, 1935>)# I,~15q#
-̂ B̂illingliurst, Leg is lac ion sobre salitre# pp# [jl6,
1̂21#
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major recommendations received the immediate approval of the
government# To the disappointment of many the committee
recommended the retention of the same nitrate tax# Those who
disliked that provision* however* could certainly give their
approval to the other recommendation made: the return of full
title to th© nitrate properties to certificate holders# In
decrees issued in 1881* this policy was announced; and the
procedure to be employed in th© transfer was outlined#
The most important of these decrees was Issued on 
20June 6* 1881# It announced that nitrate certificates 
issued by Peru would be recognised as valid obligations by 
th© Chilean government* It also provided that properties in 
Tarapaca would be returned when seventy-five per cent or 
more of their certificates and th© remainder in cash were de­
posited with th© government# Th© cash deposit would be re­
funded if the outstanding certificates were brought in within 
ninety days* Three months later* the seventy-five per cent 
requirement was lowered to fifty per cent* The Decree of 
March 28* 1882* initiated th© policy of accepting certificates 
for nitrate properties* with th© previously outlined pro­
cedures in effect# By th© end of 1882* certificates amounting
to #8*787*155 and representing fifty-seven separate ©stablish-
21monts had been redeemed# Although extension of th©
^Aldunate Solax», Documentos Relativos a Salitroras* Peruvian Section, pp* 75-7Y#
^Valdes Vergara, AdminiatracIon de Tarapaca, pp*9-12; Ruiz Bourgeois* PoreciicTMTriero’ "SETleno. II, 321f.
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redemption decree of 1882 had not been planned* the provision
. 22was revived again in 1886*
In the following year, 1887* & fairly successful at­
tempt to call in all outstanding certificates was undertaken# 
It began with the cancellation of the privilege to redeem 
certificates and the enactment of a law providing for the 
buying of certificates by the state at the rate of h 105 for
a certificate originally valued at one thousand soles— the
23equivalent of h 183# To obtain funds to carry through the 
plan a foreign loan to be no larger than & 1,113,781 was 
authorized# The retiring of certificates began in July, 188? 
and was completed by the end of the following year# Seventy- 
one oficinas with a value of 10,1|50,623 soles (fe 1,097*250) 
were acquired by the state in this transaction# Owners of 
certificates representing eighteen oficinas refused to sell 
under the terzns of this arrangement, and the government de­
clared their rights void#^ Nevertheless, holders of these
22Aldunate Solar, Documentoa Helativos a Salltreras# Peruvian Section, p# 91*
23This arrangement was made with th© government of Italy in a protocol signed on Feb# 15, 1887* Other countries followed suit and obligated themselves not to support contra­ry claims of their citizens# See Great Britain, British and Foreign State Papers # LXXXIX, 1290f#
2ij*Aldunate Solar, Documentoa Helativos a Salitreras, Peruvian Section, pp# 97-99* i02# a VablV giving^he ata-' tlstics of this transaction appears on pp# 103ff#
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certificates war© allowed to redeem them beginning in 1892#
The return of the nitrate Industry of Tarapaca to 
private enterprise had been rapidly completed# Yet in the 
process the government had managed successfully to preserve 
for itself large parcels of nitrate property# Consequently* 
in future years* it was able to gain larger revenues from th© 
sale of the lands and to exert a greater influence on th© 
development of the industry by the manner of their disposition* 
The calling in of nitrate certificates in 1887 preserved to a
pAgreat degree this power of the government• v
Even before the process of redeeming certificates was 
finished* Chile * s taxation policy had been established# Her 
policy in this regard was quite different from that of her 
predecessors* because in none of the nitrate fields did export 
taxes serve as a major source of public revenue prior to the 
War of the Pacific# In Tarapaca, until the policy of mo­
nopolisation was inaugurated in 1873* Peru allowed free expor­
tation# Thereafter* export taxes wore imposed; yet they were 
secondary in importance from th© standpoint that they operated 
as either supplementary income to the monopolisation of sales 
policy or as a means of promoting the accomplishment of
Ibanez, Minas 1 Salltreras, p# Z$lm In all proba­bility this ac11 onlly the Chilean government constituted a reward to the foreign holders of these certificates who supported the revolution of 1891#
^uTh±s action was taken by President Balmaceda* For further Information on his nitrate policy see Chaptor VIII, pp* 212ff#
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complete state ownership* Beginning at the nominal level of 
S 0*Qk per Spanish quintal, th© tax was raised by a series 
of increases in 18?6 to S l*lij. (fifty pennies) and again in 
1878 to S 3«00* These raises were especially designed to 
make private sales impossible and thus to force those who ha:1 
not already don© so to exchange ownership of their properties 
for nitrate certificates*Th© tax was bringing results by 
the time the war started*
Nitrate production in Bolivian territory was still in
its early stages of development during th© decade of the
seventies* While Bolivia had granted tax exemptions to th©
first enterprisers in th© fields near Antofagasta, that
generosity would surely have ended within a few years had not
treaty agreements with Chile forbad taxation of producers in 
28that region* Th© protection of the privileges given th© 
Antofagasta nitrate producers by th© Chilean government 
prevented Bolivian taxation in that field* In th© second 
major Bolivian nitrate field, the district of Tocopilla, 
Chileans possessed no special privileges* But th© decision 
to give Peru control over the deposits led to the adoption 
of the rental procedure whereby Bolivia assured herself of a 
fixed Income regardless of whether Peru worked th© deposits
2?Miguel Cruchaga,^ Estudio sobre La Qrganizacion Economica _i la Hacienda Pub'lica die CnTle T^antiagos Guienburg, "lBHoTT II Appendix Ho* 2, p* 13*
P8Actually, a tax imposed by Bolivia led to th© War of the Pacific*
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or not,^
Chilean policy changed from what It had been prior to 
1879 Q-nd was gradually re-orianted toward an export tax basis 
as a result or new conditions created during the war* Mhen 
nitrate was discovered In her fields in Taltal and Aguas 
Blancas in 1872, the Chilean government recognised that pro­
ducers in these regions could not pay an impost and still 
compete successfully with the richer deposits of Tarapaca*
But during the war need for additional revenues led to passage 
of the Law of September 11, 1879 which imposed an export duty 
on nitrate of forty centavos per metric quintal,^0 This tax 
was applicable only in the fields of Taltal and Aguas Blancas, 
which lay south of the twenty-fourth parallel, and the de­
posits In Antofagasta as far north as th© twenty—third paral­
lel, This latter area Included th© portion of the Bolivian 
littoral that Chile incorporated at th© beginning of the war* 
The law, however, granted a two year exemption to producers 
in Taltal and Aguas Blancas because th© lack of railway fa­
cilities handicapped the marketing of their product,'***’ When
^9cruehaga, Estudio Economica de Chile, II, AppendixHo* 2, p* 13? Sernper "and IllVncXsY ESu¥FrTa d"eI salitre,p* 123,
^°Billinghurst, Le/:islacion sobre salitre, p* 302*
^Aldunate Solar, Documentos Helativos a Salltreras, Chilean Section, pp* 53f« ..  ~~
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th© tax was increased a year later and mad© theoretically
uniform in all areas under Chilean control* the full exemption
was reduced to fifty per cent and th© privilege was extended
32to June 30* 1883* The exemption was granted because the 
producers in Taltal and Aguas Blancas were Chileans who origi­
nally had been encouraged by th© government to develop those 
fields* Nevertheless* the government showed no disposition 
whatever to continue the policy when the privilege expired#
As a result, operations in both fields ceased; for without 
railway facilities* competition on an equal basis with pro­
ducers In Tarapaca was impossible* Producers in Aguas Blancas 
and Taltal protested the change in policy* but their efforts 
were in v a i n * 33
The immediate imposition of a tax by Chile which in 
effect was paid mainly by the Antofagasta Nitrate and Railway 
Company shows that Chile did not consider the tax exemption 
privilege previously enjoyed by that company necessary to pro- 
mot© the development of th© Antofagasta fields during the 
latter part of the 1870 »s* Moreover, the Chilean action 
placed her government in the position of fighting a war to 
protect a privilege that she herself had rescinded even before 
the war was concluded*^ Recognizing that this charge could
32 Ibld.. pp. 65, 71, 75, 77, 101; Ibanez, Minas 1 Salltreras* p* 257#
33sernper and Michels* Industrie del salitre* pp* 3l!|ff*
3^of course* Chile was not legally prohibited from levying a tax on th© Antofagasta nitrate producers#
b© levied against her# th© Chilean government maintained that 
it was the principle involved and the ultimate motives behind 
th© Bolivian taxation that impelled her annexation of Anto­
fagasta*^ Nevertheless* under Chilean rule heavy taxation-- 
such as th© Chileans had feared Bolivia would impos©**-became 
both characteristic and permanent*
As has been noted* th© forty centavo tax levied on the 
southern nitrate districts was not applied in Tarapaca# In­
stead* in the latter district a much higher tax of 4>1 *5 0 was 
imposed in 1879* The tax in Tarapaca, until equalization 
occurred in the fall of i86 0* amounted to $3 *2 6 per metric 
quintal* This was a level some eight times greater than the 
tax in Chilean territory but only slightly less than half as 
great as the Peruvian duty of 18?8*
Admittedly* the Peruvian tax had been prohibitive* 
but the Chilean rate was not* Although that rate was changed 
to $1*60 silver in 1080, producers in Tarapaca wore still not 
satisfied; however* their ability to produce nitrate at a 
good profit remained undirainished as proved by the great ex­
pansion of the industry In following decades* The tax of 
i860 was retained into the twentieth century and was paid 
throughout its period of effectiveness at th© rat© of exchange 
prevailing when imposed— thirty-eight pennies* An important 
modification in th© procedure of paying the tax was made In
3*see the Chilean War Circular of April 12* I879  printed In Dennis* Tacna-Arica Documents, pp* 83ff*
^Blllinghurst* Bos capitales salitreroa, p, 2g2*
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1892 when th© regulation requiring thirty per cent of th© tax 
to be paid in sterling became effectives no modification was 
made in the ratio of exchange
The nitrate tax was recognised by the government and 
considered by individual producers to be at a high level, but 
not until the nineties was considerable pressure exerted by- 
producers to bring about a reduction# This pressure coincided 
with the deepest depression yet to be experienced by the 
nitrate industry and led producers to blame the high export 
tax for their ills* Yet in no way did th© government seri­
ously consider lowering the tax# It parried such demands by 
arguments to the ©ffoct that tax reduction would benefit con­
sumers, not producers, and that recognition of th© value of 
nitrate as a fertiliser, not th© price, governed its use#3®
So important had th© nitrate tax become in providing 
the government with revenues that reluctance to alter the 
tax is understandable# As ©arly as i860, twenty-on© per eent 
of Chile *s revenues were derived from that tax or from govern­
ment sales of nitrate# The proportion increased in following 
years becoming twenty-five per cent in 1883, forty-eight per 
cent in I89O, and thereafter declining slightly to thirty- 
eight per cent in 1901# After 1901, nitrate revenues continued
3?Martner, Politic© comercial ch.ilena* II, pp. 3 0 8, 
il37» l|-93f«
^ Chile, Delogaclon Fiscal de Salltreras j Guaneras, Memoria del Deler.ado en 1897 (Santiagoj Hacional, 1897), pp. 29f.
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to account Tor more than one*third of the total revenue® of
Chile*39
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ahrnncisco Valdes Vergara, Problems3 gconomlcos d© Chile (Valparaiso: Universe, I9 1 3), p* 527# Compu- 'tat ions are adjusted to the rate of 1 <3d*
The over-all nitrate policy of Chile was designed to 
preserve the revenues derived from th© industry and even to 
bring about a gradual increase in them* In pursuance of this 
plan the government sold state-owned nitrate properties to 
tho highest bidder to obtain revenue and to add to the pro­
ductive capacity of the industry* Such additions, if was
39jPartner, Pol.itlea comercial chllena, II, 390f, 477 Semper and Mlchela. Induafcrla del salitre. p, 118#
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thought # would eventually increase the quantity of nitrate 
exported and the revenues derived therefrom# Throtighout the 
nineteenth century the formation and operation of combinations 
in the Indus try--which sought to curtail product ion-*-we re in 
most instances vigorously opposed by the government#^ As 
the adjoining table of the nitrate revenues of Chile shows# 
there was a total annual increase in revenues derived from the 
export tax in almost every year for which the statistics are 
given# During those years when a decrease is shown# the 
primary determinant was the effective organisation of a combi­
nation*
Nitrate revenues were the chief source of public funds# 
and nitrate shipments quickly became Chile*a major export# 
replacing the copper industry early in the decade of the 
eighties# It accounted for forty-six per cent of the exports 
of Chile in 1881# sixty per cent by 1893* and seventy-six 
per cent by 1 9 02# The significance of this development and 
of the reliance placed by the government on nitrate revenues 
was that the single-product economic order that prevails in 
many Latin American countries prevailed also in Chile# Thus# 
being dependent upon th© functioning of th© nitrate industry# 
Chile fs economy was unduly affected by fluxions In that 
industry#^*
^Combinations in th© nitrate industry are discussed In Chapter VI#
^South American Journal and Brasil and River flat© Hail (tondon) j,r"xX (Jan.- l8# T883)# i TAprlT T? #~T0or6) #TS3T Chile# Suporentendoncla de Aduanas# Memoria en 1902 (Valparaiso i He If man# 1903)# p# if8#
$ Q
It has already been noted that a major aspect or th© 
developing nitrate policy of Chile related to the disposition 
of her public lands in the nitrate region# In the newly ac- 
quired northern provinces the government of Chile gained con** 
trol over lands that possessed a variety of natural resources 
large in extent and valuable in nature# Among these, nitrate 
was the resource of most immediate importance since the 
markets for it were rapidly expanding, and th© entire world*s 
supply now rested under the control of a single nation# Th© 
greater portion of the lands in the northern provinces had 
been public property under Bolivian and Peruvian rule; 
therefore, these automatically devolved upon Chile# The 
Chilean policy of returning to a system of private ownership 
obligated that government to some extent in the disposition 
of its public lands; but once those obligations were settled, 
there still remained public lands known to possess nitrate 
deposits as well as other areas in which deposits were likely 
to be discovered#
Possession of these lands gave th© government a potent 
weapon for exercising, In conjunction with her inherent powers 
of taxation and regulation, a decisive influence on the course 
of th© industry’s development# Th© future prosperity of indi­
vidual producers frequently depended upon their ability to 
obtain new nitrate bearing lands with which to replace their 
worn-out properties; and after 1890, this could be achieved 
only inadequately and sometimes not at all by private trans­
actions# Thus, most producers were forced to rely tipon th©
$9
government for replacements#^ From this standpoint, it w&® 
fortunate for the producers that their acquisition of new 
properties normally met with the interest of th© government.
Ownership of nitrate bearing lands gave the government 
another significant means of controlling the development of 
the industry In that th© sale of lands could exert a decided 
influence on the volume of production. The government, in 
pursuance of a desire to increase production, could offer 
such lands for sal© or achieve th© opposite effect by re­
fraining from selling state properties# But th© desire to 
increase production was a persistent one, and its basis lay 
squarely in the relationship between th© volume of nitrate 
exports and public revenues# Productive capacity largely de­
termined the former while the chief determinant of th© latter 
was th© tax on nitrate exports# This relationship and the 
specific desire to increase revenues obtained from the nitrate 
tax continued to be the major influence in shaping the policy 
regarding the sale of state-owned nitrate lands# A final in­
centive for government sales can be ascribed to the need for 
the immediate revenue that the sal© of the valuable state 
assets would bring#
Although initiated in 1302, the sal© of nitrate lands 
on a large scale was postponed until after the Revolution of
^ I n  1889 a company was formed in JSngland to purchase a nitrate property. Their agent was unable to locate any property for sale. The company was finally liquidated# See South American Journal. XXVII (July 27. 1889)* 100s and
SSr*(AugV,-227 189177*215.
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1 8 91# Th© process of retiring nitrate certificates occupied 
the attention of the government until 1088, and the increase 
in the quantity of lands being exploited that resulted from 
certificate transfers obviated any necessity for sales from 
the standpoint of the producer* Likewise, it tended to reduce 
the chance that properties offered on a strictly cash basis 
would find buyers* Certificate sales, as is noted elsewhere,^ 
had led to a great increase in foreign ownership of nitrate 
properties* A strong aversion to this trend grew among Chileans, 
of; idiom , the most prominent was President Jose" Balmac©da#^ 
Chileans feared that should a sale be held, foreigners would 
obtain most of the properties offered and foreign dominance 
of the industry would be increased* The sentiment, although 
widespread at the time and destined to develop to an even 
greater extent later, proved insufficient to bar permanently 
such interests from obtaining additional lands from th© state*
So intense was President Balmaceda1© dislike of foreign domi­
nation of Chilean nitrate that in I889 he threatened to for­
bid the sal© of state-owned lands to them in the future*^ 
However, after Balmaceda*s death, his views were largely 
ignored*
^Se© Chapter XIX, pp* 88ff*
^For a fuller discussion of Balmaceda*s ©ntI-foreign attitude see Chapter VXII, pp* 212ff•
^William II* Russell, A Visit to Chile and the Hit rat© 
Fields of Tarapaca (London: J#~3*"Virtue araT'Co*, IH9 0 ), p* 315; William' H* Russell, “The Troubles in Chile,” The 
Graphic * Feb* Ilf, 1093-# P* l8Ij-*
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Th© sale In 1882 offered lands located in Tarapac/ to 
the highest cash bidder# There was no machinery Tor exploit 
tat ion on these lands; however , the quality ©f the deposits 
indicated by the price paid for them* supports th© conclusion 
that th© state possessed properties not inferior to those al** 
ready under production# Chile received only slightly less 
than th© valuation placed on th© properties by th© government 
for those oh© sold* Even so* the results were disappointing 
since only fifteen out of one hundred and four properties 
offered found purchasers#^ Th© Jefe Politico of Tarapaca, 
Francisco Valdes Vergara, in his official Inform© of 1883 as­
cribed the failure of the initial auction to th© fixing of an 
absolute minimum price that frequently had no relation to th© 
value of the property# He suggested that a specific, well- 
considered evaluation of th© worth of each property b© es­
tablished if future auctions continued to be based upon pre­
announced minimum prices*^ This advice was later followed#
With the subsequent decline in th© need for added 
revenues after 1 8 8 2, a factor that partly accounts for th© 
sal© in that year, and the absence of th© other motivating 
factors, no sale of state-owned lands was forthcoming for over 
a decade# But in l893~9lf# some nitrate producers, especially
^Semper and Itiehels, Industrla del salitre# Appendix No# 18, pp# 290f; Aldunate Solar, Documentoa Helativos a Salltreras# Chilean Section, pp# 17Y-ITS# — - —
^Valdes Vergara, Administracion de Tarapaca# pp*1̂ 8-l60#
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among Chileans, began to clamor for new lands} and more im­
portantly, the government round it sell* in need or additional 
revenues in order to permit resumption of specie payments and 
to meet payments due on the foreign debt# Thus motivated, it 
announced that auctions would be held in l89î #4® During that 
year two sales were held (on June 15 and October 15) offering 
properties in various nitrate districts# From the forty- 
three oficinas and e st ac ament os placed on the market, twenty- 
three found purchasers who paid more than one million pounds 
sterling for these properties* The sales were quite suc­
cessful, and the government obtained prices that at least 
equalled and frequently surpassed the officially estimated 
value. Another of the same series of auctions was held on 
May l6, 1895, when three properties were bought for a total 
of nearly one thousand pounds sterling#49
One other sale was conducted before tho end of the 
century, but it was not as important as the auction of l89lj,f 
since only minor properties were placed on the market# These 
deposits, bordering on working oficinas, were npt of a suf­
ficient size to warrant the use of separate machinery# Oc­
curring in 18979 the sale produced twenty-seven thousand
4^Aldunate Solar, Documentos Belatlvos a SalItreras, Chilean Section, pp# 181-193} ^oub|T"Amerlcan Journal, ^  I (Sept# 1, I89I4.)# 222} Oct# 20, TcJ94/ p* 395 See also Fetter, Monetary Inflation in Chile, p# 82*
49semper and Michels, Industrie del 3al.itre, Appendix No# 18, pp# 292f#
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pounds sterling for the eighteen properties bought#-^
The most effective us© of nitrate land sales by the 
government came aft or the turn of th© century when in 1901  
and 1903 rich deposits were ©old# For th© twenty-nine proper­
ties auctioned in 1901, Chile received one hundred eighty* 
three thousand pounds# It was alleged that eighteen new 
companies were formed on the basis of the lands acquired by 
private interests at this time#^ Certainly th© sale of 1901 
greatly increased the productive capacity of th© industry# 
While that had been one objective of the sal©, by far th© 
most influential factor had been th© need for fund© to meet 
th© costs of expanding Chilean military forces so that the 
country would be prepared for wliat seemed to be an unavoidable 
war with Argentina#-^
For established nitrate interest© th© sale had meant 
a serious reduction in their relative strength in the industry 
and seemed to compromise their effort to restrict the growth 
of production# Therefore, this group strongly opposed th© 
holding of other auctions— which the government was then 
contenp 1 atIng— and maintained that due to present over­
production, the freeing of new lands for exploitation through
5°Ibid., pp. 29k£f.
^United States, Department of State, Consular Reports. LXXX (1902), 1 6 3.
^ Tn e basis for the war scare was a boundary dispute. It had boen a pressing question for several decades, but was eventually settled peaceably In 1902# See Caldamos, History of Chile, pp# \\06f#
6ij.
government sales served to aggravate unduly the problems of 
the industry* From the nitrate port of Iquique this attitude 
was echoed by the chief of the governmentf s supervisory agency 
for nitrates {the Delegado) * ^  I2v©n with his support» a new 
sale was forestalled for only two years* While an apparent 
conflict between the interests of the government and of pro* 
ducers occurred* the difference was* rather* a matter of 
opinion concerning the course of action to be taken to promote 
the interests of both* Th© government reasoned that th© 
nitrate market was expanding; therefore* capacity for produc* 
tion should be increased* The nitrate producers* for their 
part, held the opposite view* As events soon showed, th© 
operators were wrong* When in 1903 state lands were again 
placed on the market, buyers willingly absorbed fifteen new 
properties for which they paid almost five and one-half million 
pesos*^ The alacrity with which the lands found purchasers 
gives an added indication of the profitable state of th© 
nitrate trade*
Thus, the sales policy that had been projected in the 
minds of Chilean leaders in the eighties and established in 
practice In the nineties was continued on a broader and more 
significant scale after the turn of th© century* In the 
nineteenth century sales of state-owned nitrate lands had 
bean few and relatively ineffective in bringing into th©
^Semper and I Tic hols, Industrie del salitre, p. 1 7 6.
54lbld., Appendix IIo. 18, pp. 29lj.»299,
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industry important now producers with the partial exception 
or the one held in l89lj-* For the most part existing pro* 
ducers had been the beneficiaries until after 1900* Indi- 
cations after that date show that competition in the industry 
increased as a result of the government1© policy regarding 
the sale of lands* with the entrance of new producers working 
new lands, productive capacity and exports climbed steadily* 
Beginning with th© sal© in 189)4., a n0w procedure that 
altered the old cash payment system wont into effect* Stated 
in the Law of November 2 9# 1893, it provided that two years 
would b© allowed before full payment was due* An initial 
payment of twenty per cent would be required with thirty per 
cent more to be remitted within a year and the remainder at 
the end of the second year* Luring the payment period an 
interest of eight per cent was to be charged, and failure to 
fulfill the obligations would result in penalty charges*
Under this plan many purchasers met with difficulties in 
meeting their obligations principally because they over­
estimated the rapidity \7ith which the properties could be 
made productive* To remedy this th© Law of February 23, I897  
provided that purchasers in that year would have the period 
of payment lengthened to three and one-half years* This pro­
vision was also made applicable to those who had purchased 
lands under th© previous law excepting those who had already 
exploited thirty per cent or more of the nitrate on mortgaged
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The inauguration and extension of this time-payment 
policy was primarily designed to aid Chilean investors to ob» 
tain nitrate interests* They had claimed that they were 
hampered in obtaining such interests by their inability to 
compete with the superior capital resources of foreign in­
vestors. Stilly the time~p aymen t policy in its practical 
operations suggests that even that consideration did not 
fully equalise opportunities between Chilean and foreign 
purchasers* Those who had difficulty in meeting their obli­
gations on time were mainly Chileans# Too, $. measure of 
their difficulty arose from the falling exchange rate that 
made conversion of pesos into sterling increasingly costly#^ 
Because of this hardship, Chileans also considered the policy 
of the government of selling lands for sterling adverse to 
their interests# This objection was satisfied in 1&97 when 
Chilean pesos were made acceptable*
As a result of the sales held by the government, 
foreign investors wore able to maintain their dominant position 
in the Chilean nitrate industry# With the exception of th© 
auction of 169If in d̂iich Chileans obtained approximately fifty
^Aldunate Solar, Dpcmontog Rslativos a Salitreras. Chilean Section, pp# 197-SOoj lbaSeg, rT  "'Salltreras^ pp* 250f; Delegaci<fn de Salltreras, Memo'rla cm X897# p'*' '21#
^M* Jos<f Vicuna, Conf erencia sobre la industrla salitrera dada on el Congreso ilinero de" KJ^hTTSan^a7soT'" Barcelona.“TUQkTT ot. 'MTTi' Sou^rAaeH^I^ournal. XL (Feb. 22, 1896), 206.
6?
per cent of the lands purchased at that time* foreign inter­
ests* and those predominately English* obtained the majority 
of the properties
Table IX
Sales of State-owned Nitrate Lands* 1602*1903a
Date No# of Properties Extent(Hectares) State Assessed Value PriceReceived
1882 15 2 ,3 0 0 6 6 6 0 ,3 8 1 6 6i|j6,28l
l89l|. 23 6 *0 3 5 878,533 1 ,0 5 5 ,6 3 5
1895 3 32? 10l|.A95 1 0 8 ,0 9 2
1897 18 1 ,3 1 3 3 6 1 ,2 6 0 # 389,l{10
1901 29 2 ,0 6 5 1 ,9 6 0 ,3 2 1 2,147,671
1903 15 2 ,8 9 3 3,915,021 5 ,it81j.,2 6 2
TOTAL 103 iij-,933 6 1,6 1 0 ,0 2 9
62,119,171^
6 1,7 1 0 ,0 0 8
,A3.2l.,.3l0
62,33lf,10lf
aCorrpiled from Semper and Michels* Industrie del Salitre* appendix #10* pp# 290-299*
^In pesos of l8d#
All public and to an extent private nitrate lands were 
supervised by an organization that was carried over from Peru­
vian rule# Peru had established an official known as the 
Inspector General of Nitrate as her chief agent In th© nitrate
^This is indicated by the list of p4irchas©rs given In Semper and Michels* Xn&ustria del salifcre# Appendix No# IB* 
pp# 290-299*
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area* The office continued to operate under Chilean rule but 
was not permanently established until September, 1883# An 
Englishman named Robert Harvey held the post in 1679* when 
Chilean authority was established in Iquiqu©#^ Retained in 
the office until 1881, he performed a valuable service Tor 
Chileans by drafting several reports outlining th© status of
the industry* According to the testimony of the Chilean Jofe
✓ ✓Politico of Tarapaca, these reports were indispensibl© in the
forrralation or Chilean nitrate policy*^
For years the Inspector General strove to enforce the 
laws regulating the industry and to oversee public nitrate 
properties with a staff and organization wholly inadequate to 
perform properly the numerous duties# One of th© malpractices 
that illustrates th© prevailing confusion during the early 
years of Chilean control was that unauthorized individuals 
were operating oficinas* This condition can b© largely ex­
plained by noting th© lack of knowledge of Chilean authorities 
regarding the policy that Peru had followed* It was not until 
repeated complaints had been made by certificate holders that 
official investigation revealed the existing condition and 
the practice stopped*^ 0
^See Chapter III, pp# 83* Other aspects ofHarvey1s career as Ifltrat© Inspector considerably modify th© favorable evaluation noted below*
^Valdes Vergara, Administradon de Tarapaca  ̂pp* I4.,
12, 28*
^°Aldunate Solar, Documentos Relatives a Salitreras# Peruvian Section, p* 79 * Ruiz BourgeolsV Dor echo Minero ~ Clixleno« II, 321*
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Not only did. Chilean officials become confused whan
dealing with situations that arose out of Peruvian arrangements*
but for a tine the Chilean Jefe Politico of Tarapaca issued
nitrate grants on his own initiative and without author!**
Atsat ion from the government in Santiago* That practice* too*
was halted when it was revealed* As a matter of fact* the
policy of accepting nitrate land claims was stopped In 188if*
shortly after the end of the war* During the war* grants
could be obtained in the provinces south of Tarapaca* but
apparently few werei while in Tarapaca no grants could be
legally consummated* In l88i|.* the Chilean government ceased
making grants In all her territories under the Decree of July 
6228, lo7'7* That action was necessitated by a provision In 
the Treaty of Ancon of 1083 which made Chilean laws applicable 
to the province of Tarapaca* Had no suspension occurred* 
private interests would have been able, and were eagerly 
planning,to make advantageous acquisitions under the decree 
of 1877* In bringing about repeal the government followed 
the precedent set by Peru in 1868* and clearly indicated its 
expectation of gaining revenue from the sale of such lands* 
Revocation was also indicative of the intention of th© govern­
ment to organize the industry on a basis that would gain large
^Bllllnghurst* hegialaclon sobre salitre* pp. 376f* 
^Ruiz Bourgeois* Perecho Minero Chileno* II* 327* 
^Billinghurst, Legislacion sobre aalltro* p* Ij.0 9.
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revenues Tor the treasury and permit a measure or public con­
trol over the development of. the industry without involving 
the government in nationalisation*
The Chilean policy of preserving a large portion of 
the nitrate lands for the state placed a heavy responsibility 
upon the Inspector General*s office, since it was in charge 
of the administration of public nitrate lands* Correction of 
the unsatisfactory status of th© office, however, did not 
come until 1889* Then, President Balmaceda transformed it 
Into the Dele&acion Fiscal de Salltreras 2  ftuaneraa and di­
rected that it function under the supervision of th© minister 
6kof finance* *
In his decree that brought about this reform, Balmaceda 
bestowed numerous functions upon th© Delo&acion* It was 
charged with caring for state-owned nitrate lands, measuring 
and evaluating both public and private nitrate lands, defend­
ing judicially public nitrate interests, and recommending 
means to increase consumption and to develop the Industry*
The Delegacion was also responsible for gathering statistics, 
checking to assure that transportation facilities complied 
with the laws, and assuring personal security to the workers*
To perform these many duties th© staff of th© Defenseion was 
enlarged, and an official known as the Delegado was placed in 
charge of the office* lie had an assistant, five deputies, a 
statistician, five engineers, and a host of lesser officials
^Ibanes, Minas j. Salltreraa, pp* 2 3 6, 2)4.9•
71
working under himt Xn th© perforraance or their duties the 
more important officials or the DeIej%&cion made regular in-
6*3spect ion trips through th© nitrate region*
In discharging its runetions, th© pelepcacion main­
tained a high level or efficiency* Its routine duties con­
sisted oT gathering statistics and keeping a careful watch 
over public property! its more important obligations were 
measuring and evaluating the quality or nitrate lands, pro­
tecting the interests or th© government, and submitting 
recommendations Tor future policies* Recommendations mad© 
by the Dele^ado in his report ror 1890 not only Illustrate 
the high calibre or th© advice given, but also show that it 
was often, though sometimes not immediately, followed* In 
the first place, the Dele&ado observed that since an increase 
in world consumption of nitrate would be advantageous to the 
state, the government should give financial support to adver­
tising and sales promotion measures undertaken by the pro­
ducers* While the Balmaceda administration did not Implement 
this Idea, the following administration gave effect to the 
proposal and eventually, In 1 8 97, the policy became a perma­
nent one* A second proposition pertained to the disposition 
of nitrate properties, particularly those too small to support 
independently an oficina* In the sale of these lands the 
Delegado believed that preference should be given to operators 
whose lands were Insufficient to continue profitable production
bid.» pp. 237f, 2IP.-2I4.Q.
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or to producers whose lauds were contiguous to the properties 
being sold* To an extent this was done in the sal® of 1897•
In a third plan, designed to preserve the public Interest, 
£>eleRado counselled the sale of public nitrate lands to 
forestall the formation of a combination in th© following 
instances; if the government considered that such an organ­
isation was detrimental to Its Interests, if after permitting 
one to form it caused a serious decline In nitrate revenues* 
Circumstances in 1893 generally conformed to the latter situ-
AAation and the device was effectively used* ^
The influence of the Delegado upon Chilean nitrate 
policy, however, was not always as strong as is suggested by 
the examples recorded above* For instance, in 1901 and fol­
lowing, the Delegado exerted his influence, without consider­
able effect, to prevent new sales of lands The recommen­
dation was based upon the belief that th© sale of 1901 had 
increased productive capacity sufficiently to provide for a 
steady expansion of exports, and that further increases would 
lead to over-production* Th© opinion Indicates that th© 
PeleRado gave consideration to th© interests of producers as 
well as to those of th© government# Thus, it cannot be main­
tained that he merely reflected prevailing sentiment among
For the report of th© Delegado for I89O see Al&unat© Solar, Documentor Relatives a SaTitreras, Chilean Section* pp. 123-I3S>#
^Semper and Michels, Industrie del Sailtre, p* 1 7 6#
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private interests nor that he was unmindful of th© need for 
balancing the interests of the government with those of 
producers#
In two other important aspects the Deie&aolQn ac­
quitted itself admirably# The first entailed testing all lands 
in the nitrate region to ascertain th© extent and quality of 
th© nitrate deposits# Officials worked continuously In this 
endeavor, and the government relied upon their reports in
AAestablishing the minimum prices for lands being sold# w The 
second field of activity involved establishing accurate 
boundaries of private nitrate lands* It has already been 
pointed out that usurpation of public lands was a practice 
carried over from the era of Peruvian control# Little had 
been done to correct this situation before the creation of 
the Delegacion# and evidence exists that the problem was 
aggravated during the early years of Chilean control when 
nitrate Inspectors overlooked or abetted illegal extensions 
of boundaries#0^ Considerable losses were Incurred by the 
state as a result, since such usurpations diminished the value 
of th© usurped properties to the degree that the caliche on 
them had been exploited#
During the decade of the nineties rectification of
^®For an example of th© method of evaluating th© quality of nitrate lands see Ibid# * Appendix No* 9# PP« 200- 
203#
Ibanez, Minas 1 Salitreras# p# 25i|.# It was r©x>orted that usurpation of state lands was practiced again during the Revolution of 1891#
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boundary proceeding® were numerous • This activity was spurred 
on by a presidential decree issued in 1 8 9 5# but the magnitude 
or the undertaking and the necessity or relying upon unenerge— 
tic local orricials to prosecute th© cases in court hindered 
and slowed the entire operation#*^ After repeated urging©, 
bbe Delegado obtained in 1897 the assistance of a lawyer (to 
b© free from legal ties with private interests) specially 
charged with th© responsibility of conducting cases initiated 
by the Delegado# By 1901̂ * the boundaries of nitrate es­
tablishments in Tarapaca had been definitely drawn# Th© im** 
portanee of that function of the Delegacion Is indicated by 
the subsequent removal of its headquarters from Iqulque to 
Antofagasta because it had corrected boundary irregularities 
in Tarapaca#^
At the same time a lawyer was added to the Delegado1s 
staff, the office itself was more firmly established by the 
passage of a law regulating its activities# The law ratified 
in the main the organization and activities of the Delegacion 
as it had been previously established by decree#^
The Chilean nitrate policy promoted the growth of the 
nitrate Industry, but it was not solely responsible for the 
great strides made following 1860# Chileans claimed credit,
701 Aldunate Solar, Documentos Relativos a 3alltreras# Chilean Section, pp# 103-ltio# ~
Ibanez, Minas _i Salitreras, p# 263#
72Aldunate Solar, Documentos Helativos a Salitreras. Chilean Section, pp# 103~i®?F# ~
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however, for th© expansion of th© industry, and in an official 
publication after th© turn of th© century, four of the poll** 
cies of the government were noted as being Instrumental in 
this developments (1) government subsidisation of propaganda 
(2) introduction of a superior method of refining "after th© 
first years of Chilean dominance;" (3) "devolution of the 
nitrate beds to private property;" and (J4,) "disposition of the 
taxes on exportation, although high, « # # which would stimu­
late th© cheapest production*
i&hen properly evaluated, these assertions do not en*** 
tirely uphold the contention they were intended to maintain.
In reality, government support of propaganda did not assume 
major importance until th© end of the century; moreover, the 
development of the technical advance alluded to began during 
the period of Peruvian rule and apparently was not developed 
by Chileans#^ On the other hand, the return of th© industry 
to private enterprise was a positive and important factor in 
bringing about the enlargement of the industry# Furthermore, 
the method of carrying out this aspect of the Chilean nitrate 
policy had the merit of preserving th© interests of th© state 
and preventing the monopolisation of th© Indus try#
The high tax on nitrate exports, however, cannot b©
73ohiie# Satadistlca Miners de Chile ©n 1903 
(Santiago: Barcelona, 1965)5 1, 39* *
?^See Chapter V, p#l£3; Semper and Michels, Industria del Salitre, pp# olf.  1 1 " 1
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credited with promoting the expansion of the industry? nor 
was it imposed for the purpose of encouraging economy in 
working the nitrate deposits* Actually* the tax seems to have 
promoted the unwise practice of selecting first only the 
higher grade caliche for processing* This procedure resulted 
in progressively greater costs of production* not tame econo- 
my*75 pa?om the standpoint of th© government* the chief 
virtues of the high export tax were (1 ) that it preserved to 
Chile a large portion of the wealth produced by th© nitrate 
industry that otherwise might have been siphoned off by 
foreign interests; and (2) that it provided Chile with a 
lucrative source of revenue* On the other hand* the taxation 
policy created two imfortunate results*7& first lay in
the government*© excessive reliance xipon nitrate revenues* 
Secondly, th© high tax may have kept the price of nitrate at 
a level that encouraged th© rapid search for a synthetic 
substitute* Even before 1900* ^h© nitrate trad© felt th© 
competition arising from a synthetic fertilizer; and while 
the development of a practical substitute was not forthcoming 
for a decade and a half more* a number of experiments leading 
to that end were being conducted*77 Thus* in th© long run it
7^lbid*» pp* 97? Miguel Cruchaga* Salltre y Guano (Madrids Heus* I9 2 9)* P* 203* Cruchaga asaoFEs^mt^nEH©"* combinations caused producers to exploit their best lands first*
 ̂ 7^See Francisco A* Encina, Nuestra Infer!oridad economic a (Santiago i Uni vers i t ar i a , } * pp*r 278f • 
77south American Journal* XLIV (Jan* 2 9, I89I), 12lj_#
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might have been more prudent Tor Chile to exact a lighter 
tax# with lower prices and greater production forthcoming, 
Ghile would have, perhaps, retained her nitrate revenues 
intact without promoting competition# The heavy tax on 
nitrate exports in the nineteenth and early part of the 
twentieth centuries may have had a more profound influence 
on the history of present-day Chile than has previously been 
realized#
CHAPTER III
ENGLISH INVESTMJESSfTS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP
Th© capitalists oF Great Britain dominated th© in**
vestment Field in Latin America throughout the nineteenth
and Into the twentieth century. They made their First major
investments in Latin America in the 1820 *s$ however* losses
resulting From these investments curtailed th© Flow oF cap!-
1tal to Latin America For several decades* By the middle oF
the i8601 s English capitalists again began to expand their
interests* and English investments in Latin America mounted
steadily For the next thirty years* As a matter oF Fact,
during the last years oF the l8B0*s there occurred a great
boom on the London stock market centering around enterprises
2in these countries* Although Chile did not receive as large
English investments in Latin America during the 1820 *s had been placed chieFly in government bonds and min­ing enterprises* There Followed a spree oF speculation which ended with a crash in 1825* In the market collapse most oF the investments wore liquidated with disasterous losses For investors* J* Fred Hippy, "Latin America and the British Investment Boom,” Journal oF Modern History,XIX (1947), 129# See also C* It* llobson, "British Overs ©as Investments, their Growth and Importance," The Annals oF the American Academy oF Political and Social ScTeiicê ~T X̂V iTl (Hov* , 1916 ) Z( *
^J* Fred Hippy, "The British Investment Boom oF the l880fs In Latin American Minos,” jnter-AmorIcan Economic AFFaira * I (March, , Tip- -,n-
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investments as did many or her neighbors , English, capital 
placed in Chilean enterprises was extremely significant to 
that country* This was ©specially true because of investments 
made in th© all-important nitrate industry*
While French and German capitalists acquired import ant 
interests during the nineteenth century, they never serious­
ly challenged British supremacy in this field* Investments
in Latin America mad© by citizens of the United States were
qrelatively unimport ant * **
Although European investments in nitrates began in 
1 8 5 39 they were significant only after 18 65* Th© first 
Europeans to acquire interests in the nitrate industry wore 
engineers who came to Install nitrate producing machinery*
Many stayed and later obtained nitrate properties of thoir 
own or as frequently occurred, in partnership with Chileans 
or Peruvians* Their holdings, however, wore not largo and 
the men who founded them commanded too little capital to ex­
pand their interests* For th© most part, these pioneers 
from Europe came from either England or Germany*
Only after 1865 did Europeans with sufficient fi­
nancial resources to establish strong enterprises awaken to 
the opportunities that th© fields offered* In that year the 
English commercial and Investment firm of Anthony Gibbs and 
Sons transferred Its activities from the guano trade to th©
^Hebert Pels, Europe the World1 s Sankor, 1870-X9llj.(Hew Haven: Yale Univ* Pro as, Y536), PP# 3-8? gives a summary of European foreign investinonts*
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nitrate Industry.14- This company joined two other English 
producers already In the field who had become indebted to it* 
In forming th© Comoania de Balitres de Tarapaca* they operated 
two oficinas and claimed nine others*^ Other Englishmen, 
several Germans and a few Frenchmen also acquired important 
nitrate assets* Many of these individuals were later to 
participate in th© incorporation of th© industry on the London 
stock market*^ By 1872, European interests controlled ap­
proximately forty-six per cent of th© productive powers of 
the industry, while Peruvians possessed less than one-third*
In spite of these new foreign enterprises, statistics 
denoting th© productive power of the various nitrate pro­
ducers during the decade of the seventies ©how th© growth of 
Peruvian concerns and the decline in relative strength of
^ibbs and Sons began operating in Peru in 1826* Xt ia possible that the capture of th© Ghinoha Islands {where most of the guano was located) by the Spanish in 186!^ was a major cause of th© company’s action* See 11 Bon Jose"Santos Ossa, 11 Revista Chllena* L3CIX (Ho* 73), 19$*
^Billinghurst, Los capital©© aalitreros* pp* 31f•
LThe more important foreigners active in th© nitrate industry at this time were th© following* of English ex­traction, G* E* Brooking, J* D* Campbell, Mllbourne Clark,P* J* Eck, J* M* Xnglle, S* T* Humber©tone, H# B* James,E* Hains worth, Maurice Jewell, and G# Lomax; of German ex­traction, J* Glldermeister, and th© partner© invariably identified as Folsch and Martin#
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foreign operators* {Be© Table No* III below#)
TABLE III 
Distribution of Productive Power 
in tli© Nitrate Industry* l872**l878a
National of 1872 18714. 1878
Peru***•••• 29.3$ 56.8# 58.8#Chile•**•*# 25.0 20.0 19.7England**•# 23..8 1^5 13.4Germany* * * * 20.1 7.6 7.6France# #*#• 1̂ .0 1.1 «**«**■
11 aly##••*# — mm mm 0 .5
aAdapted from BIXlinghurst, Los capitales salitreros* p* 18*
These trends resulted from the policy of nationalization
7followed by Peru** A more detailed analysis of th© distri- 
button of nitrate interests by nationality Is presented in 
th© following table* number four* on the allocation of 
nitrate certificates# According to these statistics, Peru­
vians held over one-half of the certificates* Chileans owned 
eighteen per cent, and Europeans possessed almost twenty- 
eight per cent*
The decline of Chilean productive power in Tarapaca 
was partly compensated by the encouragement given by Chile 
to its industrialists to open th© newly discovered fields of
^See Tables III and IV on pages 81 and 32 respectively* While the data In these tables cannot be accepted as com­pletely accurate* th© trend of development Is probably re­liably indicated#
82
Taltal and AguaX Blancas# Production there and in Anto­
fagasta were not taken into accoimt in the above table? 
therefore* Chilean and English nitrate interests* too* would 
be slightly greater than is indicated in either Table III or 
IV.
The minority status of European capitalists In 1079# 
however, became a dominant one soon after the change to 
Chilean rule# Among the foreign Investors the English quickly 
became the ascendant group#
TABLE IV
Distribution of Nitrate Certificates 
by Nationality, l8?9a
Nationalof Value of Certificates PerCent Nat ional of Value of Certificates PerCent
PeruChileEnglanduemany
S 10,665,033 








1.7  ~o*l ~0#1
aBillinghurst, Los cap!tales Balltreros# p# 23# Total value of certificatesaccorciing^bo 1 e is
s 19,756,203#
The vast Increase in British investments rested in 
part upon the incorporation of properties already in Englishphands in 1879# Yet British dominance was the result of the
8Examples of this characteristic may be found in the following references: Chile, Ministerlo de Hacienda,F omen to de la industria salitrera (Santiago: Debates, I8 0 9),
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activities or three men, John Thomas North* Robert Boyd Harvey* 
and John Dawson* who prior to th© War of* th© Pacific had not 
been prominent in nitrate affairs* Even though these men had 
been unimportant earlier* they achieved a position of leader** 
ship within a short time* As the lists of directors in 
English nitrate companies show* many of th© pioneer English 
operators allied themsolves with the trio* By co-operating 
with one another* North* Harvey* and Dawson were able to ac- 
quire potentially valuable nitrate deposits at greatly reduced 
prices* Later they used these as the basis for th© numerous 
companies, whose formation in England they promoted in suc­
ceeding years*
Because two of the men held influential positions 
and because of their unusual ability* these men were in a 
position to capitalize upon the uncertain situation regarding 
the future of the industry created by the war* One of the 
triumvirate* Robert Harvey* was an engineer working for an 
oficina in Tarapaca7in the 1870*s*^ just before the war be­
gan he had been made Inspector Genera! of Nitrate by th© 
Peruvian government* Harvey had the good fortune to ingrati­
ate himself with the Chilean authorities when they invaded 
Tarapaca* and he was retained in his position for many months*
/p* 129* Augustin Ross* Llemoria sobre las Relaciones corner- dales ontre Chile y la Bran Bretafia "{LoVidoriT icjQRJ, Appendix ~ south American Journal and Brazil and .RiverPlate Mail (l55355)7  H v H J m T ;  1U99 )TSg7 “  — ^
9j* w* Merriarn to Dept* of State, Ho* 7 9* Dec* 26, 1879* Iquique, I*
81*.
As Inspector General* Harvey was able to acquire In partner­
ship with North and Dawson the right to operate several 
pricings belonging to the government* He was* likewise* in 
a position to obtain a thorough knowledge of the various 
nitrate establishments in Tarapaca" and to assess their value* 
Thus he gained within a short time priceless Information that 
enabled him to engage in the buying of nitrate properties 
with a minimum of risk* Moreover* as a Chilean official he 
was ever aware of the attitude of the government on the
question of whether or not th© industry would b© restored to
10private enterprise* It has been alleged that he was certain 
—*as early as the middle of i860*— that Chile would honor the 
Peruvian certificates and return the properties to holders of 
those securities* It is equally probable that he possessed 
no sure knowledge* but merely a strong suspicion that the 
devolution of the nitrate establishments to private ownership 
was the more likely course of action by th© government**^ 
Although Ilarvey held a strategic position* he
•^Billinghurst* Los capital©a salltreros* pp*I4.7* Cornejo* 131 Salitre* pp* GUf* l'obf$' soe also Osgood Hardy* "BrltisK titrates and the Balmaceda Revolution*'* Pacific Historical Review* XVII (May, I9I1-8 )* pp* 165-175*I have also used the Spanish translation of Hardy * s article which may be found in Revista Chi Iona* Ho* 113* PP* 6o~8l* and is entitled "Los inter©Wes salitroras y la revalueion de Balmaceda*"
^By mId-1800* the first Chilean nitrate commission reported in favor of restoring private enterprlso In the nitrate industry* However, the government took no stand on this question until a year lator* Bee Chapter II, p*
85
probably would not have acquired such vast holdings during
the war years had he not joined another Englishman, John
Thomas North, in the utilization of his knowledge# As a
12youth North had studied engineering Tor a few years# Be** 
fore completing his studies, he began working In a manufac­
turing plant near his home in heeds, England* In that occu­
pation he demonstrated sufficient ability to rise to the 
position of subforwman# North1 s great opportunity came in 
1869, mien his employer sent him to th© west coast of South 
America to supervise the Installation of some nitrate ma* 
chinery# Instead of returning to England after the job was 
completed, North remained to seek his fortune# Although 
virtually penniless, the future "Nitrate King" obtained work 
which enabled him to gain a reputation as an engineer# By 
1871 he had become manager of an oficina in Tarapaca#
Before long, he entered into other enterprises 
that gave him a sizable income# North held contracts with 
Peru to sell guano; he established a mercantile business in 
the major nitrate port of Iquique; and he became an agent for 
several shipping firms# Prom the standpoint of later events, 
the most important interest North acquired in the earlys1870fs was the Companla Proveodora# Based upon a concession 
granted by the Peruvian government, this company supplied
■̂ %Iardy, "Los intereses salitreras," pp# &9f#
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water to the towns along Peru’s nitrate coast*^ These 
various enterprises, developed without mueh capital, pro­
duced quick profits* Apparently, North promoted them in. 
order to establish himself in the nitrate industry* To do 
this required a large amount of capital for the purchase of 
lands and for the erection of a processing plant* It may 
have been that North approached his goal in 18?5 only to be 
prevented from continuing his plan by Peru’s nationalization 
scheme*
At any rate, North left for England in 1875 and 
did not return until shortly after Chile conquered the region* 
Upon arrival in Iquique early in i860, he and Harvey became 
close associates*^" Like Harvey, North ingratiated himself 
with the Chilean authorities by placing the ships of his 
water company at their disposal* Within a short time th© 
favor was returned in the form of a lucrative concession to
lgexport guano*
In 1800, both North and Harvey had important 
business relations with a third Englishman resident In 
Iquique— John Dawson. Dawson was the manager of the Iquique 
branch of the strong Chilean financial institution, the Bank
^Pedro Pablo Figueroa, Dicclonario blografico de extran.jeros en Chile (Santiago, I9 6 0) "pp* ̂ !}̂ )~16l j 'OoutK American JoumalV XL (Hay 9 # I8 9 6), 52q*
^"Se© the letter written by Harvey in Billlnghurst, Los capitales salltreros, pp* l̂iff, foot-note no* 1*
^Dennis, Tacna-Arlca Documents, pp* 169, I92*
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or Valparaiso*^* Because of his authority to lend money, 
Dawson was a necessary partner in the business designs or 
North and Harvey* The former had some capital of his own, 
but Harvey had no source of income sufficient to allow him 
to engage in the buying of nitrate certificates on a large 
scale* That Dawson did materially aid the pair in their
«| ntransactions and held an interest in them is quite certain*
As a result of a serious disagreement between himself and 
his employers, Dawson resigned his post in 1883* The misun­
derstanding miglit well have been over a reportedly contro-
"I 8versial loan he made to North and Ilarvey in 3.880* Some
16Billinghurst, Los capitales salitreros, p* 58* Billinghurst asserts that many Englislimen'T^orrowed the capital needed to get their start from Chilean banks* See pp* 9, 59* Dawson and Maurice Jewell, another associate of North * s, were members of the Municipal Council of Iquique from 18?9 to 1883* Valdes Vergara, Admlnistracion de Tarapaca» p* 38*
^In a pamphlet published in London toward the end of the nitrate boom the following charge was made: Mien "Hr* Dawson, was the agent of the Bank of Valparaiso, all the power and influence derived from that post were at the service and disposal of Mr* North* All the companies in which he was a shareholder and their friends had credit there* Those who could not count themselves among the list of his friends, or who had the indiscretion of not winning the sympa­thies of the almighty lord of the province, wore condemned to find the funds of the bank inaccessable, however good their securities*" See Anon*, The Nitrate Craze (London, 
1 8 0 9), p* 16* This quotation is an exc©rpt”from the Chilean newspaper Libertad Electoral*
^ In his book, Los capitales galitreros, pp# ^9 , 6 3, Billinghurst asserts that after Daws on’ * 0 loans' to North and Ilarvey became known to his superiors, they ordered an im­mediate recall of then* But Dawson allowed the account to remain outstanding anyhow* v/hen the eventual reckoning came in 1 8 8 5, the bank suffered a great loss because of the fall in the rate of exchange, from "^thirty-five to twenty-five pennies, occurring in the Intervening years*
years later, Dawson was again in charge of a bank In Iqulque* 
But this time* It was with a British firm and one controlled 
fay North. 19
The opportunity for these thro© Englishmen to os-* 
tablish themselves as nitrate producers came with the repeated 
disasters suffered by Peru during the war* Those occurrences 
and the feeling of uncertainty on the part of certificate 
holders concerning the future policy of the Chilean govern­
ment caused nitrate certificates to undergo a great decline 
in their market value* At this time many certificate holders, 
Peruvians particularly, believed that Chile might well follow 
the Peruvian example of monopolizing the industry and even 
refuse to honor the securities issued by the latter country* 
Especially in Lima, where the majority of the securities were 
located, owners of certificates displayed an eagerness to 
sell their interests*
North and Ilarvey journeyed to Lima to purchase 
oficinas at reduced prices on the supposition that Chile 
would recognize private rights and with a six hundred thousand 
peso letter of credit obtained from Dawson* All reports 
Indicate that their venture was most successful* Some au­
thorities claim they bought as many as nineteen ofIcinas at 
prices as low as twenty per cent of their face value, but
*^In 1 Q8l\.p Dawson established in Iquique a newspaper, El Progreso, for the purpose of supporting the nitrate Industry* P* P* Figueroa, Piccionarlo do extran.ieros * p* 77*
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it cannot be stated with certainty just bow many they purchased 
or at shat cost#^ It appears* however* that North and Harvey 
acquired nq .less than seven oricinas valued by the Peruvian 
government at S 800*000 (about & 150*000)#^ Based upon these 
properties lour companies were formed in England vfoose total 
capitalisation equalled h 835*000. Although the details of 
the North-Harvey transactions in Lima are obscure* North gave 
a general description of the situation some years later#
X comprehended* better than any other foreigner* the precise value of these certifi­cates* inasmuch as I knew* by my past work and travels* that some of these lands contained important nitrate deposits# I bought* then* at a great discount* a considerable quantity of them* convinced that the Chilean government would triumph in the war and that* once vic­torious* she would respect completely the proper­ty right that these securities emitfcdd/fcy /the vanquished constituted # • # • I practiced then a selection of these certificates with the object of increasing the exploitation of the nitrate fields that they comprised#“
Thus* by the time North and Harvey returned to Iqulque* 
they possessed the rights to most of the properties upon which
2°Comejo* El Salitre. p# 116*
^ ►Ibid. i The oficinag purchased by North and Harvey at this time were the Suen rietiro* Jaapampa* Nueva Carolina* Primitive, Peruana* Poao Almonte* and Hamires#
^Article by Gras ton Calmette In El Figaro (Paris)* April 23* 1895 and quoted in Cornejo# El^alltre. pp# llof# The quotation continuesj”• # « wishing tjo assure forever the prosperity of this Industry# of which no one In Europe sus­pected its great importance# I bought along with some friends the greater part of the shares of the railroad that served the region where the major nitrate lands were located. Thus* I became the arbiter of the future • # • #t
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they founded an immense nitrate interest* It may well be* 
as a contemporary alleged# that during this trip the two men 
acquired for little more than one hundred thousand pounds# 
oficinas that were capitalised at approximately one and a 
half million pounds on the London stock market*^ Certainly# 
the acquisitions were fortunate ones* For that# neither can 
be criticized as they have been by some Chilean and some 
British authors*2 -̂ But if Harvey did possess the confidential 
information that Chile would return the nitrate properties to 
the certificate holders# then malfeasance in office could be 
legitimately maintained* Of course# the liberality with 
which Dawson gave credit for this speculation fails to measure 
up to the equality of treatment that Is today deemed desirable 
in loan transactions* Nevertheless# one cannot view these 
dealings as either un-buslnessllke or as an isolated Instance 
of favoritism* They were fortunate speculations that were 
made possible in part by privileges in no way unusual then* 
Considering the risk involved in speculating in depreciated 
securities whose ultimate worth depended upon their validation 
by a government not originally responsible for their Issue# 
the profits resulting from the certificate purchases of North 
and Harvey were, in reality# partly justified* Others were 
trading in certificates at the same time# and there Is reason 
to believe that the firm of Gibbs and Company was undertaking
^Billinghurst# Los cap it ales salitreros* p* l|$* 
^ Tbid* # pass 1ml The Nitrate Craze, passim* 
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come speculations in certificates when North and Harvey made 
their eoup*^ These men were, as a matter of fact, akin to 
some of their North American contemporaries who, perceiving 
great developments to come in a particular industry, sought 
to capitalise upon the opportunities arising in like situ* 
ations* That a degree of chicanery was involved in the early 
development of tee nitrate industry should not be surprising 
t© North Americans whose own economic history is filled with 
similar incidents*
In the spring of 1882, North designated Dawson as his
pAagent in Iqulque and sailed for England* Within a few years 
he was to become a leading financier and the recognized head 
of the group of English investors who held strong interests 
in the nitrate Industry# The plans North formulated for the 
future monopolization of the Industry were grand in design^ 
and in spite of adverse circumstances, h© was partly sue* 
eessful in carrying them through* He headed, along with 
Harvey, a group that controlled three*fifths of the producing 
companies formed in England by I89O*
Of the six producing companies that North personally 
promoted, three were organized shortly after his arrival In 
England#^ The first, and by far the most remunerative, was
^Billinghurst, Los oapltales salitreross p* 49 
^Cornejo, HI Salitre, p# 128
^Por the English nitrate companies and their capi­talizations see Table V, p# 96 below*
9&
the Liverpool Nitrate Company, Limited* Capitalised at;
& 110,000, it purchased the oficina Ramirez from North and 
Harvey for ten times the price paid for it by those men in 
Lima* The differences existing in the purchase price in 
Lima (h £#000), the value of the oficina in certificates 
{& 13,750), and the selling price (h 50,000) led to the
pAcharge of over-capitalization* The record of the Liverpool 
Company, however, refutes the allegation} for it was the most 
profitable English producing enterprise in the industry for 
the next thirty years* Of the two other producing companies 
formed by North before 1888, the first, the Primitive Nitrate 
Company, Limited, was justly criticised for being over-* 
capitalized* The second, the Colorado Nitrate Company, 
Limited, achieved a status midway between the Liverpool and 
the Primitive*^
During this period when North was establishing him­
self in the industry as a major nitrate producer he extended 
his interests by acquiring control of the Nitrate Hallways
Company, the railroad that provided transportation for 
/ 30Tarapaea* With hi© extensive holdings, North represented 
the chief British Interest in Chilean nitrated by 1887* His
^Cornejo, El Salitre* p. 117} Billinghurst, Los capitales salltreros* p. I$*
^9por the dividends declared by these and other English companies see Table VII, pp* ll5f# See also. Ibid* * PP. 79-33# 90.
3%»or the history of this railroad (Nitrate Hallways) see Chapter XV*
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importance was i^eognised In the financial circles of London 
as is indicated by the favorable estimate of North that ap­
peared in an issue of the Stock BxehanR© in 1888*
The introduction of this great article of commerce is due to the ability and energy of Col* North* It is he who has practically intro­duced this fertilizer into the European mai’kets, he having discovered its valuable qualities in Chile* He has been rewarded for his exertions and prescience by having realized a princely fortune, which no on© Who knows him begrudges him* In making a fortun© himself he has been the cause of numbers of other persons also largely benefiting by his knowledge and influence* A© everybody knows, he is a self-made man, who carries his prosperity with a cheerful modesty, which indicates the innate true gentleman, and has brought him troops of friends*31
But North was still far from th© goal he had set for
himself| and in ensuing years, he attempted to solidify and
assure the dominance of his interests by monopolizing the
industry* In part, the basis for monopoly had already been
achieved*^ with transportation facilities under his control
and with a significant share of productive power, his chance
for success was great*33
To fulfill th© plan a major increase to th© pro-
duetive power of the North-Harvoy group was necessary* Thus,
North undertook the floatation of a vast number of producing
^Stock Exchange* as quoted in South American Journal* XXV (Oct* 5$, |
^See excerpt from Libertad Electoral in Nitrate Craze, p* 16*
"There may have been on earlier attempt. In XdQli, on th© part of Chilean producers to monopolise the nitrate industry* See South American Journal* XXI (May 8, 1081$.),
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companies on the London market, and in order to obtain the 
required response from purchasers of stock in England, he 
Initiated actions that brought special attention to nitrate 
securities*3!f 'Those companies that had already been formed 
were to act, in his scheme, as the attraction for this capi­
tal* The Primitive, Liverpool, and Nitrate Railways per- 
formed their function especially well# The first declared a 
ten per cent dividend in 1888 and in 1889# announced an as­
tounding seventy per cent return} for the second straight 
year the Liverpool came forth in 1888 with a forty per cent re­
turn andi iu I889, increased that to fifty-five per cent# 
Meanwhile, Nitrate Rails, which had returned only ten per cent 
in I887, declared cash dividends in both of the following 
years of twenty-five per cent# Th® London Nitrate Company, 
Limited— the one other company formed before 1888 but not 
within the North-Harvey orbit— declared a return of 8I4Z per 
cent in I889, its only dividend to common stockholders in the 
nineteenth century#
Th&ae immense profits produced the desired result, a 
great demand for nitrate shares#^ To capitalize upon this
^ 1B1 think, ” said North in an interview, "that# * • /nitrate securities/ form one of the best investments possi­ble# Nitrate is as yet in its Infancy} its properties are not realized# It is at once the best, the cheapest, and most successful fertilizer In tho world# In time every country will be obliged to use it#H New York Herald, quoted in the South American Journal* xxvi (F0E._^7"iOT§T,“ i79.
"Aa early as October, 1887, the South American Journal wrote of a boom in nitrates and commentecT'that " from a joint-stock point of view this nitrate industry is quit©
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"market boom" the interest group floated seven new producing 
companies and three service organisations whose combined capi­
tal equalled & 2#1*72#000#^ The eight other producing compa­
nies organised during the boom had a combined capitalization 
of & 2#857#800# Since four of these enterprises probably 
were connected with the North-Harvey group through inter­
locking directorates# the influence of the "Nitrate King" ex­
tended beyond the interest group p r o p e r #  37
Several service companies# whose activities were di­
rectly related to the nitrate industry# were formed by the 
North-Harvey group#3^ The first of these was the T&rap&ca 
Waterworks Co*# Limited# organized in 1888# It acquired a
new# but private capital has for years been employed in working nitrate factories • * • • i/ahd there is/ ample scope for the favorable utilization of joint-stock funds#” See XXIV (Oct. 1# 1887)# 562.
36*j3iQ seven new North companies were the Lagunas Syndicate# Paecha and Jazpampa# San Donato# San Jorge# San Pablo# San Sebastian# and Santa Elena* See Table V below#
37Th0 four companies connected by directorships wares Rosario# Santa Luisa# Lautaro# and Tamarugal# It was alleged# too# that the London company was under North *s influence#For the lists of directors see Stock Exchange Yearbook (London) (I89D# passim; See also Ross# ^eXagiones comeroialeg entre Chile y la gran Bretana# Appendix 25, jp* 236X# la© Wsario company represented the Incorporated holdings of the German J# Gildenaelster, and the Tamarugal was formed from the nitrate lands possessed by A* Gibbs and Sons# See Billinghurst# Los capitalea salltreros* pp. 87, 90«
3^North had other enterprises in the nitrate region not represented by English companies# He was th© principal stockholder In the gas company that served the nitrate port of Iqulque# and he was part owner of the Tarapaca Foundry •See Cornejo# El Salltre* p# 130
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TABLE V
British Investments In Nitrate Enterprises* 1090*
Company Bate Total ,Organised Capital0
Ltd.
Producing Companies
^Colorado Nitrate Co.* Ltd.Julia Nitrate Co.* Ltd. •^Lagunas Syndicate9 Ltd. •Lautaro Nitrate Co. 9 Ltd..^Liverpool Nitrate Go., Ltd.London Nitrate Co., Ltd. .New Tamarugal Nitrate Co., Ltd. Acquired Tamarugal Nitrate Go Termed in I889  •a-Paceha and Jaspampa Nitrate Co* *Prlmitiva Nitrate Co., Ltd.. .Rosario Nitrate Co., Ltd.. , .©San Donato Nitrate Co., Ltd. «*San Jorge Nitrate Co., Ltd.. *#5an Pablo Nitrate Co., Ltd.. .*San Sebastian Nitrate Co., Ltd. •sSanta Elena Nitrate Co., Ltd..Santa Luisa Nitrate Co., Ltd..Santa Rita Nitrate Co., Ltd. •Taltal Nitrate Co., Ltd. . . .  Tarapaca' Nitrate Co., Ltd. « •Total Gapltal of Producing Companies
Service Companies










1 1 0 .0 0 0160.000
6 5 0 .0 0 0
3 6 0 .0 0 0
2 0 0 .0 0 0  1,2550,000
1 6 0 .0 0 0
3 7 5 .0 0 0160.000
1 4 5 .0 0 0110.000
2 5 0 ,0 0 0
9 6 ,3 0 081,000 80,5004,964,800
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0100,000
7 0 0 *0 0 0
3,4 4 3 *0 0 0514.800
610,622,600
aContplled from the Stock Exchange Year~Book (I89I), passim. ̂  ̂
^Total Gapital Includes outstanding bends as well asshares.
#North*Harvey Companies
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going concern by purchasing the Proveedora Cia, which had 
long supplied water to Iqulque and controlled the water sup- 
ply business in Pisagua# Col# Horth, th© owner of this enter­
prise and the promoter of the English concern# received a 
total of & 150,000 for his interests*^ Before the Tarapaca7 
Waterworks was created# the water-supplying monopoly of Col* 
Worth was seriously challenged by a project engaged in by 
another Englishman* Thomas Hart* In 1885 the latter obtained 
from th© Chilean government a concession to pipe portable 
water to Iqulque from th© Pica springs that lay southwest of 
Iqulque on the eastern edge of Tamarugal Fampa* Horth tried 
to discredit Hart and his project, since it threatened M s  
water business with complete ruin* Fortunately for Horth#
Hart died before completing his project, and wTh© HItrate 
King* purchased the concession from Hart1 s heirs for some 
i* 35,000*^° With a capital of & lj-00,000, Tarapaca f/aterworks 
enjoyed a steady prosperity and returned to its shareholders 
slightly more than Its capital by 1900* Iqulque, Pisagua, 
Arica, the Nitrate Hallways, and some of the oficinas were 
served by the company*
At the time the waterworks firm; was being organised, 
the North-Harvey group founded the Bank of Tarapaca and 
London with a capital of h 500,000* John Dawson, still a
^investor*s Heview (London), II (I8 9 3), pp. 135f.
verbid.$ Libert;ad Electoral quoted In The.NitrateCrase, p. 17} Guillermo E* Billinghurst, OeoCTafTa <fe 1.Tarapaca (Santiago1 El Progreso, 188?), p# Ill, ' ̂
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close associate of the interest group, was placed in charge 
of the bank* It was not an immediate success* however# since 
Its activities were solely with the nitrate industry and with 
companies whose precarious position lowered Its reputation. 
Nevertheless, It slowly established itself until by I892 It 
was able to return profits to Its owners# which# while low in 
comparison with tt©ae made by other service companies# were 
steady.^
In I8 8 9# th© Nitrate Provisions Supply Company# 
Limited* with a capital of h 100*000# was added to the growing 
list of North-Harvey companies. Its purpose# as stated in the 
prospectus* was to establish a fleet of steamers to supply 
foodstuffs* merchandise* and other goods to the oficinas of 
Tarapaca. The design* though never realised* was to obtain 
a monopoly on supplying the company stores. It was claimed 
that success was assured because the directors also held po­
sitions of influence in eight producing companies and in the 
water and railway enterprises. As Billinghurst noted at the 
time* the enterprise had no chance of success since its eapi* 
tal could in no way b© considered sufficient to monopolise a 
trade in Innumerable articles whose annual Import value ex* 
ceeded two million pounds.^2 Th© prediction proved correct. 
The company never prospered.
^ "South American Journal* XLVII (Oct. 28* 1899)#5>0*?1 Stock"SESEan^e Yearbook YX&91). p. 3»
^Billinghurst# Los capltales aalitreros. pp. 106-112.
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Much later, in 1895# the North-Harvey group floated its 
final service company* th© Nitrate Producer1© Steamship Compa­
ny* Its operation was given to another firm with the stipu- 
lation that no renmmeration would be received by th© operators 
if net profits fell below ten per eent#^ Th© company operated 
several ships competently, and an average dividend of eight 
per cent on its h 100*000 capital was declared during th© first 
six years it functioned*
These service companies, capitalised for a total of 
one million pounds, were organised by North as part of his 
plan to monopolize the industry# While they provided neces­
sary services, the banking and provisioning needs of th© 
Industry especially were far greater than North1® resources 
could supply* Thus, only the waterworks company, already a 
flourishing monopoly prior to its incorporation in England, 
experienced better than moderate success#
By 1690, nitrate companies formed in England domi­
nated the industry# British investment® in th© nitrate 
industry totalled, h 10,622,600, and English producing compa­
nies represented more than half of th© productive power of 
the industry*^ The investments were distributed as follows:
& li-,9 6 4 ,8 0 0 into eighteen nitrate producing firms* h 700,000
^South American Journal, XXXVTII (March 16, 1895)#293#
44xbld* XXX (Feb# 7, 1 8 9 1), 163# According to my ealculatIons eased upon th© reported production per ofielna in I89O, the British controlled almost fifty-six per cent In that year#
into a combination produc ing and railway enterprise; and 
& ̂ 957#800 into the three service companies and two railroads* 
or the total British capital# the North-Harvey interests con** 
trolled approximately sixty per cent {$» 6*390*000)* Of the 
capital devoted to producing companies# the group represented 
about forty per cent (& 1#9^7#000)* Because of the relative 
unity among British producers provided by the inter-locking 
directorates of th© chief interest group# the "Nitrate King" 
held an even more significant place in nitrate affairs than 
is indicated by the productive power of his producing compa­
nies*^ His primacy# although not complete# was recognised 
by his election as president of the Permanent Nitrate Corn** 
mittee established in bondon in 1889* ^  Until his death#
North held that position*
North*a Influence in the industry was further enhanced 
through his relationship with British consular officials sta­
tioned in Tarapaca* In 1889 the vice-consul at Iqulque#
Maurice Jewel# was promo ted to the consulship*^ Because 
Jewel was a partner of North# a special relationship was 
apparently established favorable to th© interest group* The
Fred Hippy# "Iniciativas economic as del *Rey del Salitre* y de sus socios en Chile#" Revista Chilena* No* 113 (Jan*-June* 19^9 )# p* 83 and f0 0tnote1,rno*™" If5r ffls "artlole 1® a translation of an article appearing in th© Pacific His­
torical Review* XVII (Nov*# 194#># i*57-if65.
^Asociacion Salltrera d© Propaganda# Circular Trimestral* Iqulque# No* 12 (Aug* 21# I8 9 6)# Appendix#' p* 3#
k7j?. 0* to Maurice Jewell# No* 1# June# I889# F* 0*16/257.
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British Minister to Chile recognised the Inadvisability of 
this situation and recommended a change# He advised th© 
Foreign Office that Ww© want a regular consul at Iqulque*** 
the present man and his vice are partners of Col# Horth, wh 
is not quite correct and Iqulque is an important Fort# » • • 11 ̂  
In all probability nothing was done to oust Jewel, sine© as 
late as 1895 the vice-consul at Fisagua was connected with 
the Horth group as an agent of the Nitrate Railways company#^ 
Just before th© boom collapsed the producing compa­
nies possessed a market value of almost nine million pounds—  
approximately sixty per cent above their par value#-*® Compa­
nies formed before the boom days had declared by I89O no less 
than forty-eight per cent In dividends, and on© had returned 
to its stockholders 181 per cent# Meanwhile, many of those 
created in the early years of the boom had already made 
profits# Squally promising were th© adjunct enterprises, 
although only Nitrate Rails had proved Its worth#
Th© rapid floatation of these companies had been 
aided by the current wave of prosperity in the industry# That 
in turn stimulated rampant speculation in nitrate securities# 
The extent of this speculation can be seen in th© table on
^Kennedy to Sanderson, May 27, I89O, F# 0# 16/2^9*The action taken by The Foreign Office on this matter was not revealed in the transcripts obtained from th© Public Record Office#
Hayes Sadler to Salisbury, No# 6 , Jan# 23, IS9 6,F# 0# 16/2 9 6#
Journal of Finance (London), II (Oct*, I8 9 7), 11̂ 9#
ioa
the market value of nitrate stocks during the boom years* 
The deflation that followed in I69O is also shown* North* 
himself, seems to have encouraged speculation in the shares 
of his companies, although he denied the charge* A few
TABLE VI 
Stock Market Quotations 
For Some Nitrate Companies, l888**189Ga
Far Highest Highest Highest QuotationCompany Value Quotation Quotation Quotation on Nov* 28,
1888 1689 I89O I89O
Colorado * 5 11 7 /a 11 15/16 5 1 /2 2 1 /2
Lautaro 10 9 1 /8 8 4  1 /2
Liverpool 5 33 3 A 31 18 7
London 5 31 1 /8 31 1 /2 10 h
Primitive 5 39 1/2 38 3 A 23 6
San Jorge 5 *»«*«•«• 12 1 /8 7 5 /16 5
San Pablo 5 18 3 A 15 1 /2 5 lA 2
aInvestorfs Monthly Manual (London), Nov* 2 9, I89O,p* f>6 6*
unheeded voices had warned of the vicissitudes for investors 
who recklessly participated in this speculative mania and 
pointed out the lack of stability in the nitrate industry*-^
^^Flnanclal Times (London), April 30, 1 889, quoted in Henry SewelX iXana, BrTtlah Capital and Chilean Industry (London* T* I* Johnson, 108$} ,pp. T-2* In" l¥82V' Gana tried to gain the assent of the producers In Aguas Blancas to
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Perhaps the sharpest of these warnings came in 1687 from a 
British consul In Chile whose report predicted a sharp decline 
in nitrate prosperity and stated that the promoters in London 
"wrer© going out on top of the tide* 11
Col* North*a importance in the nitrate industry led 
the press to give him the title of the "Nitrate King*" and 
he lived the part in both public and private llfe*^ A 
leading gossip columnist of stock market affairs who called 
himself "Diogenes," repeatedly remarked that "whatever he 
touches seems to turn to gold*"^ Another comment, equally
th© formation of an English company which would monopolise operations in that field* He failed* Judging from his attitude as expressed in this book, the experience soured him on the nitrate industry* See p* 5>*
^Great Britain, Foreign Office, Diplomatic and Consular Reports* Misc* Series, I889, No*’1' 122V “',rri,ri
^Lat© In the year 1888, North attended a dinner given by the financier Rothschild* Also in attendance were Lord Randolph Churchill and the Prince of Wales* The Weekly Bulletin consnenteds "We wonder what the Colonel1 s intro- duct ion to the Prince and the rest of th© aristocracy will cost him?" Quoted in the South American Journal* XXV (Dec* 29,1888), 1060* A week earlier It was reported that Col*North "is going to start the season with a big fancy dress ball at the Hotel Metropole* He has become Master of the Mid-Kent Staghounds, and it is boasted that at the first meet under his mastership, at Farmingham, the other day, l)|l) bottles of champagne were opened before the hunt com­menced* Col* North is a rather well-built man, with a florid full face, whiskers, and a moustache* He is Col* of a Volunteer regiment*" Ibid** Dec* 22, 1888, p* 1026* For a description of the fancy dress ball see Hardy, "Los intereses salltreros," p* 7i}-#
^South American Journal* XXV (Nov* 17, 1888), 868* North had many other enterpris©a outside the field of nitrates* He invested in the Arauco Co*, which mined coal in southern Chile, and he held interests in a West Australian Gold Mine*
remarkable* noted that "Rothschild in financial topics occu­
pied a lesser place to Mr# North# Two other English 
publications, the Pall Mall Gazette and the Financial Times, 
largely concurred with the prevailing opinion of Col# North 
and added their laudations of th© "Nitrate King#"^ However* 
at least one contemporary journal, the Financial News, used 
critical language in referring to th© activities of North and 
regularly disparaged his interests*^?
The opposition to North rested* first, on the belief—  
largely substantiated at a later time— that he was more of 
a promoter and speculator than a businessman# Secondly, the 
antagonism against him was concentrated among th© nitrate 
enterprisers outside of the interest group, ©specially among 
those trying to form companies to exploit the deposits of 
Taltal* North mad© vigorous efforts to frustrate th© plans 
of others, and what was called by some a "Nitrate War" raged 
between th© Taltal and North groups for many months# At a 
gathering of North *s followers early in 1889, a lieutenant of 
the "Nitrate King" virtually declared war on the Taltal group 
in a "remarkably outspoken speech," while North himself 
asserted that any investments placed in companies operating
^Cornejo, El Salltre# p# 128#
£6See South American Journal. XXVI {Feb. ?, I8G9),177I For the comment of "the Stoctc Scchanpte* that "newspapers that have spoken well of his ventures have not found him un­grateful," see Ibid*, Feb# 16, 1889, p# 211#
^North carried on a feud with th© Financial News#See Ibid* * Feb# 9, 1889, p# 177# _ r
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in Taltal would be wholly lost*^8 Referring to North*8 fight 
with the Taltal interests* the South Amerlesm Journal made 
th© following observation* "With the beet intention©* hie 
opinions may be affected by his interests* These are evl** 
dently hostile to th© Taltal competition**1̂*?
North * a campaign against th© Taltal Interests is on-* 
tirely understandable* He had reaped a fortune in the boom / 
years* but he had not achieved his objective of monopolising 
th© industry* To b© sure, th© group h© headed controlled 
slightly less than fifty per cent of the productive capacity
Aapossessed by English companies* Yet that strength was more 
apparent than real because the Primitive company* which ac­
counted for almost on© quarter of the production of the group* 
had virtually exhausted its deposits* A sharp decline in 
productive power was imminent* Then, too, lacking a much 
greater control over production, North could not hope to 
dominate the non-Bnglish producers* His opposition to the 
development of the deposits outside of Tarapaca constituted 
an attempt to minimis© the magnitude of th© task that he still 
had before him*
£6ibid.. pp. 163, 177*
•*9Ibid.. p. 177. The oossnent continued* "With all respect for Col* North, we are disposed to think he Is a little arrogant when he virtually proclaims that every con­cern, not brought out under hie auspices, mot b© undeserving of public support*f<
^Calculated on the basis of production reports for th© year IS90*
^Billinghurst, Loo capital©© aalitreros* p* 9 1*
106
To pursue M s  plans, North found It necessary to go
A2to Chile in 1869* He wanted to obtain additional nitrate 
establishments* Since the possibility of buying from private 
holders was small, the realisation of the scheme rested upon 
the "Nitrate King*s” ability to pursuade the Chilean govern* 
ment to revive its policy of selling state-owned properties*^ 
With this in mind, North began his well-advertised and osten­
tatious voyage to Chile * ^  He used all means at his command 
to gain a favorable press in Chile and to convince the 
Balmaeeda administration of the wisdom of offering state
Ap°tfNorth obtained a letter of introduction from the Foreign Office to the Charge d* Affairs at Santiago* Since these letters were rather freely granted, it does not appear that North received special consideration* See letter of introduction given North, Jan* 2I4., 1889, F* 0* 16/256*Another was provided W* E* Spencer, Jan* 30, I889* F* 0*
16/2 5 7.
■^North also wanted to check on his other Interests in Chile* The most important was the Nitrate Railways, whose monopoly was being threatened by the government of Chile*In addition, North was part owner of the Arauco Go*, a coal mining and railroad concern operating in southern Chile, and he was part owner of several enterprises located In Iqulque* One was th© commercial firm of North and Jewel, and another was the Tarapaca' Foundry* See William H* Russell, A Visit to Chile and the Nitrate Fields of Tarapaca (London? 1J* s* vTrtue & Co* , I89O), p* V?*
%0ver two hundred persons were reported to have cheered North at the train station when he and his party were starting their journey to the seaport of Liverpool* Among the twenty people in the group were two newsmen, William H* Russell, formerly of the Times (London), and Montague Vltzetelly, representing the Financial Times* Apparently, North hoped these reporters would provide him with favorable press contacts in Chile* North stated that the expenses of this trip amounted to h 20,000* See South American Journal* XXVI (Feb. 9, 1 8 8 9}, 176 and XXVII (Dec'.Sl, 1889), 1 W ?Also consult Hardy, "Loa interoaoa salitreros," p. 75.
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nitrate deposits for sale* But even in personal talks with 
the president and other government officials, he met with 
hostility* While formerly Balmaceda had contemplated a new 
auction of state properties, he had abandoned th® plan be­
cause he feared foreign interests would obtain most of th© 
lands offered* A sale, he felt, would enable them to es­
tablish a monopoly over Chile’s most important industry*^*
The official and personal attitude of the president toward 
English investments in th© nitrate industry and regarding
Col* Berth specifically was so unfavorable that he publicly
fihcriticised the "Nitrate King’s” private transactions. We 
can, therefore, credit Balmaceda’s policy with preventing 
th© culmination of the design that North had in mind when 
making his voyage to Chile*
Before North returned to England in the summer of 
18&9* there were indications that a period of depression was 
in store for the industry*^ Although this fact was not 
fully recognised immediately, the years I89O, I89I were 
ones of reduced earnings* Only five of the nineteen pro­
ducing companies paid dividends in these years* The aftermath
^Russell, A Visit to the Nitrate Fields, p* 312*
^Ibld* * p* 62* For other aspects of North’s voyage to Chile see Chapter VIII, pp* 2l£ff*
^See Chapter VI for more about the depression* At the same time, the market for nitrate securities weakened*The stock market gossip, "Diogenes," claimed North’s absence was the cause* South American Journal, XXVI {Feb* 9, 1889), 193f* But others said investors were selling while prices were still high* Investor’s Monthly Manual (London), XIX (March 30, I889), 99# ~
of the boom revealed the instability of th© nitrate trade and 
showed the weaknesses of many of the enterprises* It also 
demonstrated that the high expectations stimulated by the 
high dividends of th© boom years would not be reached for 
most companies*
While the heritage of the boom remained to plague 
some enterprises until the end of the century, two companies 
in particular suffered harshly from the effects of being 
formed hastily and unwisely* On© of these* the Tarapaca 
Hit rate Company, Limited* was organised in 1889 by promoters 
who had no particular property in mind for th© firm to oper«* 
ate# The promoters expected to purchase an oficina either 
from the Chilean government or through a private transaction# 
Eighty thousand five hundred pounds were subscribed as th© 
capital* and the chairman of th© company proceeded to Chile 
to buy a property# When it proved to be impossible to purchase 
an oficina* it was decided to invest in th© shares of a new 
North-Harvey company, th© Faccha and Jazpampa# Poor business 
management* however# led to th© exhaustion of the entire capl~ 
tal# leaving no funds to meet past and current expenses* A 
threatened foreclosure was forestalled by an exchange of 
shares with the Paecha but Involved a severe loss to in* 
vestors#^®
The second example was the Primitive, one of th© first 
companies associated with the Interest group# During th© boom#
68Soath American Journal. XXXI (Aug. 21, I89I), 215.
there had been a great deal of speculation in Primitive stocks 
Much of it* of course* was stimulated by the dividend of 
seventy per cent declared in I889* But when the Primitive 
failed to declare a dividend in IQ90* it was revealed that 
the previous one had been distributed on expected profits and 
with borrowed money* Faced with a debt of h 200*000 and with 
exhausted soils* it could not regain its former position of 
eminence* No further dividends were declared by this company* 
When making plans in 1895 for a reorganisation* which failed* 
North announced at th© stockholder1© meeting that he owned 
5*J|3G shares bought at a total of 3» 122*000* Intended to 
gain the confidence of the stockholders, his attempt backfired 
when It was revealed that he originally held 16*000 shares* 
Other directors of the firm also were charged with selling 
out at th© high boom prices*^ As on© financial Journal 
pointed out* North and his friends 11 sold and sold1’ while they 
were urging others to "buy and hold*" With such revelations* 
North began to lose his influence among nitrate Investors*^® 
Those who had previously relied upon his financial keenness 
and refused to believe th© allegations made against him* now 
began to regard him with resentment*
As so often happens* the majority of commentators 
accepted the boom while It flourished with few reservations* 
but later on evaluated it more critically* The South American
69ibld., XXXIX (Nov. 9, 1095), 491* Grt* Br., Consular Reports* Mise* (1889)* No* ll|2*
70south American Journal* XXXIX (Nov* 2* 1895)*
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Journal could well be placed In this category# The estimate 
of th© Economist in 1896 reflected th© opinion of nitrate 
Investors who were facing with apprehension a period of sever© 
depression* It stated that ”in its limited sphere there ha© 
been no more outrageous boom* * * than in th© shares of th© 
companies* which under th© auspices of* * * Colonel North, 
were formed in such rapid succession for working nitrate 
properties in Chile.”^  North provided a convenient scapegoat, 
and in some ways he deserved the abuse heaped upon him*
The companies floated under the auspices of North and 
Harvey provided huge profits to the promoters, #10 reaped 
additional rewards by speculating in th® securities of their 
companies. Because they were primarily interested in gaining 
immediate returns from their Investments, as well as attract­
ing support for their stock floatations. North and Harvey 
followed the practice of declaring as high dividends as possi­
ble* This, of course, led to future financial weakness for 
their companies*^ Most contemporary observers, too, testify 
that the North—Harvey enterprises were over-capitallaed.73
The Lagunas affair provides a clear, although ex­
aggerated, example of the methods employed by Col* North*
^ The Economist (London), LIV (Aug* 1, I89O), 999*
7̂ Xbld» 1 Excerpt from th© Financial Times (Sept* 2, 
1896) quoted in South American Journal,̂‘ "&f (Sept* J>, 1896), 
260$ The Investment itSex*'' a1' quarVerljy supplement to th© Investor*© Mont hiyManual, March 30, 1889, p* 99*
73r0ss, Helac .tones comerciales entr©; Chile y; la Gran Bretana, p* 111*
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While in Chile in 1889# Horth had purchased for h 110*000
the nitrate lands known as L a g u n a s #  ̂  ^ney were located south
of the main deposits in Tarapaca and had no rail facilities#
That same year he organised the Lagunas Syndicate Company*
Limited* and transferred the property to it for seven hundred
7$pounds In cash and shares valued at Is 109*300# Lagunas 
Syndicate had a total capital of Si 162*000* In X8 9 2 the value 
of the property was greatly enhanced when nitrate Rails**** 
also controlled by North*— contracted to extend its track to 
Lagunas#
By I89J4. the time was propitious for floating a new 
company because prosperity for th© nitrate industry had re** 
turned# North was ready and he organized the Lagunas Nitrate 
Company, Limited, with a capitalization of & 900*000#
Lagunas Nitrate bought one-third of the property of Lagunas 
Syndicate for h $$0,000 In cash and fc 300*000 in shares*^ In 
this scheme, the important fact was that the directors of 
both companies were identical* North and his cohorts, as 
heavy investors in Lagunas Syndicate, were organising Lagunas 
Nitrate solely for their own profit*^? prom the money derived
7^Comejo, El Salltre* p* 13$
7%outh American Journal. XLIV (June 2 9 * 1 8 9 8 ), 122f.
Railway Time8 (London), LXXIII (May lit* I8 9 6 )» 61̂.7. Apparently, tagunas Syndicate sold Its shares of Lagunas Nitrate (since th© directors undoubtedly knew their true value) for h 32lj.,000#
77xnve3tor'a Review. VIII (Oct., I8 9 6 ), 305.
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In the sale* Lagunas Syndicate declared a dividend of one 
hundred per cent— the first return it made* The deal* 
likewise, made possible a significant increase in the eapi~ 
taliaation of Lagunas Syndicate* By 1896 its capital had 
risen from h 162,000 to h 1*100,000* At the same time, North 
contrived in another way to profit from the floatation of 
Lagunas Nitrate* In distributing the shares of the company 
he and his friends retained most of the stock# This had the 
effect of creating a great demand for it on the stock exchange# 
Speculation in Lagunas Nitrate shares ensued, and some paid 
as high as h if93* for the ii 100 shares#^ North*s scheme has 
been described as follows 1 ,fBeyond the bare number required 
to keep the stock exchange in a good humor, all the shares 
were allotted to the directors and their entourage# whom the 
public were subsequently induced to relieve of their holdings 
• # « #«79 a comparison of the records of share ownership 
in Lagunas Nitrate reveals a startling amount of selling in 
the manner described above# North, his wife and son, Lord 
Rothschild, Dawson, and others too decreased their holdings 
tremendously, tfhile only two stockholders increased the 
number of shares they held at the time of the allotment#®^ 
Fortunately for North, the details of these dealings were
?^South American Journal* XXXVI (June 16, I89I}.), 651# 
^Investortg Review* II (Oct#, 1893), 332#
80Ibld.. VIII, (Oct., I896), 305.
not revealed until after his death*
In spite of the recession of 1890*1891 and the debacle 
of the Primitive* Col* North retained his leadership of 
English interests* throughout the period from I890 to 1 8 9 6# 
most of the British companies returned adequate dividends*
This was ©specially true during the prosperous times from 
I893 through 18 95* Among the companies sponsored by North 
and Harvey* the most successful producing firm continued to 
be the Liverpool Company# From 1890 to 1896 it declared 
dividends amounting to 125 per cent# This brought the total 
returns made in thirteen years by the Liverpool enterprise 
to three times its capital# While this company was called 
"the bright particular star of the North group" It was also 
alleged that "it has acted • • # as a decoy duck to the public 
by attracting money Into similar but overcapitalised ventures 
# * * ^"81 3an Jorge company delivered 8?^ per cent
during an equal period and brought its total returns to 
slightly over on© hundred per cent for the eight years it had 
operated* The record of the Lagunas Syndicate ©quailed that 
of the San Jorge# Other profitable North*Harvey companies 
and the total dividends they declared from I89O to I896 were 
the San Pablo (IjX)#)* the Paccha and Jasp&mpa (324$)# and the 
Colorado (234$)# The New Taraarugal paid its eight per cent 
preferred shares* but the other producing companies in the
^Financial Times as quoted in the South American Journal# xfeSTTSeptTXl& 1 8 9 5 ) *  2 8 5 #  - - - - - -  ™L ~ m
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interest group declared low dividends or non© at all*
Of the eight companies outside the North-Harvey group
the London company continued to be the moat profitable# It
distributed dividends of 95 per cent on its preferred stock
between 1688 and 1896* Three others* the Santa KIta (1*.8$£)#
the Rosario (38^)* and the Consolidated (26^) mad© good
records* After the Lautaro merged with the Santa Luisa in
I892* It paid ifO per cent in dividends before I896* Both the
Julia and the Taltal companies experienced continued weakness
throughout the prosperous period* and even an amalgamation
of these two firms in 189!̂ failed to improve their statu©#
Between the sunsser of 1895 summer of I896
important changes occurred in the nitrate Industry with the
development of a depression* This decline continued with
a plittle abatement until the close of the decade* The do- 
press Ion in turn led to a serious diminution in the market 
value of the shares of companies engaged in or dependent upon 
the nitrate industry# Prom June to September, 1895# pro­
ducing companies suffered a loss In market value of on® 
million pounds* and a like amount was lost by Nitrate Rails# 
The lack of confidence in companies in the North-Harvey 
group* with the exception of the Liverpool* caused investors 
in those companies to bear the brunt of the losses*®^
®%ee Chapter VI* p*l80ff far a discussion of this nitrate depression*
®-%* inane ial Times as quoted in the South American Journal# xffiBT(Stept# l̂ *" 1895)* 285# ----
TABLE VII
Dividends Declared by English Nitrate Producing Companies*(Common Stock)
1890 1890 1891 1892 1893 I89lf 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 I9OO
Allansa Org# nil nil nil 6 6
Amelia Org. nil nil nil nil
^Colorado lj£| nil nil 3 6 8 6| nil nil nil nil nil
Consolidated 8̂ 13 5 k 2 2 2 2Bsperansa G*g. nil
Julia nil nil
Julia-Taltal Org. nil
^Lagunas NI* 74 nil nil nil nil nil nil
^Lagunas S&# nil nil nil nil nil nil 100 jj. 2 nil 3 k
Lautaro 5 nil nil 5 10 15 10 10 6 3 k 6
-̂Liverpool 181 nil nil izi 22 k 35 30 25 15 12|? 15 35
^London 81̂ 2 nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil 2§ 2| 8
New Julia Org. nil nil
lew Paccha
& Jazpampa Org# nil nil
cN@w Tama- -Srugal nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil nil
^Paccha h 6 124Jaspaapa 2§ 2§ 9 nil
^Primitiva 80 nil nil nil nil nil nil
Rosario 71 nil 6 124 10 6 nil nil nil 34








#San Donato nil nil nil nil 24 24 nil nil nil nil nil
*San Jorge 15 10 15 12k i7i 20 124 10 Ik 7k 7§ 74
«San Fablo 
tfSan
20 2i 10 12| 10 5 nil nil nil nil nil 24















nil 13 1$ 10 10 nil nil 24 5
aCompiled from the Stock Exchange Year-Book (I889-I9OI}* passim*
^Of this companyfs h l6o*O00 capital* h 110.000 is in preferred shares of 7 per cent*
c0f this company * s 6 390*000 of share capital* h 195*000 Is in preferred shares of 8 per cent*
%his eonpany paid common shareholders 2k per cent in the years 1892-1894.# 
Original Morth-Harvey companies#
Then* as the decline set in* another blow hit the 
industry. Col* North died or apoplexy at a stockholder*s 
meeting*®^- Coinciding with the depression* North1 s death re­
moved the sole remaining symbol of a thriving era for the 
nitrate investors. And even though much criticism had been 
leveled at him for several years* on© newspaper* ishlch had 
been quite unfavorable toward the man in his later life* re­
marked: "His removal from the field whatever the ultimate
effect will be must cause disorganisation* and his blunt 
bluffness will be missed from many a company meeting for some 
time to come*"^
For a while* the market reflected the loss of North 
who had been chairman of six nitrate companies (this number 
Includes service companies) and a director in three others#
^Ibid# * XL (May 9# IS9 6 }* 510* A short biographical article follows on p* North built an "Italian Palace"at Sltham* Kent which he called Avery Hill* It was located on an estate approximately i|50 acres In extent* Avery Hill contained a picture gallery 100 feet by 50 feet* a dining room 50 feet long* and a wbig* brilliant ballroom decorated in crimson velvet* Th© picture gallery was panelled In mahogony and marble* onyx* and til© mosaic were used In various rooms •** The cost of building was between & 250*000 and h 300*000* See South American journal* XXVII (Sept* 21* 
1 8 8 9)* 381; XIiI (July 11* 18^6)* SoFEli entertained atAvery Mil all important Chileans visiting In England*P. P* Figueroa* Dlccionario d© ext rani ©ros* p. 160*
^Pall Mall aa&ette (London)* May 6 * I8 9 6* p* 4* Flowers were sent to North's funeral by over on© hundred persons or businesses* Included In this group were the Prince of Wales* the King of Belgium, and th© Khedive of Sgypt. See South American Journal* XL (May l6 * I8 9 6)* 51̂ 9*
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In addition* North had many other enterprises independent of 
nitrates*^ The belief that he held large blocks of stocks* 
however* was not justified by the fact* Apparently* Horth 
had reduced his holdings considerably or transferred them to 
his son*^ The market recovered after this disclosure* but 
the depression continued to harass the industry during most
A&of the remaining years of the century*
Actually* the strength of the North-Harvey group was 
declining by 1 8 9 6* and it virtually dlsintergrated within a 
few years after the death of its leader* Harvey* who sue** 
seeded North as chairman of Nitrate Rails and of soma of th© 
other enterprises* was unable to maintain firm control* He 
was eventually ousted from his positions with several of the 
c o m p a n i e s * ^9 o?h© formation of a number of new producers as 
a result of the state land sales of bad likewise
served to lessen the power of the Interest group*
During the period of depression from 1896 to 1900 a 
few companies suspended production entirely* and most others
86ibid., xxxvii (h o v . 10, iBglj.), k?j+.
^Reports concerning the relatives of Horth conflict. On© report states North had two sons* Harry and Arthur* Jr* * on© brother* Gamble* and a son-in-law named Dockett* See Ibid** XL (May 16* 1 8 9 6)* 51̂ 9* Another report states North ha<T one son* Harry* two brothers, Harry and Gamble* a son- in-law named a* A* Lockett* three daughters * for vahom only two names are given— Louise and Florence* His wife was named Jane* Ibid* * XLI (July 11* I8 9 6)* i|8 *
88Ibid.. XL (May 9, 1896), 510.
89rbld., XLiiI (Aug. 1 4, 1897), 176f.
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table vtxi
British Investments in Nitrate Enterprises*
Date tfotaS,Company Organised Capital
Producing Companies
Ltd
Aliansa Nitrate Co*,Amelia Nitrate Co** Ltd** • *^Colorado Nitrate Co** Ltd*# * Consolidated Nitrate Co*# Ltd*Eeperansa Nitrate Co** Ltd* *^lagunas Nitrate Co* * Ltd* * *^Lagunas Syndicate, Ltd* * * *Lautaro Nitrate Co*, Ltd* • •^Liverpool Nitrate Co*, Ltd* •London Nitrate Co*, Ltd* • «New Paceha and Jazpampa Nitrate Co Ltd* * • *  « • * * « « « «New Tamarugal Nitrate Co*, Ltd Rosario Nitrate Co*, Ltd* * •Salar Lei Carmen Nitrate Co*,*San Donato Nitrate Co*, Ltd**«San Jorge Nitrate Co*, Ltd* *«3an Pablo Nitrate Go*, Ltd* •*San Sebastian Nitrate Co*, Ltd Santa Catlllna Nitrate Co*, Ltd*#Santa Elena Nitrate Co*, Ltd*Santa Rita Nitrate Co*, Ltd**Santiago Nitrate Co*, Ltd* *Total Capital of Producing Companies
Service Companies
Anglo-Chilean Nitrate and Railway Co*Ltd* * • • « * • * * « * • * • * * .■̂ Nitrate Provisions Supply Co*, Ltd* * •̂ Nitrate Railways Co*, Ltd* * * * * * * #Hltrate Producer*© Steamship Co*, Ltd #BsnR of Tarapaca and London, Ltd* * * TaXtal Railways Co*, Ltd* * * * * * *  •sTarapaea Waterworks Co*, Ltd* * * * * Total Capital in Service Companies* * * • Total Capital In All Nitrate Enterprises*
18<









1895 1888 1882 1888 * * • * * *
S> 1,200,000
3 9 1 .0 0 0160.000 lij.0,070
4 0 ,0 0 0
9 0 0 ,0 0 01,190,000
603,340110,000
1 6 0 .0 0 0
34,850
5oo,4&01,108,000180,500160.000 300,000 
1 6 0 ,0 0 0  
143,750 100,000 
107,875 
1 2 0 ,8 0 0  
2 9 0 ,0 0 0




6 0 0 .0 0 0  , 4 0 0 ,0 0 06 6,685,110 
614,311,755
passim* lCompil©d from the Steele B :e Year-Book (1 9 0 1),
^Original North-Harvey Company,
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found it necessary to work only part tlra©#̂ 0 Of the twenty- 
two English companies that operated throughout th# latter 
half of the nineties, only four made significant profits#
While most others failed to declare any dividends, a few of 
th® six new enterprises were making profits by 1899*
A growth in capitalisation of the English nitrate 
companies occurred, during the decade of the nineties# In 
I89O, eighteen producing and seven service companies 
represented an investment of over ten million pounds# In 
18 96, with seventeen producing and eight service organisations, 
the total investment climbed to almost thirteen million 
pounds# In 1900, the total investment of over fourteen 
million pounds represented twenty-two producing and seven 
service companies#^ However, these increases did not en­
hance English power in the salt rate Indus try.
After I9OO, the industry underwent significant changes 
brought about chiefly by the government sale of vast new 
nitrate deposits# As a result of properties acquired in
^Journal of Finance, IV {Oct#, 1897), ll|9* Only the Liverpool company was at par on the stock market at this time#
^This sum includes only the capitalised value of companies listed by th© Stock Exchange Yearbook# Evidently, some British interests were Incorporated In'(jixile# For instance, Horth partners, Jewel and Dawson, vmre part owners of the San Agustin do Huantajaya Mine Co# utios© headquarters were in Iqulque# Se© South American Journal# XXIII (Jan# 9, 1887), 4# In additimTj^itisEin^s^mnts in property lo­cated in Iquique were considerable# See th© report of the British consul at Iquique, P# 0# lo/333 (Get# 3, igOl)#
these sales* forty-six new of iclms began producing by 1907# 
Half of these new nitrate establishments appear to have been 
owned by Chileans* while English interests accounted for only 
one-fifth of the total* A return of prosperity* likewise* 
made possible the revival of twenty-four oflcinaa that had 
not been operated in 1 9 00* ^  Fifty per cent of th© offeina^ 
in this group were of English ownership* These changes led 
to an increase in production and to a shift in the ownership 
characteristics of the industry# ̂3
The distribution of ownership of th© nitrate industry 
during the years immediately following the War of the Pacific 
is difficult to determine accurately* Detailed statistical 
reports on capital invested in the industry or regarding pro­
ductive power are either lacking or unavailable* The earliest 
and most authoritative estimate is for th© year 1881^94 At
9%>ata taken from tables in Semper and Michels* Industrie del salitre* pp* 338-3iiii* Salvador Soto* Botes onoEHew .........  . ex­isting In 1900* Among the seven he list© as being the" largest producers* four are English* and on© each was listed for German* Spanish* and Chilean interests*
^Adolfo Ortuzar* Chile of Today {Bew York# Tribune Assoc** 1907), p* 87* Accordingto an official calculation by Chilean authorities In X9°&* of th© capital invested in nitrates was foreign* 22% was Chilean* and 18$ was repre­sented by enterprises owned jointly by Chileans and foreign­ers* Chile* Minlsterio do Hacienda, Comision Salltrera* Informes 1 Actas de la Comision Salltrera (Santiago# Cervantes, 
1 9 6 9)* p#““i4 8* l“ i9<58* an"SmglTsn consul estimated thedistribution of capital as follows# English—  38*8$ # Chi lean-- 
38^1 German— 12%$ Various— 11*2$* Alejandro Bertrand* ha crisis salltrera (Paris# Louis Michaud* 1910)* p* 70*
9^SIllInghurst* Los capital©© salitreroa, pp* 6lff*
that time Chilean interests controlled thirty-six per cent 
of the productive power of the industry while Chilean and 
English capital owned jointly another fourteen per cent* 
Foreigners accounted for the remainder with th© English pos­
sessing twenty per eent* Most Peruvians lost their holdings* 
Thus* Chileans held in the middle i860 *& the largest interest® 
in the industry* A reported attempt by Chileans to monopolise 
the industry at this time apparently mis-carried, because in 
subsequent years* their relative position in the industry 
declined s h a r p l y *  95
Th© "Nitrate Boom11 considerably altered the relative 
strength of English and Chilean interests# The growth of 
English interests continued after the boom for at least an- 
other five years*9^ Bo rapidly did British investments in 
nitrate grew between 1885 and 1895 that a British Consul as-* 
sorted they controlled as much as seventy per cent of th© 
productive power of the industry* However, the most reliable 
data places the maximum at sixty per e©nt*9? Thereafter* 
depression* the effects of over-capitalization* and th© poli­
cy of th© Chilean government regarding the sale of nitrate 
lands brought about a decline in the proportion of productive
93>south American Journal* XXI (May 8# 1881̂ ), 6*
^However* th© proportion of productive capacity con­trolled by English producers did not increase*
97Asociaelon d© Propaganda* Circular Trteestral* Mo*
13 {Eov* 25* 1897)* P* IV* Stat 1stica cimplled by ' Eduardo Vljil* manager of th© association*
power hold by British companies* By 1897* they represented 
only forty-two per cent and at th© turn of the century only 
forty* M s  decline continued after 1900 until by 19X2* 
English interests accounted for slightly over on©«*third*9®
With the decline of British interests# the productive 
power of Chileans rose* From a low of thirteen per cent in 
I8 9 5# they gradually increased until by 1912 Chilean Interests 
surpassed the English by a few per cent age points* Apparent­
ly* th© most important Chilean Investors in nitrates were 
the great financial houses In Valparaiso and Santiago* The 
Bank of Valparaiso and the Bank of Edwards seem to have been 
particularly interested in such investments* ^  Wealth cam© 
to a number of Chileans from their nitrate enterprises; 
however# almost no information concerning their activities 
appears in the available records*
Besides the English# other foreigners held properties 
in the nitrate industry* The Germans were represented by two 
or three large producers* In I88I4.# the Glldermeister and th© 
Folsch and Martin interests accounted for seventeen per cent 
of productive capacity; the sal© of some of the Glldermeister 
holdings to an English company cut th© German portion In half 
by 18 90* Toward the end of the century a new German firm#
98ibid* 1 Cornejo* El Salitre* p* l6o, gives the esti­
mate of Vi JSX f or 1 9 1 2*
99rbid., p. ll+iij Billlnghurat, Los capitaloa 
Balltreros, pp. 37£*
12if
H# B# Sloman and Company, acquired large holdings in the 
district or Tocopilla# Germans controlled about twenty per 
cent of production in 1 9 0 0*^*
One Spanish nitrate baron, Matias Granja, maintained 
a significant place in the industry from the lS7 0 *s onward#
For a long time he operated properties In Tarapacaj however, 
it was his activity in th© district of Aguas Blancas that 
makes him important • During the I89CMS GranJ a obtained ©on- 
trol of valuable properties in Aguas Blancas, and he began 
building a railroad into the region from th© port of Caleta 
Coloso, Just south of Antofagasta# The completion of this 
railroad in 1903 opened up the Aguas Blancas deposits for 
exploitation# Granja and his associates controlled from five 
to ten per cent of productive capacity#
Statistics for 1897 reveal that other foreign groups 
controlled the remaining fifteen to twenty per cent of pro­
ductive capacity# In the order of their importance they 
wares French - 8 3/i|$S Peruvian - 5 3/if$; Italian - If 3/8$; 
Austrian - 3/8$#^^ Thus throughout the nineteenth century 
European companies led by th© British dominated the Chilean 
nitrate industry#
1QQIbld## p# 157#
^^Vergllio Figueroa, Dicclonario his tor loo y 
blografico de Chile# IV, 372-375#  '~r
102while members of these groups have not been con­clusively identified, the following Individuals probably formed a part of the groups indicated: Eduardo Charm© and GilGalte (French), Pedro Perfetti (Italian), Jos© Devescovi, and
x%$
th© Mitrovitch brothers (Austro-Hungarian) * Most of these men, but Charmo, Galt© and Perfetti in particular* are listed as heavy purchasers of nitrate lands in the government sales* See Semper and Michels* Industrie del sailtre« Appendix No* 18* pp* 290-299*   ~n “ rTrj
CHAPTEH XV
the hxthath mxmoAm
Those who worked nitrate deposit® during the early 
years of exploitation faced a difficult obstacle in getting 
their product across the high cordillera that separated the 
oficliras from the sea and the nitrate markets# At that time 
and until 18?0, the slow and expensive process of freighting 
by carte constituted the only means of transportation* Its 
inadequacy was a major impediment to th© expansion of produce 
tion* Full development of the industryfa potential rested 
upon th© building of railway facilities which could carry 
large quantities of nitrate across the Cordillera with case 
and rapidity* These facilities, first acquiŝ ed by the Tara** 
paed' and Antofagasta producers, were later extended into 
other fields* The completion of a railroad in each of the 
nitrate fields resulted in an immediate Increase In output* 
Even though it was of primary irqportance, the process of 
railroad building was not completed until after the turn of 
the century*
The first railroad was built in Tarapoea* the only 
nl trate^producing region prior to 1870 and the major one 
thereafter* The initial concession for Its construction was 
mad© by the government of Peru in i860* But the concession**
126
1g7
atooa Called to begin oonotruotiom m  did a im noA g»up bo 
toom the privilege w&® mvott to I66I&# L&©k or mrf£l*l«&t
capital m o m s s  imis the pî ob&bl# «*u*« or foilwo* Scmw«rv 
bb@ n&st gpeup to reeoivo %hm g3*ant# Hamon Monber© and 
Brothers of Lima* wot with ouooom#^ They wore granted in 
1668 a bw#nty«fiv# year ssonopoly and a guomntood return of 
*#v®fla per cent for building a line from the isajior nitrate 
seaport, Iquique, into the prodmotlon region m  far m  La 
Norla* It also promised that preference would be given to 
the owners of this railway when <aithoriaatlcei mm  mad® for 
additional oonstruotion to the region# Likewise, any railroad 
built to Bolivia was to eonneet with th# Xquiqu# line# to­
other provision permitted the sale of the railroad to 
foreigners if the approval of the government mm  obtatoed# 
but with the understanding that **lf assigned to foreigners., 
they shall submit to toe laws of the eoimtry* without power 
to have m o a r w  to any diplomatic remedy.”2 Additional eon- 
cessions to ksontero and Brothers were made in 1669 end 1871.
Xn effect, the former granted the right to extend the railroad 
threxû i the nitrate district and to tlie port of Piaagua, while 
the latter allowed the building of feeder lines to ofiolnas
Xm Is J. Gobenes, Pocmaentoa de loa Ferro-Oarrllea de la Provldoracla de farapaetf* iMtaaf Sacional, IG7 3), pp.
37 ” •
2Budd to Kimberley, Dee* 12, IQ̂ lf* F. 0. 16/2 9 8. tteasre. Budd, Johnsons and Jeeks were lawyers for the nitrate Hallways Co., Ltd. See also Hose, M l aolones oomrclales 
antra Chile X ifi Breta£a, Appendix jfo, 23, p. T&ij7
u s
Dot adjacent to the stain line.-* The railroad began operating 
in 1670* Thereafter* construction proceeded intermittently 
in convicting the sain lino and in providing roil connections 
for oflolnee as the need for then arose*
Although originally a Peruvian enterprise* the 
railroad in Tarapaea was finally controlled by an English 
firm. In 18?4. Montero and Brothers incorporated their held* 
ings into the CoBgienig BaolonssO, do loe Fcrrooarrllea 
Salltreraa del Peru with a capitalisation of & l,2Q0*0G0j 
however* leans had to be secured in London to meet the costs 
of construction. Financial difficulties led the company into 
receivership within a short time* and control was not re* 
stored to it until just before the war of the Pacific began.^ 
In 1632* another reorganisation brought about the incorpo­
ration of the company in l&igland* and the Tarapaca rail 
system* now known as the nitrate Hallways Company* Limited* 
acquired all of the assets of the previous organisation. 
Sitrate Hallways kept the same capitalisation but had out*
f*standing 6 1*100*000 in debentures.** The transfer was duly
approved in advance by the government as the original con*/eesslcm required#
3Ibld«. pp. 2l5f.
^Bussell* a Viait jgg thg Mfcgafes p p. 355*358.
, W . I  PP. 222, 5391 Pot 1& ,Ccaipania M M  Fer^.a^|.lgft BdXlfa)! a l »  HonorgBXe^oialslon (Santiago* Z&E&pu.bilea# X003)* pi So*
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in the ensuing speculations#*? s v m  so# th# price of Mitr&b#
Hallways stock# unlike the stock of most companies partiel**
pating in th# boo®# possessed a higher economio value than
its share capital Indicated# Th© chief reason, for this lay
in th# monopoly th# company enjoyed which enabled it to charge
high freight rates without materially lessening the volume of
traffic rolling over its lines#
The main line of Nitrate Hail ways# which was 190
miles long# started from Iqulqu© where it ascended the
coastal range# then turned northward and traversed the
nitrate region# and finally veered west and down the cordil**
leva to the port of Pia&gua* Its many branch lines# which
provided rail connections to outlying of joins#* included a
I46 mil# extension to th# hagtm&a bed# south of Xquiqu©* m
all# the road had 291 mile# of track by 1896* By I903 its
10trackage totalled over 330 miles#* This railway system pro** 
vided the main transportation facilities for nitrate into 
th# twentieth century* Before other railroad# were built In 
Tarapace, Nitrate Hallways carried to port more then three** 
fourths of all nitrate exported*^
As a matter of fact# Nitrate Hallway# proved to be
~ 9«oa»f rnxmipma s s m s s ^ m  m m  P M M  s. M  m mDretana. pp. 67*.
AUBurd#t 
Pm 7391 C U W M *  .
^Delegateion de Salltraras.
ftp (London) {IO9 6 )#
rxa ®
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the real ”gold mine" of th© Industry until I89 6* From th©
time Col* Horth gained control of th© company In 1887 through
th© year 1 8 9 1* shareholders received a fifteen per cent stock
bonus (in 1888) and dividends whose total value ©quailed the
amount of outstanding stock* From 1892 through 1895* dlvi*
dends for holders of eoBSfion stock amounted to 68 3/M5*1® P©3?
cent* while preferred stockholders received their seven per
cent and owners of debentures (which totalled h X*785*M>0 In
1895) received an interest of five per cent* Because of
these large and steady returns on its high capitalisation*
the record of Nitrate Railways during these years far ex**
ceeded that made by any other enterprise connected with th©
12nitrate industry*
Largely as a result of these hug© profits* consider** 
able hostility toward Nitrate Railways developed in Chile* 
Company officials were appropriately embarrassed by th© ad** 
verse public opinion and they sought means of counteracting . 
It* The solution they chose* however* did not involve low** 
©ring rates and reducing actual profits* Rather* it was to 
undertake a financial reorganisation of th© company which 
would enable th© shareholders to continue to receive large
^Statistics are taken from the Stock B&chan&0 Year* book (1889*1896 )♦ See also Table X* p* i5o below* The Investor*© Review* IX (1893)* P* 336 commenteds tfDlvT3ends have been wrung out of th© nitrate producers of Tarap&ca by the Infliction of excessively high rates* the directors of the Railway© Company-^directors at the same time of the producing companies— preferring the pecuniary benefit of th© few to the welfare of the many*11
profits without the appearance of having done so# In ex-
plaining the project to a meeting of stockholders* the close
associate of Col# Horth* Robert Harvey* remarked that
• • • it will be of very great advantage to the shareholders# Unfortunately* our railway Is not in England * and large dividends are not looked favorably upon there and I would rather not say anything on the subject; but It is really to the advantage of all th© shareholders that the divi­dends shall not be so large apparently#”
When placed Into effect* the reorganisation plan 
added to the common shares of the company seven per cent pre­
ferred shares with a face value of & 276*000# Since the pre­
ferred was distributed to each shareholder according to a 
ratio of one preferred share for each five shares of common 
stock* the new stock added nothing to the actual capital of 
the company#^ m  spit© of this measure* dividends remained 
at twenty per cent for two more years#
Neither Peru nor Chile fully respected the monopoly 
privilege granted the Monter© Interests# The government of 
Peru created the first potential competitor of Nitrate Rail­
ways by granting a concession to th© Ksperansa Sociedad#*^
^South American Journal# XXX (Ian# 17* I89D *  7lĵ
^Xbld#* May 9 , 1091* P* $82} Money Market Review* hiII (Mayf7T891)* 1106; Ross* Re.laoiones ©pre;i^P^y''rla Gran Bret ana* Appendix No# 21̂ * pp# 2 3 1 -2 3 5 gives a copy ox tiie law tiiat authorised the reorganisation#
l^The Esoeranza Socledad received from the Peruvian government certificates to tne value of S ̂ 990*000# See Valdes Vergara* Adminlstracidh de Tarapaoa# Appendix No#I* 
p* lljjO#
Thin concession c a lle d  fo r  th® b u ild in g  of m ra ilro a d  from
th® port of Fat ill os* south of X^ul^ue* to th# &agu*msi 
nitrate fields* Although Momtor® and Brothers opposed th® 
project es^th# grounds that it violated their zmmp®%& priv­
ilege©, their protests railed to halt lb# construction^ ̂  
However* the company was unable to finish laying brack before 
the outbreak of the War of' the Pacific! end apparently# r©«* 
sumption of work taae&imbely following th# war was impossi­
ble**^ But plana for collating the line were being mad# 
wzmn CoXm Berth became th# guiding hand of Nitrate Railways# 
Realising that additional protests would be useless* Horth 
personally bought a controlling interest in th# Pafcllla# 
enterprise* hater he sold hi# interest to Nitrate RalX#*^®
In this way the first major threat to th# rail monopoly was 
successfully met*
while all challenges to the transportation monopoly 
of Nitrate Railway# were stoutly fought by that oofspsny* its 
efforts were never entirely successful* Many nitrate pro­
ducers and the Chilean government saw in the monopoly and in 
the company fs policies a harmful influence on the industry * 
and they worked to lessen it# great powers# The hostility
toward Nitrate Hallways was based on several considerations*
»
*6ibia.
^•Stm delay In ecaapletlng the Patillos railroad may have resulted from lack of funds*
ie M 2 tiB X  m m * < *« •  Q* W98>« 38, tw *
13k
to th® ftost pl&G®* pmtfkmmm of nitfmt# saw 
profit® being sljdioMa off by th® rail MSQMflSr a® a »#ulfc 
of it® high flight charges. £M$ss&ly» th# gowfttio^t fe*» 
lleved that th# high- rat## SNwftugstt tte #en«atltgr of ssltr&b® 
oxportad. a&d eon##<ju*ntly th# wmmmm® it collected frw th# 
toe on sitrat# ©sports**^ fttotly* mim® it m m  a foreign 
company, profit® mdd by litrat# Mailway# avoussd xsuMNstaMttt* 
smo33g CSiiloana* Many Chil#«m# favorod gowiroat action to 
curtail th# mompoly* mourn supported th# ids# of mllmm&mg 
othar railroads to b@ built either by th# stats or prtyab# 
interests in eoŝ xrtitioa with Hltr&t# Hallway#* as was wmsfa&» 
ally don#| still others sought to add th# system to th# 
owned railway mtworM#^
Thus* because of its high rates and largo profits* 
Hitrate Hallways became to Chilean# th# symbol of their 
failure to win the greatest profits from th# industry and of 
British control over nitrates# President Balmaosda* being 
in agreement with this sentiment# inaugurated a policy do* 
signed to reduce foreign dominance of the nitrate fields by91encouraging Chilean investments there. * k beginning had al- 
ready been made in the latter months of the proceeding
*9i£ba export tax was. likewise, a burden on the 
nitrate trade.
20
tc •*' ®o. 1*2 Sept. 3,
^Bussell, a I M £  12 ifet Mfcrat.o fields, p. 312.
administration when by executive decree President Santa Maria 
annulled the privileges of Nitrate Railways#*^ Balmaceda 
supported this action over the protests of both the company 
and the British Foreign office#*^ He also took advantage of 
a bitter and vigorous controversy over rates between Nitrate 
Railways and th© of iclna Agua Santa to grant a concession 
for the building of a railroad to the ofiefna in competition 
with Nitrate Railways• Th© result was the formation of th© 
Campania de Salitre 1 Ferroearril de Ague Santa in 1890#^
The Agu© Santa line became the first effective com** 
petitor of Nitrate Hallway and it was owned by Chileans# 
Construction of its sixty-four miles of narrow gauge track 
began in 1 8 9 0# Two years labor It started operating# By 
1896 th© Agua Santa Railroad had tapped the freight of the 
central section of the Tarapaea fields so effectively that 
through its Port of Calebs Buena more than fifty per cent as 
much nitrate was shipped as passed through th© Port of 
Iquique#^ While the company was not an immediate success
^Budd to Sanderson, Jan# 11, I89I4., F# 0* 16/2 9 8, Enclosure No# 1# Apparently th© British government supported the company and protested the action#
23see Kennedy to Salisbury, No# ijlf, May 12, I89O,F# 0# 16/2591 and Budd to Sanderson, Jan# 11, loglj., F# 0*
16/2 9 8*
^Russell, A Visit to the Mtrate Fields* p# 197$Budd to Sanderson, Tan* TI,TC8^ ,  F# 0* I6/598, Encloauro No# 1* Th© grant was made to J# Hra Errassuris who subs©** quently transferred it to the Agua Santa Nitrate and Railroad 
Co#
^South American Journal# XXXIV (Feb# 18, 1893), 189$
financially, it toftleuticm© ©f becomtog © p»fltmbl©
©&b©rprl@© before th© «Mi of th© ©cs&tury* BiirMen^o d** 
dared on Xta h 600*000 of oonncm ©bom* totalled bwciity^w© 
p#r ©*&& by 1900# ^
to 1090# Balmac©da tosued a ooaeeeBioB imothdr 
competitive railroad to b© built to Tarapaoal To ©xerci©© 
this privilege the Qtmmm&pi dp Sail toy £  d#
tosato was fomeiSU Like the Agua Sa&fea Oo^su^ it was ©««&•* 
trolled by Chileans» to operation by X89if# the tonto sNdLMey 
tapped the nitrate bods in the north of Tttrapa&tt# just south 
of Ftaagua# By X896 it carried war Its fifty*eto mil® line 
of narrow gauge track more nitrate than was exported from 
Fiaagua*^
Hitrate Railway© was imeeaatog to its efforts to 
maintain its monopoly against- thee# projects* The support of 
th© Foreign Off lee was solicited and obtained for the fight* 
But in spit© of official protests* the Chilean government 
refused to respect the monopoly privilege© el&taed by the
XXXIX (July 27* 1895)# 102$ Dalegaolon.,d© Salltrera©* ]
Chile (Hew York* JfeuKl-McBally, 1912}* p* 196*
^7hs Agua Santa Railroad was listed in the St< Exchansse Yearbook (1901) • This probably indicates fclw fepgilali tmreafeaants in tho corapany Imd becaw© either quite significant or the controlling ones*
2^C« A# Mason to J< H« Sadler* Hoverabor 11, 1896, Hncl. uo* a in Sadler to F* 0* Ho* 36, F* 0* 16/290* Great Britain* Foreign Office, DlBlffi3atl.o and Consular Reports, Annual series (London, Harrison and JonaT,. *8997 22Q'?*p* 10*
Burtng nemt of BAXs&aes&a Hibr&be
Railways @ m  foimd it JtapoMlbl* to got a court fctwfag on 
the question* Nevertheless, in X89O a suit m  successfully 
initiated against the Ague Santa BaiXroad* It dragged m  
without a judgement being md© for o w  four years* and no 
remedial action was obtained by the company from the Chilean
c o u r t s *^9 in 1892* the Foreign O ffic e  was advised by i t s
le g a l counsel to  w ithhold any fu rth e r p ro test a u n t il the  
C hilean courts rendered its  d e c is io n *A lth o u g h  the Foreign  
Office continued to  support the n itra te  Railways* apparently  
i t  held  no hop© o f preserving the rig h ts  o f the company**^
Meanwhile* in  1881** the Chilean government was g iv in g  
consideration to an application node by an English firm* 
Anthony aibbs and Sons* fo r  another railway concession in  
fTarapaca* Gibbs and Sons were successful in  making i t  appear 
in chile that the scheme had the support o f the Foreign
^Kennedy to  Sanderson* May 2?* XQ^G* F# 0* 16/2591 Budd to Sanderson* yen* 15* 1894* $*» 0* 16/298*
^Buddl to Sanderson* Jan* 11* X89I1* F* O* 16/298* Enclosed Is a precis of the suit brought by nitrate Hallways against the Agua Santa Railroad* on one occasion# a mpm** eentative of the k m m  Santa called nitrate Hallways wan odious monopoly which attests to destroy the national Industry and the freedom of trade*11
3°X#aw officers to F* 0** Jan* l6# 189(1* F* 0* 16/298*
^^Budd to Sanderson# Jan* 18* X89iu X*1# 0* 16/298* Sanderson noted on the flap of this ccmMunlcation that nlt Is useless to plunge into controversy**
Office#^ The British Minister at Santiago* hail previously 
advised Chile against granting the concession on the grounds 
that it inf ringed upon the rights of Nitrate Hallways f 
however he was later instructed not to oppose the project 
but merely to ^reserve the right of remonstrating against 
it* *33
For the next several days representatives of both
Nitrate Railways and Gibbs and Sons exerted pressure on the
Foreign Office* The lawyers for Nitrate Railways wrotet
®The Directors have learnt with some surprise—I might almost add with dismay— that, in consequence of some telegram received by Mr# Kennedy from the Foreign Office, the Senate in Chili are under the impression that Her Majesty *s Government favour the granting of concession to Messrs# Gibbs and Sons • • • «We have always tinderstood that Her Majesty fs Government were satisfied as to the propriety of , the position taken up by the Railway Company and were doing ell in their power to prevent the granting of these concessions by Chill • • • «/She company/ is counting upon— and 1 trust not without reason— the strong support of Her Majestygovernment #3q.
On the other hand, Gibbs and Sons expressed its 
appreciation for the instructions directing Kennedy to ab­
stain from opposing the proposed concession# Yet the refusal 
of Kennedy to retract previous statements, it was said, oper­
ated to the disadvantage of the company# A request was made,
S^hord Rosebery to Kennedy, Tel* No* 2, Jan. 11, 1891*., F* 0# 16/298#
33*»d Rosebery to Kennedy, Tel* No# 2, Jan# 11, I89lf, F# 0# 16/296#
3^Budd to Sanderson, Jan. 11, I894, F# 0# 16/298*
ther afore, that Kennedy be instructed to withdraw his previ­
ous opposition to the project* If this were done, the e^pt- 
ny maintained* "Nitrate Railways and ourselves /will hayg/ a 
free field with the Chilean authorities#
Congress adjourned late in January without baking 
action on the proposed concession, and the Foreign Office 
welcomed the opportunity to clarify its position*^ While 
it was an established policy to maintain strict neutrality 
in the rivalries between English interests before a foreign 
government, the Foreign Office preferred that no action be 
taken regarding the proposed concession to Gibbs and Sons 
until the Chilean courts rendered their decision in the Agua 
Santa case* When further study revealed that once passed 
by Congress the concession could not be vetoed by the Pres In­
dent, the Foreign Office changed its policy again* It re- 
verted to its original position of unofficial opposition to 
the passage of the bill*^
In the spring of I89I4., at the suggestion of the 
Foreign Office, Gibbs and Sons initiated direct negotiations 
with Nitrate Railways for the purpose of making a satis­
factory freight rate settlement# Had this been accomplished,
^Gibbs to Sanderson, Jan# 11, 189 ,̂ P* 0. 16/298* 
36Joel to Lord Rosebery, No* 3, Jan* 17, I89lj.,
p. 0. 16/29 8.
^Law Officers to P. 0#* Jan# 16, I89J4* P. Q« 16/298.Their recommendations were carried out* See Sanderson to Kennedy, No* 3^, May 2lj., 189̂ , F* 0# 16/298#
Gibbs sad sons war® willing to give up their attempt to ob­
tain a railway concession. However, Nitrate Railways would 
go no lower than eight pennies par quintal ntfiile Gibbs wanted 
that rate reduced to six pennies when the monopoly rights 
expired in 1895.3& Stas Foreign Office advised a second at- 
teopt at eea^uromlse but nothing was done*
As a natter of fact# by the suasaer of 1894 Nitrate 
Railways was not seriously concerned over possible eorape- 
titlen by Gibbs and Sons* The outloolt for the Gibbs con- 
eeaslon had dissued considerably* Minister Kennedy reported 
that opposition to the concession had increased* ffloe re­
luctance to lessening the importance of Iquique as a port and 
the desire to respect the wishes of Her Majesty's government 
had constituted the basic reasons for past opposition to tbs 
concession. Added to these was the hostility toward Gibbs 
and Sons created by recant revelations of that first's par­
ticipation in currency speculations which adversely affected 
the rate of exchange. By September the Gibbs concession was 
almost a thing of the paet.^9
At this time the Chilean government made an offer to 
Nitrate Railways* In a conversation with Minister Kennedy# 
the Chilean Minister of Interior noted that public opinion
38<jibbs to Sanderson# June 34* 1094# F* o* 16/298*Also see enclosures.
3$Ksnnedy to Lord Klsherlsy* Ho. 11* May 12* 189k# p. 0* I6/29Q1 Kennedy to Kimberley, Ho. ill, Sept. 1, I894,
P. 0. 16/298*
dmaaided something be dene to curb the railroad mompoly in 
Tarapaoal After agqpveMlng the desire of doing as l i t t le  
injury as possibl© to mooted interests# the Chilean sslnleter 
proposed a plan whereby Ultimate IMilwiiye and the ffmmmmnt 
might cooperate to mutual advantage# *gfa* plan provided for 
only a moderate reduction in rates and fspeeds fna further 
competition* Xn return the railroad was to assume rasponai** 
b illty  for making major i M p r o m m m t m  in the port of Xquique 
and building a railroad to ha Fas# Bolivia# Although titrate 
Railways was informed of the proposal * it was apparently 
rejected#^*
Another point of controversy between the gweramnfc 
of chile and Hitrate Railways involved the latter*a claims 
for images incurred during the Revolution of X89X# Chile 
rejected these claims because of the clause in the original 
concession prohibiting foreign owners from having ^recourse 
to any diplomatic remedy*11̂  Support given the railway by 
the Foreign Office engendered a spirited debate# The point 
was mode that Chilean opposition to the claim for the reason 
stated above was Incompatible with the revocation of the 
monopoly in 1886 and the subsequent concession to the Ague 
Ssstft Railroad# still# Chile maintained her position and
^%fwmedy to Kimberley, Ho# 1̂2, Sept* 3# 1894#F# c# 16/29 8#
^hsam to Kimberley# Deo* 12# 1894* 0# 16/298*
ffltrat© Hallways collected no claims*^
After 1895 Nitrate Hallway® tmderwsab a period of 
read jus taiont * necessitated by a successIcn o f events which 
altered the status o f the company# lliese  now fa c to rs  were 
three In numbers the complete 1osa o f the M m p e lia $ l*  po** 
slbicsi) the spread o f a depression a ffe c tin g  the e n tire  
nitrate industry* and the death o f Ctot* North in X896* *fhe 
first two ©wonts required a re v is io n  o f p o lic ie s * 9h# death  
of Gal# North* who* w ith  aloe# associates* had ruled the  
corapuny in an arbitrary and secretive  s in n er* gave o ther 
stockholder© an opportunity to  exert an in fluence on company 
affaire#
fha effective competition provided by the Ague Santa
/end Junln Hallways forced the eompany to cut rates drastic 
eally# Rates that had averaged 9 3/^ pennlea per quintal
^La» Officers to F# 0** Sept* 27# X$95* F# 0* 
16/2981 Budd to Kldborley# Doc* 12* I89I4., F* 0* X6/29O# See also note of w* B« Davidson on badfe of this coomanicaticKa* British claims arising out of the Revolution of I89I in­volved m a m  nitrate producing ecapsa&eft and railroads oper­ating In the mining region of north Chile* Most of the claims, however* wore disallowed# Marolal Martinss* Inf cm
£ &  A i m  $& c m e  ^  i y g t e m l BJSSuSiS^St s r c i i i* * logo)» PP* l a o r f * & H a t  of those olatos can bo found in ggeaontadoB jfc
enterprises totalled #1,133«U£0# Of this sue. the ©laira of Sltrate Railway© equalled |Q58*457» Chile paid only #29,026 in ©lalas to British companies*
dropped to an average of k V 2 pennies by 1903* ^  consti­
tuting as this did a more than fifty pax* eeat drop in freight 
rates* it largely explains the reduced earnings of the compa­
ny after 1396*
Robert Harvey, who replaced col* Worth as chairman of 
the company, stated in 1696 that he hoped Nitrate Rails could 
Just hold its o w , ^  but even this proved impossible* Hot 
earnings, which had averaged Si 1*86,500 between 1338 and I89I, 
dropped ever forty-two per eent between 1895 and 1896 to an 
average of & 279*71*6*^ Dividends disappeared altogether 
in 1696 and never did exceed five per cent thereafter*
Because of the sharp decline in dividends and in the 
market value of the stock of Nitrate Railways Which occurred 
after Berth*a death, stockholders became more Insistent in 
their demands to have a knowledge of the actions of the di­
rectors. Zhey realised that the financial position of the 
easpany was weak and that administrative costs had been high* 
Criticism grew until charges of mismanagement were put be­
fore the board in November, 1896* A committee was appointed 
by the board to investigate conditions; but because of the 
lack of confidence in its members, a now committee was created
ssdJtou* p*XQu*
^m &S&SSlB. MZ&SS* v m  (July, 1896), 50.
^ a m t h  American f-ffOTrt# xxxu (April 23,  1892), Itfl*.
the feUoving year*^1
late in 1897* the eosnralttee oneated a sen­
sation with Its revelations, it was charged that the board 
had entered Into contracts with the Tarepaea waterworks 
Company on such terras as could not have been entertained if 
tha interests of the water Odspany had not been largely 
represented on the board of the railway***-? Another eharge 
ooncorned an item of & 93*615 listed in the books under the 
heading "legal expenses* losses* and compensation in Chile." 
Shown as the secret service fund* the amount was expended 
between 1337 and 1395 at the direction of Col. North. Be­
sides these fields* North received h 156*693 between 1393 and 
1096 for legal expanses.^ Concerning these disclosures the 
South American Journal remarked* "fhe directors make no 
secret of the faot that they knew perfectly well for what 
purpose the sums paid were to be used* which was to oppose 
in the Chilean Legislature and Law Courts any scheme for 
rival lines threatening their alleged monopoly* and they 
claim that they were successful in so doing* and in putting 
off the evil day for some years** According to the report 
two lawyers in Chile were in charge of disbursing the
^letter, written by H* Allen (stockholder la Nitrate Railways) to the BooncNolst. I.IV (Hov. 28, IG9 6), 1576J see the issues of Uov. S *  lS96, p. 1531 and Deo, 12, 1896, p.
16 42.
^Railway Tims* KOtV (Jen, 15* 1890)* 06,
m »  u i v ^ ’f a ^ , 1? ! 1890' "■ 6ÎI*, a s s a  a a U s s a  a s s u .
11*5
£unda*^9 one o f these* J u lio  &egera* wm m prominent mmftmr 
o f the government p a rty * but he denied th a t money wee 
used is^roporXy o r th a t be wm paid e&eesalvely fo r  M e  
services #£°
The Chilean rep resen tative  in London also denied the  
charges o f corruption  made against h ie  government# po in ting  
out that north’s fa ilu re  in  m aintaining the monopoly proved 
in te g r ity  o f h ie  government* But he did estim ate th a t 
& 15*000 would have been s u ffic ie n t to  ©over le g itim a te  
le g a l expenses* the im p lic a tio n  being th a t Iforbh# perhaps# 
pocketed a la rg e  p a rt o f these funds* A Chilean in v es tig a tio n * 
although proposed* was never c arrie d  o u t*^  2h a l l  probe* 
bility some of these funds sere used in  a m rm er th a t would 
not bear re ve a lin g ! however* from the company*© standpoint# 
an e ffe c tiv e  e ffo r t to  preserve the monopoly wm b e n e fic ia l 
fin a n c ia lly *  Such expenditures by fo re ig n  f ir m  operating  
in  L a tin  America were not unusual; and furtherm ore # I t  la  1m* 
possible to c a lc u la te  the sums necessary to  achieve the  
purposes for which th is  money was used#
Bven though the rep o rt emphasised the fa c t th a t the 
past p o lic y  o f the ra ilro a d  had su ited  the in te re s ts  o f the 
North~Harvey group ra th e r than the company* the board ab ly
^9Xbld. .  pp. ? 0 f.
Ibid*. March 16, I6 9 8, p. 3531 So® also V.
Figueroa, TWMMBfftfP BlOKr&loo. ZIX, 3 6 9.
^S o u th  tearlegn Journal. XLXV (Jan* 15, 1898) ,  67)
Jan. 22,  189S , p i  iBSl ««y ^  1S9O, pp. 5Q 5f.
defended it® actions* Stressing the need for board members 
vfcn had influence to producing companies# it pointed with 
pride to it® past The statement Issued by the board
claimed that fro® 188? through 1 8 9 6# & 8#$06*J9$ had b o m  
paid to shareholders and that thi® represented 168 
per cent in dividends*^ Indeed* th® oompimy had returned 
largo profits to investor© | but because of pmt polioio® 
m i  competition from new railroads, prospect® of dividends 
to the Immediate future were not bright*
toe investigation by the committee ended the doml* 
nance of the Hwtfc-irarvey clique* Hebert Harvey wm ousted 
front hi® position as Chairman of the Board and another Berth* 
Harvey lieutenant also lost hi® position#^ Criticism m s  
levelled at Horth9® policy of building the extension to 
Lagunas* Originally warranted on the supposition that the 
maximum freight rate would be charged# the plan did not 
materialise* since the ss&enslon vastly increased the value 
of the property and because Berth held Interest© to that pro* 
due tog company* it was alleged that the welfare of the 
railroad m s  not adequately protected* Inasmuch as Laguna® 
sold one*third of Its lands for h 0£0#GO0****the original to* 
vestment being h 110#OOQ~~the charge seems to be well** 
founded*^
£2Ibld.. XLIII (July 31* 1397)* 121.
53xbict.« Aug. 14, 1097* pp. 176f«
^%yyULw#ar Ttooa. o o t . > t ® d  in South
i j T O m a l .  x l t  csov. 7*
The Antofagasta fields had boon the second nitrate
area to obtain access to the sea via rail* Here# both the
fields and the railroad were operated by the same company,
/the Corapania de Selltre i  Perrooarrll da Antofagasta* whose 
organisation has been treated elsewhere#^ Just prior to and 
during the War of the Pacific# production in Antofagasta rose 
sharply as a re s u lt of the diminution of exports from Tara- 
paea where the monopolization policy of Peru and the war had 
led  to  a partial paralysis of production* Maximum exporta­
tio n  from Antofagasta was reached in 1879 when over a million 
q u in ta ls  were shipped* But by the end of the war and with 
the revival of the Tarapaca fields, the freight carried over 
Ferrocarril Antofagasta fell to one-quarter of a million 
q u in ta ls — a level it maintained throughout the remainder of 
the century* This railroad# however# served other interests 
in addition to that of nitrates# and in I881f it received 
permission to build its lines to the Bolivian border*^ In 
1 8 8 8# the nitrate and railroad activities of the company
were divided Into two separate and Independent organizations#
/The railroad became known as the Comp an! a de Ferrocarril de 
Antofagasta*
The Taltai region was the next to obtain rail
^The Antofagasta Railway was an Anglo-Chllean enter­prise established as a result of a concession Issued by the Bolivian government in i860* See Chapter I# pp* 23ff*
^ South American Journal* XXVI (June I8 8 9)# 71̂ 8*
TABU XX 
Railroads in the Nitrate Region
assesaseessaaasaaB«emaaa^a^^^pBss«s^M^nias»^^nws^^naw
Railroad (Jeilceaetera) Served ia©nfc*,° 1900
, -    -----   „.T1. r.. (Metric Quintals)
Nitrate Railways Co*.I»td«
/Cewsinia de Salltre 1<R Anna
/
Angio-Chilean Hlfcrat© and Railway Co*, Ltd*
OoapwyU de Ferroearrtl
IS3S g& dglde caieta coiesa
Taltal Hallways Go* * Ltd*
*D#legacion Fiscal de Salitreraa, ttUSXtB tt M »p* 5o*
bIblcU * p. 81**
transportation* An English concern, Taltal Railways Company, 
Ltd* * began constructing lines In 10G2 and completed the 
major portion by the middle of 1888* Its one hundred tixirty 
miles or track made possible a vast Increase In nitrate 
production In Taltal; and by 109& that region ©xported over 
two million quintals* approximately eisbt per cent o£ the 
nitrate exported in that year*^ The profits reaped by
539 Tarapaca 7*393*336
123 Tarapaca 3,686*355










S7SffiSsms MXivXal JBfeemaiMMWgj 1896* p. 777*
taltal Hallway# m w  reached the lucrative levels or Bitrafce 
Hallway#* P m  1882 through 1896 total dividend# equalled 
only 1*1 3/2 par ©eat and never exceeded seven par want in 
any one year*
The rail facilities of Toeopllla ware built by an 
English f l m  organised In 1887# the &nglo^Shllwaaa Hlbrate and 
Hallway Coeapany# Ltd*# and were completed in I89O* By 1900# 
that rail line waa tarrying about the &&sm quantity of 
nitrate as the Taltal lino* By 1895# its capitalisation 
had re ached & 500 #000* Ho dividends for eojamon stockholders 
were declared but nost of the stock of the ooaip&ny was in 
seven per cent preferred shares*^ while noting that the 
building of this railroad was of izssenae significance- In 
permitting an increase in overfall production# Billinghurst 
charged that the coc^ony# like others created in I88Q-89# 
was over capitalised*^
Tha Agues Blancas field was the last Major nitrate 
region to acquire rail transportation* Until 1903 its output 
had to be transported by Eailê -pulled carts* Its railroad 
which was built by the Spanish nitrate f 1 »  of $
Campania led to the port of Caleta Golosa# just south of
Delegacion de Salitraraa, Mroari* «& M3Z» P* ?0# IBBBEte 
tp X9Ql» P. 58.
50t ^ ## p, 57, Britain* EfflffHiyM: jjgBadtfl*Annual GorTes, 1899* Ho. 2287, p. 28.
S^Bllllnghurat, £g£ oaaltalog SSUSSSSSS* P* 96.
TABUS X
Capitalisation and Dividend statistics 
for Hitrate Railroads*
1888 UL»<%?,100 nilb nil nil
1888
1890 600 ,000 —  nil ZS$
1890 265 ,000
1882 3,938 ,010 60* 108 3/1& l6£
1882 600 ,000 1?# 2i ^
•statistics conpilad from Stock Bacchants Yearbook.
I891-19d# passto.
^Most of the shares of this company were in 7 per cent preferred stock#
Antofagasta#**0
The organisation of the Taltal and Anglo~Chilean
railways# like those that directly eorapetcd with nitrate
Hails# met with loud but unsuccessful opposition froxa Col#
north# ills purpose was to disparage these enterprises by
Anglo-Chilean Nitrate and Hall­way Co*# Ltd#
SagMsia aa z ^ eearril de Ahto-
yy? -1 Fgrroccrrilde acts Santa 
✓fawffMKBta de Sal—S M M U fM M t «Ma«t w«aw#sa _itre 1 .Ferrocarrll de Junin
Hitrate Railways Co* 0 Ltd#
Taltal Railways Co# 1 Ltd#
^sensor and Michels, Jtodusfcrfft dgl saUfcys. p. 108,
1SI
raising doubts regarding the productivity of the fields upon 
«hieh their prosperity would be based* thereby preventing 
thera from obtaining capital in England*®'1’
She'se seven railroads* which served the nitrate 
industry almost exclusively* comprised an liaportant portion 
of the railroads of Chile* In 1903, their main line tracks 
accounted for approximately twenty-three per cent of the 
railroads of Chile and forty-four per cent of the private 
railroads* fihen branch lines arc included* they represent
Aj»thirty and sixty per cent respectively* ®




After the first successful shipment of nitrate to 
Europe was made in 1831, the nitrate industry gradually ex­
panded Its output* However, it was not until the decade of 
the l860*s that the rate of expansion Increased significantly* 
The rapid growth of the industry at this time was brought a- 
bout by the opening of additional markets and by improving 
the technique of production# Since nitrate was used princi­
pally as a fertiliser it had to compete with guano in the 
markets of America and Europe* In the contest for markets 
nitrate was at a disadvantage because guano had appeared 
earlier and farmers were accustomed to using it# However, 
the depletion of the guano deposits early In the decade of
the 1870 *s simultaneously reduced competition in the ferti-
1User market and enlarged the demand for nitrate# Thus, 
with their position greatly improved, nitrate producers be­
gan to expand their production facilities*
The improvement of the technique of processing 
caliche* however, was necessary before productive capacity 
could be expanded sufficiently* The really Important changes
^Hutchinson, Two Years in Peru* I, 57* See also Chapter I, pp# 5ff#
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mlong this line came during th© letter half of the nineteenth 
century* a period characterised by advancements in technical 
knowledge in many other industries* Before that time* pro­
duction of nitrate on a large scale had been iu^possible be­
cause the procedure used in elaborating caliche was time- 
consuming and expensive* In addition* this early method 
could process only caliche containing a high percentage of 
nitrate#^ Beginning in 1853* major technical advances were 
made* The use of steam in the processing method was intro­
duced; and between X876 and 1880* a new method of elaborat­
ing caliche based upon the use of steam was perfected and 
introduced*^ The new procedure* called the Shanks Process* 
permitted greater economy in production and made possible 
the use of lower grade c a l i c h e While the older process 
required caliche having at least twenty-five per cent
nitrate* the Shanks Process could refine caliche having only
*■>thirteen per cent*^ Consequently* producers could utilise
pApparently the process in us© was Introduced early in the nineteenth century by a German Immigrant named Otto Harneeker* See V* Figueroa, Plccionario bio&rdflco* III*1*29*
^Semper and Michels* Industrie del Sailtre* pp* 6lf*
^For a description of th© Shanks process see Ibid* * pp# 62ff* Although no precis© date for the introduction of the Shanks process can be given* it was in us® at least by 18814.* The development of th© process seems to have been a gradual one for idiich no one individual was responsible*
^The Shanks process also made possible th© utili­sation of iodine found in the caliche* While iodine became the most laaportant by-product ol the industry* even Its pro­duction was limited by agreement among producers* Th©
a larger amount or the nitrate deposits round on their 
property*
The growth in nitrate production* resulting from the 
increased demand and the improved processing techniques* can 
be followed in Table XX below* ̂ For most years when the in­
crease in output declined* the reason lay in the formation 
of a combination*? Moreover since the productive capacity 
of the industry was usually much larger than actual produc­
tion* output could have been increased even more if the de­
mand for nitrate had warranted*
The expansion of production was brought about by en­
larging existing oficinas as well as by the creation of new 
ones* Statistics indicate* however* that the number of 
oficinas in operation month by month varied widely* and thatararely were all running simultaneously* Bven with a number 
of establishments closed temporarily* because of the war*
iodine combination made agreements with producers of iodine in other countries beginning in 1886* At that time* Chilean iodine was allotted almost sixty per cent of the world market* Some form of restriction was necessary because of the limited market for iodine* See BiXXinghurst* &&s capi** tales salitreros* pp* 72ff! Delegation de Salltrera* MeSorla 
eZHreol* PP* gg*
^The figures given for nitrate exports can be con­sidered equal to production since only a small amount of nitrate was consumed on the oficinas*
^Combinations operated during the following periods! 1685-1886! I89I-I8931 1896-1897*
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there were twanty-seven ofieinae working in  1880* By X881f, 
the number reached fox̂ ty-f our, Continued expansion brought 
new concerns into operation until X897 when seventy-two 
o fie in a®  were operating* Many ©f the®© new of 1 cin&a were 
created as a result of the selling of ©tate^owned land® in 
I89I4. *»d 1895« However, a decline resulting from the nitrate 
depression o f the late 1 8 9 0 *8 brought th© number of working 
o fio ln a a  down to sixby~one by 1 9 0 0 *9
Because oficinas operated under a wide variety of 
co nd ition s, there was no \miformity in the cost of produc­
tio n * This m s true even though the same type of equipment 
was used in  a l l  oficinas* Th© chief factors responsible for 
v a ria tio n s  in production cost® were the quality and location
of caliche worked, the sis© of the processing establishment,
10and the cost of administration* Oficinas with high grad© 
caliche located in shallow veins near the processing plant 
had an advantage over those whose deposits lay deeper in th© 
earth and farther from th© plant* Then too, th© larger plants 
could process nitrate for a lower unit cost* Most of the 
more efficient oficinas were located in Tarapaca where th© 
quality of caliche was highest, and practically all ware
9Cruchsga, Or-K&nlzaclon ecpno^ca M  _gMlg_, I I *  Appendix No. 2, p. 191 H & m r f a m m  S I  g g & M  M B I m *  1684, Xqulqu© quoted in  Semper and M ichels, In d u s trie  d a l ® © litre * 
p* 1391 Bee also Delegacion de B a lltre ra s , M̂©Ji9r|̂ |̂ ,lon Xo9T* 
pp. $ot, and Mamorla an 1903,» p . 20.
l°Seinper and Michels, Industrie del sall.tre. pp. 9S£X.
11owned by foreigners*
Comprehensive studies of the cost of production to 
the nitrate industry are wanting for the nineteenth century# 
However* a study based on data accumulated around 1900 placed 
the minimum cost of producing a Spanish quintal of nitrate 
at pence* the maximum at 36 pence* and the average cost
at 21*1 pence#3*2 toe fact that slightly in excess of fifty 
per cent of production costs went for wages indicates that 
the Shanks Process was largely a manual one#3*̂  Af ter trans­
porting the nitrate to port* placing it at boat side* and 
paying the export tax* the cost was greatly increased# 
Calculations made in the study referred to above place the 
minimum cost of nitrate at boat side at l$S*9 pence* the maxi­
mum at 7lf pence* and the average cost at 57*6 pence# ̂  Since 
the export tax was 27*9 pence* It represented from 37*7 to 
57 per cent of the cost of nitrate at boatside# Another 
important aspect was the tendency of costs to increase* Pro­
ducers were responsible for this trend because they followed 
the practice of elaborating the caliche of highest quality 
first* and left the poorer grades until last*3̂




P* 97* this work it is estimated that the average cost of production between i860 and 1092 was from thirteen to twenty pennies per quintal# See pp# 9of#
XS8
Throughout th© nineteenth century Tarapaca maintained 
it© position a© th© center of th© nitrate industry* Under 
normal conditions exports from that province ©quailed eighty 
per cent of all nitrate shipments* During the War of th© 
Pacific* however* when operations in Tarapaca were unsettled* 
those districts to the south became significant temporarily*
In 1830* forty-eight per cent of all nitrate exports cam© 
from the southern fields $ but by 1383* this proportion fell 
to sixteen per cent# Two of the southern f!©Xd©*-TaXta! and 
Toeopilla— rose In importance again after I89O* yet together 
they accounted for only eighteen per eent of production by 
19 02.
The pattern of nitrate consumption in the late
nineteenth century changed only slightly in spite of the
fact that total consumption increased significantly* The
great market for nitrate was Europe* especially in Germany
end France where the cultivation of sugar beets was under-
17taken on a large scale* * Although accurate statistics on 
consumption are not available before th© l8 9 0 *s* they portray 
the distribution of consumption before 1890# Uhtll 1 9 0 0* 
Europe accounted for no less than eighty-six per cent of 
annual consumption and sometimes more# With an average of
^xbld*» pp# 136f#
^For th© growth of the sugar beet Industry in Germany and France see J* H. Clapham* The Economic Development of Franc© and Germany* iSlg-lQlk (3rd edition* C^brxSge4 ' University Press *X92o) * pp* 1/7*217*
thirty*fiv# per cent* Germany constituted th# chief user 
throughout the entire period* Other European countries in 
the order of their importance to th# nitrate trad# were 
France* Belgium* England* and Holland#**® She demand for 
nitrate in the United state# began to expand quit# rapidly 
after 1897* so that in the following century approximately 
one quarter of the world * a consumption was represented by 
that country* In addition* th# Hawaiian Islands and South 
Africa consumed a good quantity of nitrate* However* Chile 
and other Latin American states provided insignificant 
markets* Of the nitrate sold during this era over eighty 
per cent was used as fertiliser while th# remaining port ion 
went mainly to the manufacturers of explosives**'̂
She rapid expansion of the world*# consumption of 
nitrate was In part due to the efforts made by producers to 
enlarge the market for their product* Th# first such attempt 
was promoted by the combination of producers organised in 
l631j. as the Comite Sailtre* Aside from its connection with 
the activities of the combination in restricting production* 
it was given the responsibility of devising means to promote 
nitrate consumption* The committee developed a comprehensive 
program which it carried out with apparent success* Its
^^Delegacion de Salitrera* Memorla m  1897* Appendix Ho. 8, pp. (>$££', Chile, Comlalon Sailfae£a.~TsM. PP. l&8f j Semper and Michels, Ixidviatrlangel aalltre. Appendix No. 21, pp. 330-332*
x9 ib ia .. p. 332.
activities acre financed toy funds collected from producers 
for that purpose* The committee sponsored an essay contest 
in which seventy-nine papers were entered* and also published 
pamphlets designed to explain the benefits and Illustrate 
the use of nitrate as a fertiliser* Representatives were 
sent to important agricultural centers and to agricultural 
colleges tooth in the United States and in Europe* These 
individuals held conferences and gave demonstrations* Sup­
port was also given to those desiring to make scientific 
studies and to conduct experiments in which the (qualities of 
nitrate as a fertilizer were tested* Of equal importance* 
too, were the efforts made to establish new distributor® of 
nit rata.20 with th® exception of the essay contest, these 
techniques were the major ones used In later years after 
promotion activities had been expanded*
With the collapse of the first combination, all pro­
motion efforts of the producers lapsed until the formation 
of the second combination in 1891* Then* the policy was 
Initiated of levying a small contribution baaed upon exports 
-one-half cent per quintal— to obtain funds for the support 
of measures designed to stimulate consumption* This exaction 
was eventually lowered in l89if to one-eighth of a cent#2**
2®$bld*s p* lip.; J* W* Merriam to Dept* of State,No* 310, Iquique, II, pp* 37-ipU
^Chlle, Comision aalitrera, 19°9* PP« 33f*
In 1 8 9 2* th® Chilean government and Nitrate Railways made 
contributions to this work, and the latter consistently gave 
financial support from that time onward,*^
When the second combination dissolved, the permanence 
of the sales promotion activity was assured by the creation 
of the Aaoclacion Sailtrera de Ih^pagsndAi This organisation 
had its headquarters in Iquiquc, and although its governing 
body was drawn chiefly from the Tarapaca producers, other 
fields had representation. It published reports and data 
connected with the nitrate trade and through the Permanent 
Nitrate Committee in London sent representatives to major 
nitrate consuming regions, ^ The Asoeiaoion Issued tri­
mestrial circulars and published other information when the 
occasion required. In these circulars the statistical po­
sition of the industry Is revealed* and news of current 
interest to producers reported. In the appendices of the 
trimestrial circulars voluminous reports from propaganda 
agents overseas were reprinted# These frequently comprise 
as much as ninety pages of email type and Indicate the vari­
ous activities undertaken by the AsoeiaoIon, ^
Its work was directed by a manager n&io for most of
22South American Journal# XXXIII (Nov# 5# 1 8 9 2), 511#
230elegaclon de Salitrera* Mesnorja ©n 1901# p, 39* Judging from the list of officers of tae Asooiacion* English interests seem to have dominated its activities,
2*hFh» distribution of propaganda funds can bo aecer- tained from any of the trimestrial circulars#
162
the period m e  Eduardo Vijil* Vijil was a cons 1st exit sup-* 
porter of combinations and or the propaganda activities that 
he directed* According to figures quoted by Senor Vijil* 
the propaganda work from I89I to 1896 had produced quite 
beneficial results* Be state© that for the $84*1*235 spent 
during the period* the total value of nitrate consumed in­
creased by sixteen million pesos while the revenues of the 
government were increased by seven million pesos#^
Since any expansion of nitrate exports would bring 
greater revenues* promotion activities were in tune with the 
interests of the Chilean government# therefore# the govern­
ment gradually adopted the policy of cooperating with
TABXS XII
Expenditures for Sales Promotion* 1885-1908®'






&Chlle* Coral a Ion aalltrera an 1909. p. 1(2*
(May 8, 1897)* P» xil*25a.aoe. de Propaganda* Circular Trlmeatral. No. 11
producers in promoting the sale or nitrate* Through her 
consular corps* meanwhile* Chile became increasingly active 
in furthering the nitrate trade* By the time close cooper* 
atlon had developed between producers and the government* 
these agents were devoting much of their energy to propaganda 
activities chiefly in E u r o p e I n  1897# the government gave 
its official approval to the work of the Asoclacion* and from 
that date begins full-scale participation by Chile in the 
effort to promote consumption*2^ Public funds were henceforth 
contributed to the work and after 1 9 0 1* the original author* 
isation of twenty thousand pounds annually was increased 
significantly* 2®
The table on expenditures for sales promotion indi­
cates the increase in activity that resulted from government 
support* Of the total sum of h 580*331 spent during the 
years indicated In the table* & 194*726 had been contributed 
by the government• 29 Most of this money was spent in western 
Europe and in the United States* but some was expended in 
Canada* the west Indies* Russia* and elsewhere* The
^Soe Chile* Delegacion Fiscal de Salitreras y Ouaner&s* Informes Consulares sobre Propaganda Salitrera (Xqulquef El WacXonal* 1B9T)*
2?An investigation conducted by the government in 
1898 concerning the operations of the European branches of the Aeoclaelon resulted in a favorable report* Bee Asoc* de Propaganda* circular Trlmeatral* Ho* l6 (Aug* 18* 1 8 9 8}* p* xl and p* H4* r...
^®Seajper and Michels* Indus trla del aalltre* pp* ll\2t *
2^Chile* Com!slon Salitrera* 1 9 0 9* p* 43*
effectiveness of the propaganda efforts is heat attested by 
the increasing emphasis placed upon them#*̂ ®
3 ° m  1 9 0 0* according to the report of the DeXe&ado de Salltreras# propaganda funds were expended as follows"* J British 1sies— & 6*l|5o; Germany— $* Franc© and FrenchSwitzerland--fe 7*000; The Low Countries—  b 3*000! Italy—  
h 1*100; Spain and Portugal— fc 2*250| South Russia— & 1*750; United States* Canada* and West Indies— h 8*000« Since the total sum equals b 36*000* the preceding table may give only approximately accurate figures# Delegacion de Salitroras, Memoria en 1901a PP# 7!f*
CHAPT1B VI
THB ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL PRODUCTION
Producers of nitrate were and are today deeply af­
fected by the competitive nature of the industry and by the 
economic changes that result from fluxions of supply and 
demand* Although in the nineteenth century the industry 
faced only minor competition from other fertilisers in world 
markets* there was a great deal of internal competition among 
the growing number of enterprises engaged In the Industry*^ 
This* coupled with the tendency of production to outstrip 
consumption after i8 6 0* led to a lowering of the level of 
prices* During the period between i860 and 1900* three sharp 
price drops occurred* Nitrate interests considered the re«* 
suiting conditions calamitous; and they tried to combat them 
by forming combinations* Basically* the theory behind the 
nitrate combinations was to restrict production in order to 
bring supply into line with demand**-thus raising the price 
of the product— afoile simultaneously preserving to each pro** 
ducer his share of the market by allotting to each* according
R* H* Whitbeck and Prank E* Williams* Economic ; of South America (New York; McGraw-dlill* 194U
to a fixed standard* his share of production#^ In most
oases* when there was a fall in nitrate exports for a given
year# the cause lay in the formation of one of these combi-*
%nations*-* Had no such organisation in the industry appeared 
during the nineteenth century* the production and exportation 
of nitrate would have steadily Increased<A
The first sharp price decline affecting the nitrate 
industry was brought about by rapid increases in production 
in the few years after Chile gained possession of the 
provinces of Antofagasta and Tarap&ea* Exports that had been 
7*700*000 quintals in 1881* increased by three million 
quintals in 1882* and almost reached the thirteen million 
mark by the end of 1383* Advances in production such as 
occurred in these years were unprecedented* While eon* 
sumption expanded simultaneously* It did not keep pace with 
the increases in productive capacity* Because of the new 
relationship between the supply of nitrate and the demand 
for It* the price received by producers for nitrate declined 
continuously* In 188!$.* the drop measured at least twenty- 
five per cent when compared with the level of 1881* Veldes
2Hlguel Cmchaga* Salitre y Guano (MadridI Beus*
1929)# 197*
3See the Table on Production* Chapter V* p# 155* Compare the drop in production for the years when combi* nations were operating; i*e** 188£*1886* 1891^1893* 1896*1897# All statistics on production# consumption* and prices re«* ferred to in this chapter ere based on this table*
D̂elegacies* d© Salitreras* Memoria en 1897# PP*
28 ft,
Vergara* who was Jefe Foli'tico of Tarapaea during these 
years* asserted that these changes disrupted not only the 
normal commerce in nitrates but the entire Chilean economy 
and that the effect was equally ruinous on both*^
Although Valdes Vergara probably exaggerated the ill 
effects of this decline in price* many nitrate producers were 
dissatisfied and sought means to restore the higher price 
level of past years* Some method of limiting production was 
deemed necessary to achieve the goal that producers eonsid* 
ered essential if they were to continue to operate profit* 
ably: the restoration of prices to their ^normal” level-*
which was a very high one*
Their opinions illustrate the character is tic re* 
luctance that producers frequently manifest toward re* 
orienting their enterprises to vastly altered conditions*
@ie high price levels that had prevailed in the past caused 
producers to believe that the lowering of prices deprived 
them unjustly of profits to be gained from their enterprises* 
Hew producers of nitrate were looked upon with dismay and 
criticized as the agents of ruination by established inter­
ests* The new producers* however* charged their critics 
with misrepresenting the status of the industry and asserted 
that* in reality* profits were attractive* Excepting the
^Francisco Valdes Vergara# La crisis salltrera. y las medldas que ee proporan para remedlarlo (s^tlaKoy loBlu. p. $,
“Semper and Michels, Induatrla del salitre. p, l?6j see also XT. S.. Cona. Reports. ¥o7 251JV 'Kay IS, 1902,
r . o. Mansfield to Dept, ofstate.
natural advantages new producers possessed* such mist have 
hem the o&se for rarely is capital attracted on a large 
scale to an industry in which chances of gain are slim* 
However* as new producers solidified their interests* their 
attitude veered into line with the opinions of those they 
had previously censured* Undoubtedly* change in attitude 
proceeded mainly from their new* established position In the 
industry*
When in I88I4.* all indications pointed to a continu­
ance of the distressing economic situation* nitrate producers 
in Tar&paea began to realize that relief would be forthcoming 
only if they organized for the purpose of bringing about 
immediate and drastic curtailment of production* Although 
the idea gained almost unanimous acceptance* It was not an 
easy task for producers to decide on the exact method of 
carrying out their plan* What seemed reasonable to one set 
of operators* appeared unjust to another* Thus* producers 
engaged in considerable discussion and controversy before 
even a majority could reach an agreement on the procedure 
to be followed*^
Even then* only producers in Tarapaca7 co-operated*
In the plan adopted in June, 1881̂ * it was agreed to establish 
a committee* headed by a president* to administer the process 
of determining the productive capacity of producers in Tara- 
pacal This committee was empowered to set up a production
^Valdes Vergara* I*a crisis salltrera* p* 10*
quota Cor each oflcina on th© bast© of its established ca­
pacity. The committee also bad th© responsibI1Ity of 
constantly evaluating market conditions. When it considered 
that market conditions warranted a ©hang© in production* it 
had th© authority to vary the quota.® The quota method* es­
tablished by th© first combination* was adopted by succeeding 
combinations as th© most practical basis for allocating pro­
duction. However* the procedure was not ent Ireiy satisfacto­
ry or just* since some oficlnaa normally produced a much 
smaller per cent of their theoretical capacity than others. 
Consequently* th© quotas gave thm& a relatively more favor­
able position than they had enjoyed under free production.
At a later time* means to correct this flaw were adopted.9
Even though the operation of the first combination
coBsseneed on August 1* I881j.* it produced no tangible benefits
before 1885. Based upon estimated productive capacity* which
was approximately seventeen million quintals per year* the
committee established an initial quota of forty-five per
cent. In September the quota was reduced to forty per cent
10and on November 1 was lowered again to thirty per cent, 
nevertheless* the lessening of production during these months 
did not affect the price structure, since large shipments
QJ. W. Marr!am to Dept* of State* No. 310* April 8* 1886* Iqulque* II* pp. 28-32.
Q7See below* pp. l8£f.
10J. W. Merrlam to Dept, of State, No. 310* April 8* 
1886* Iqulque* II* pp. 32-3]̂
l ? o
made early to the year— before restriction took effect—  
kept exports at about the seme level they had been the year 
previous*
In the following year* however* a concerted effort 
to achieve results was made. At a general meeting of oper­
ators held in February* 1885* the production goal was set 
at seven million quintals* This level would have meant a 
forty per cent quota In I88i|̂ Actually the quota was closer 
to twenty-five per cent* because to the Intervening months 
productive capacity had increased*^ Thus* nitrate producers 
planned a precipitate drop in exports for 1885#
But the combination could not attain these goals*
For one thing* the executive committee found It difficult to
enforce the quota regulations* While one company made no
pretense of co-operating* others who had accepted the plan
12did not keep within their allotments* Therefore* at the 
general meeting in February the President was authorised to 
take legal action against those producers who did not abide 
by the agreement*1^ But this threat was unsuccessful* since 
the rules of the nitrate combination* like those of the 
“pools* organised in th© United States at the same time* were
■**̂J# W* Merriam to Dept* of State* Ho* 310* April 8* 1886* Iqulque* II* p* 35*
^J* W* Merriam to Dept* of State* Ho* 310* April 8* 
1886* Iqulque* II* p# 38# South American Journal* XXII (July 
11, 1885)* 320*
^J* W* Merriam to Dept* of State* No* 310, April 8* 1886, Iqulque* II, pp* 3l|f •
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effective only 00 long as its members chose to honor tlie 
stipulations of the agreement# The general meeting* likewise* 
sought in other ways to make its organisation more effective* 
It tried to discourage the creation of new oficinas and the 
scansion of those already in operation; moreover* it strove 
a second time to gain the co-operation of producers in other 
nitrate districts# None of these designs* however* were 
accompli shed# ̂
In spite of the difficulties * the combination began 
to produce results# While the goals for 1665 and 1666 were 
exceeded* the actual decline in exports* which was about 
half that contemplated* proved to be sufficient to affect 
the nitrate markets# Prices rose to rta desirable level**1 and 
remained there into 1686; but never did the price of nitrate 
approach the level of i860 and 1881#^
Even though prices dropped slowly during the remainder 
of I866* it proved to be a monumental task to hold the combi­
nation together# bow^cost producers became restive under the
restrictions which they felt essentially favored others whose
16costs of production exceeded their own# Then,too* since 
certificates permitting the acquisition of lend were being 
redeemed, new companies* to over—haul or build nitrate works,
ljtXbld,
Se® &3-so Table XX on p* 155*
1A-“̂ Semper and Michels* Industrie del sailtre, p# lljl#
were forming* Unless th© combination could absorb the now 
producers, it could not continue to function* Because their 
lands were of high quality and frequently not previously esc** 
ploited, the new producers insisted upon high quotas for their 
adheranc© to th© combination* Even then, some refused to 
agree to restrain production* The new companies that were 
basically well-situated to produce on a competitive basis saw 
evidences of an increasing demand for nitrate at the reduced 
prices and wished to take advantage of the greater total 
profits that could b© garnered tinder free production#
These conditions made the demise of the combination merely 
a matter of time*
In reality, th© continuance of the combination was 
not required by any adverse economic condition* Producers 
who had foreseen more favorable times saw their predictions 
materialize even beyond their most optimistic hopes in the 
three years following th© first combination* A sharp in­
crease in demand kept prices stable while nitrate exports 
doubled* The resulting prosperity, as has been noted, at­
tracted much foreign capital and made th© corporate form 
of business organization dominant in the industry* These 
new factors affected the reaction of the Industry to th© 
nitrate crisis that loomed ahead*
By the middle of 1 8 8 9, nitrate groups noted with un­
easiness the growing surpluses of nitrate that filled the
Ibid* t South American Journal* XXIV (Jan* 8, 188?),
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warehouses and the lower* market prices# With shipments con­
tinuing to exceed th© rate of consumption during the suxn&er 
months* by fall th© decline was so insistent that talk among 
producers of reviving the combination became commonplace*
By the beginning of th© year X89Q* there was no longer any 
doubt but that the nitrate slump was a reality# Although a 
periodically depressed market arose out of the nature o f  the 
industry and was characteristic of it to a - degree that made 
effective preventive action impossible for individual pro­
ducers# a part of the distress felt by operators at this time 
can be attributed to their own doings# Because of th© f e a r  
prevalent among producers that th© period from October to 
December, 1889 would b© the basis for assigning quotas when 
a combination was organised# an exceptionally high rat© o f  
export prevailed during those months#^® Thus# th© disparity 
between supply and demand was heightened and aggravated#
Furthermore# it was principally the British nitrate 
companies in the North-Harvey group that favored the for­
mation of a second combination* Hapidly organised with ex­
cessive capitalisations# they were not prepared to operate 
profitably under th© condition© that faced producers in 1890# 
In the prosperous period they might have been able to declare 
respectable dividends# but on their Inflated capital their 
future in a free market held only small profits and, perhaps# 
no dividends at all* So British nitrate capitalists took the
l8Ibld## XXVIII (April 12# 1890)* l|i>2#
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lead in bringing to fruition the second combination# ̂
The major problem they encountered in this endeavor 
w «  fee reluctance to co-operate manifested by the West Coast 
producers, a heterogeneous group composed of Chileans and 
resident foreigners— chiefly Germans, Spaniards, and Italians# 
For the most part West Coast producers were family enter** 
prises, unencumbered by high capitalisations and large over­
heads, and able to produce with adequate even if not large 
profits at the low prices British producers considered insuf­
ficient*2^ Furthermore, the reluctance manifested by some 
Chilean entrepreneurs to enter a combination dominated by 
British producers might well have been created by the 
widespread antagonism toward British supremacy in the Indus­
try then current in Chile* But it is far more likely that 
disagreement between British and West Coast producers over 
the system to be adopted and the allocation of production 
provided the main divisive force and the chief obstacle to 
an early conclusion of an agreement of combination#
The formation of the second combination was accom­
plished in I89I only after months of arduous negotiations 
between English and West Coast producers during which the 
nitrate depression deepened* If limitation of production had 
been initiated early in the year I89O, it might well have 
effectively cushioned th© decline and prevented th© slump
^journal of Fiaanae. IV, (August, I898), ?16.
2 0Rosb, Relaclonea comercialea entre Chile j  la Gran Bret ana* pp# 80f*
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from booming so grave* Certainly* as the year I89O pro* 
ceeded* a majority of producers showed a willingness to co­
operate* but none of the various plans gained wide enough 
acceptance to warrant implementation* In August all of the 
London companies agreed upon a plan that did not involve th© 
difficult process of establishing quotas and allocating pro* 
duction# Instead* it was based upon the complete stoppage 
of productive operations for three selected month© out of 
eaeh year* West Coast producers* however* were not attracted 
by the plan* which made necessary a return to the quota
pimethod*" The quota plan supported by the English companies 
late in I89O allocated thirty per cent of production to West 
Coast producers and aimed at a total output one-tenth below 
the prevailing rat© of consumption* Th© latter group now 
refused to endorse this proposal unless they were granted 
forty per cent of production and unless total output was set 
at th© level of consumption prevailing in 1890*^ Final 
arrangements* when concluded some months later* appeared to 
have been brought about by English acceptance of th® higher 
quota for West Coast interests* with th® latter acquiescing 
in th© lower rat© of production favored by the English* A 
delay in bringing limitations into fore© was caused by six 
West Coast and three English producers* all of whom wished
^South American Journal* XXIX (Aug* 9» I89O)* 15?*
22Ibld.« Nov. 22.1890, p. 628; Dec. 13, I890, p.711* Deo. 20, 1890, p. 765.
for higher quotas* When restriction went into effect* one 
Important West Coast producer—»the German firm of Folach and 
Martin— did. not co-operate# The second combination in an 
attempt to eliminate th© troublesome process of assigning 
quotas abandoned* for th© first year, th® productive power 
basis and relied upon limiting production to seven months 
each year* This new time basis, however, was unsatisfactory 
to many! and after a year*® trial, the older quota system was 
re—adopted*^
Even though the negotiations leading to the creation 
of the second combination had to be carried over into 1&91# 
a curtailment of production began in January of that year*
This limitation was brought about not by producers, but as a 
result of the outbreak of the Revolution of 1891, which 
centered during the early months of that year in the nitrate 
provinces* A complete stoppage of work occurred in many 
oflcinas; and for a time, no cargoes of nitrate left Chilean 
ports * ^ After fighting ceased in the nitrate region, exports 
continued to fall below normal levels because the continuance 
of the revolution elsewhere disrupted shipping and created a 
scarcity of labor*Thus, even with the combination
^Ibld** XXX (Jan* 10, 1891), 351 Boss, Reiaciones comerciales entre Chile y la Gran Bretana. p* 85*
^fAsoc# de Propaganda, Circular Trtoea.tral* Ho* 15 (May 13, 1898), p* lv*
25south American Journal* XXX? (July 25, 1895), 95*
26Ibld.* XXVII (April 23, 1892), 1*69*
operating for only a part of th© year# production in I89X 
fell four and one-half million quintals below th© mark 
reached in I89O and approached the limit established by th® 
combination*
Production at a reduced rat© continued through th©
year 1893 and brought the benefits that had been expected
from it i# Exports remained within the bound© of the ©a**
tablished quotas, and consumption in X89I and X892 eacceeded
them sufficiently to reduce th© stock© of surplus nitrate
that had plagued the market in previous years* This con~
dition was reflected in steady rises in the price level# A
measure of the effectiveness of these improvements can be
discerned In the dividend reports of English corporations#
*In I892, they increased their dividends over th® proceeding 
year, and with a fairly well stabilised price, did at least 
as mil if not better in 1893#
Even while these improvements were being made, 
however, several forces developed which strained th© ties 
that held together the combination and, eventually, brought 
about Its disruption# One of th© most influential of these 
was the attitude of the Chilean government— factor not 
slgnifleant earlier* The government under Balraacoda had 
been strongly opposed to the formation of the second combi-* 
nation*2^ with his downfall, nitrate producers looked for 
better co-operation from the government • However, nothing
Ibid*, XXVIII (Jan* I89O), supplement, p* 6#
could annul the fact that any government at that time would
have carefully scrutinised restrictions of nitrate exports*^®
If these restrictions appeared detrimental to the interests
of the country, the government would naturally oppose them*
Actually, because of growing financial troubles, two such
measures were adopted in 1893.29 Although these difficulties
were not caused by the loss of revenue incident to the cur*
tailment of nitrate exports, they were undoubtedly aggravated
by restriction. The first official Indication of the govern*
mental attitude was a "polite warning” issued by President
Montt to English interests "not to go too far” in limiting 
'SOexports The second step was the announc ement that in the 
following year the practice of offering state-owned nitrate 
lands for sale would be revived*
The attitude of the government would have been an 
appropriate one regardless of whether native or foreign
28"Gperaciones de la combinacion sallfcrera," edi* torial in La Patria (Valparaiso) in I8 9 2, published in Charles Le Crand, ed#, Questioner Salltreras (Santiago* Gutenburg, I8 9 2), pp* Ijfi-pJ* ^
2^The South American Journal noted that in "high official circles" there was developing a hostile attitude towards foreign capital with the nitrate interests being singled out for "direct attack" because the forming of a combination, from th© Chilean view-polnt, constituted an at* tempt to create a monopoly "against public well-bdlng#" Xt was also observed that this Chilean attitude was of rocent origin, since in times past, "the Chileans were conspicuous amongst South American nations for th® adoption of an en­lightened policy in their treatment of foreigners* * • *" South American Journal, XXXV (Sept* 30, 18937, 331*
3°Xbld.. July 29, 1893, P. 95.
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capital had been instrumental In bringing about restriction 
of production* However* It 1* clear that the second combi- 
nation— unlike the first— m s  considered by Chileans as 
primarily an English project which was promoted by over­
capitalised English concerns and which unfairly prejudiced 
the interests of th© state by reducing its revenues# The 
fact that Col# North had been a leader in the formation of 
this combination gave credence to this view# Chileans be­
lieved that not only the combination but British companies 
as well would be seriously affected by the sale of nitrate 
lands# A sale would result in a great increase in productive 
power# Moreover* if Chileans became the chief purchasers* 
the British would find it more difficult to form an effective 
combination in the future#^
In addition to th© attitude of the Chilean government* 
several factors that had brought the first combination to an 
end also affected th© duration of th© second# Thus* the im­
provement in the status of th© nitrate market in 1892 and 
I893 hastened dissolution* just as a similar Improvement had 
done during the later months of the first combination when 
restriction proved disadvantageous to low-cost producers# 
Another parallel existed in th© immediate and impending en­
trance of new nitrate producing companies into th© field#
In 1893* a group headed by Col# North was completing a new
^Chilean Times* June 10* 1893# as Quoted In the South Ameri'c^^oufnaTr X3QCV (Jhly 2 9, 1 8 9 3)* XOijf*
£80
o£tclm^~the Lacunas — sfoich had good lands and a high cam­
pacity • Ha demanded a high quota for bringing this unit 
into the combination#-^ The prospect of new works being 
brought into production after the sale of 18 94 was an ad- 
ditlonal incentive to established producers to return to free 
production iraaediately* They wanted to gain the full bene** 
fits expected in the few months following the break-up of the 
combination that would come from full productivity at the 
high price level than prevailing* For these reasons* no re­
newal of the combination agreement was made when it lapsed 
early in 1894*
With the return of free production in 1894# the 
industry experienced its most profitable year since I8 8 9# 
but as in the past# prosperity was impermanent• An Increase 
in exports of three million quintals for the year 189? failed 
to raise th© total value of the product#^ Moreover# indi­
cations that another slump was beginning multiplied as that 
year drew to a close#^
With a decline in consumption and persistent surpluses 
continuing th© following year# the formation of a third 
combination was inevitable* Attempts made in £895 were 
unsuccessful* Th© opposition of Chilean firms to the for­
32Ross# Belactones comercialea entre Chile y la Gran 
Bretaga* p* 83# . . .
^South American Journal* XLIII (Sept* 2 6* 1 8 9 6)# 336* 
3 -̂Jbid.. XXXXX (Nov. 2 3 # 1Q95)* 51+1* 51p.
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mation of a combination was a major obstacle*^ Many 
oficin&g were expanding their capacity# and this# according 
to the manager or the Asociacion# IMuardo Vijil* made it 
extremely difficult to obtain agreement on quotas*^ But 
idien they were given special consideration# along with one 
English firm# in the allocation of production# an agreement 
was reached on April 1# 18 96# The production goal for that 
year was set at forty-seven per cent of capacity— or slightly 
over twenty-one million quintals# Th® third combination was 
to be maintained for a period of three years*^
This third combination was a total failure* Produce 
tion limits during the first year were far from met# For the 
most part# this was due to the exceptions made in the origi­
nal agreement and to the provision permitting all companies 
to produce freely# if they so desired# in the three months 
following the conclusion of the agreement. 38 Perhaps this 
latter concession had been necessary in order to obtain the 
co-operation of some producers# but it prevented the drastic
^Letter written by M* Nicholson to the Economist# LUX (Aug* 2lf# 1895)# 1118#
36As oc# de Propaganda# Circular Trimestrain Ho* 8 (May l±, 1 8 9 6)# ppm vl-vii* Se© also app^dfi, pp# 1-2 for a brief resume of the difficulties encountered in forming the third combination from the English view-point*
37Money Market Review. LXXII (March Xip, 1 8 9 6), giji*.. The TMnannial Times asserted that eight finns In the North group werealinost ruined by the slump. See extract published •̂n South American Joumal. XLI (Sept. 1 8 9 6), 266.
3 8Xbld.. XL (June 6 , 1 8 9 6), 6 2 9, 6i|2f XLI (Sept. 5,I8 9 6), 266,
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curtailment of production that had boon planned# This gave 
the combination a bad start from which it never r e c o v e r e d *^9
Even in 1897 when restriction m s  somewhat more effective in 
reducing exports, prices continued to drop# The combine was 
not producing th© results that had been forthcoming under 
earlier combinations#^ By this time# too# a number of new 
concerns and older ones whose position in the industry had 
improved by the purchase of additional properties became 
dissatisfied with the quotas allotted to them*^ When they 
began producing beyond their fixed quotas in October# I8 9 7# 
the third combination collapsed ̂eighteen month® before the 
date that had been set for dissolution In the original 
agreement #^
All efforts to reorganise the combination following 
its collapse proved futile# Eduardo Vijil urged producers 
to agree to & drastic curtailment of production# but his 
ceaseless efforts could not revive the combination#^ Those 
concerns that had destroyed the combination in 1897 refused 
to resume "nursing their competitors* by cutting their pro­
duction to maintain a price below which the poorer enterprises
39jbld.» XLII (May 29, 1897), 598*
4°D©legaclon de Salifcreraa, Memorla an 1897. pp.25-28.
Ip-South American Journal. XLIV (Jan. 29, 1 8 9 8), 115*
^Aaoc. de Propaganda, Circular Trlinestral. Mo. 13 
(Nov. 25* 1 8 9 7)* P* 111.
^Journal of Finance. IV (Aug., IS9 8 ), 7l6f.
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could not produo# profitably*^- Actually* a alight Im­
provement in th© nitrate market occurred in I89 8I yet during 
the remainder of the century the upswing in nitrate affair© 
remained slight* Because of lessened demand, many companies 
continued to operate on a part-time basis * ^
In the absence of a combination* English interest© 
sought to control prices in another Wiy* In the fall of 
1899# they revived a plan that had been suggested a decade 
earlier when proposals were being made to alleviate another 
period of depressed prices* At that time it had gained no 
supporters* The project involved the formation of a market­
ing organization which would posses© the exclusive right to 
permit nitrate shipments, determine their destination* and 
organize and control their sale* Th© latter objective was 
to be attained by apportioning ©ales among various con­
signment companies— those already in the business* The 
English firm of Anthony Gibbs and Company, which had earlier 
engaged in the same type of activity for the Peruvian guano 
industry* was to direct th© operations of the consignment 
companies and to head th© entire organization* However* the 
refusal of West Coast producers and the nitrate merchant© of 
Valparaiso to participate prevented fulfillment of the d©«» 
aign*^ Had it succeeded, the plan might have constituted
^See Asoc* de Propaganda* Circular Trlmestral* Ho* 16 (Aug* 8* I8 9 8)* pp* vi ff*
^South American Journal* XLV (Oct* 1* I8 9 8)* 3 6 7*
^Aasqc* de Propaganda* Circular Xrlmestral, Ho* 12
a revival of Feru*s monopolisation of nitrate sales policy 
in a more effective forra#^
The failure of this scheme indicates the growing 
strength of the West Coast producers and the decline of 
British influence in the nitrate Industry# Although the 
British interests remained the most important group, their 
control over productive capacity had dropped from fifty-nine 
to forty-two per cent between I895 end 189?*^® This decline 
continued in the twentieth century#
A favorable climate of opinion among producers had 
developed by the turn of the century which made possible a 
renewal of the combination# Realising eventually that pro­
ductive capacity would always be in excess of consumption.
(Aug# 21, 1 8 9 7), P# vi# On p# 2 in the appendix a West Coast producer suggests bounties be given poorer companies to ke$p thesn from producing?# See also Semper and Michels# Industrie del sailtre# p# iyj-#
-̂7At a meeting of the shareholders of the Santa Rita Nitrate Company in 1899 ^he chairman was asked if "some form of amalgamation" of the producing companies was possible#The chairman replied s "There is no doubt that if we had the »go* of the Americans, a trust would be formed of the entire nitrate interest, and we should see the price of nitrate placed at about A 2 or even more above the present price# Shareholders would be receiving enormous dividends, th© people handling the trust would make enormous profits, and the trade would not be any worse off than at present • • # #X guarantee to say that if this nitrate Interest were in America a trust would be formed within If8 hours, • • #/and^w© should go away for our holidays having thousands of pounds in our pockets# Instead of pence# South American Journal# 
XLVI (May 27, 1899), 597. ‘------
^®Asoc. de Propaganda, Circular Trimestral# No# 13 
(Nov# 2J?, 1897)# P« TV#
nitrate interests began to see that some type of regulated 
production on a permanent basis was the only solution to the 
maintenance of price levels* Thus a combination was the only 
practical means of bringing this about* If such an organ!** 
zation could be formed free of the flaws that had crushed 
previous attempts of this nature, producing companies would 
in all probability enjoy a greater measure of stability than 
at any time in the past* To a large extent those pitfalls 
of past combinations were surmounted when the fourth combine 
was established in 1900*
The following policies, incorporated by the fourth 
combination in its regulations, did much to preserve the 
Integrity and increase the workability of the association.^9 
The provisions established a set standard for calculating 
the productive capacity of oflcinas and a procedure for 
appeals by operators who desired a re-evaluation* In ad­
dition, another article of th© agreement defined what consti­
tuted grounds for allowing Increases In quotas so that 
controversy over this point was minimised# The quota of each 
oflcina was also to be affected by th© output of the previous 
year* In the event an oflcina did not fill its quota, it 
would not be allowed to produce in excess of the lesser 
amount* Th© adoption of this principle was motivated in part 
by the desire to prevent more favorable conditions being
^Asoe # de Propaganda, Escrituras Fublicas de la flambinaclon Salitrera d© 1901 a I9O0 (Tqulquei La 'PaTTrTa*1900;, pp*3-12*
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established Ter weaker producing units than for others; and 
in part, so that errors in the original estimate of pro** 
ductiv© capacity could be corrected* Another article pro­
vided sever© penalties for exceeding assigned quotas# Finally, 
producers were protected from having to acquiesss against their 
wishes in a limitation groater than twonty-f iv© per cent of 
the output of the preceding year#
Of groat importance to the success of the fourth 
combination was the improved relationship between th© govern­
ment and nitrate interests# Co-operation in sales promotion 
activities led to a more harmonious relationship between the 
producers and the government *as did the strengthening of 
Chilean nitrate interests# Furthermore, in drawing up the 
regulations of the association, the members of the combine 
did not overlook the interests of the government# Those pro­
visions which assured a level of production at least equal 
to the consumption of the previous year and which limited 
quota reductions to twenty-five per cent, minimised the 
effects such restrictions would have on the government*© 
nitrate revenues# Moreover, th© purpose of the association 
was to allow a moderate yearly increase in production, enough 
to keep pace with growing consumption without outstripping 
it and sufficient to permit an increase in nitrate revenue®, 
without endangering an orderly development of th© industry#^0
^Semper and Michels, Industrie del salitr©, pp# lJ|5-
ll̂ T#
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In thin way* it was hoped* th© interest of both producers 
and government would be protected#
The fourth combination met with immediate and con* 
tinuous success* Within on© year the price of nitrate rose 
significantly and thereafter maintained a perceptible in* 
crease# Even the sale of nitrate properties by the govern* 
ment in 1901 and 1903 did not disrupt these well-laid plans# 
The companies created as a result of the sales were absorbed 
by the combine# Thus* the formation of powerful new compa­
nies did not result* as they had in the past* In the collapse 
of the organisation nor in excessive production* In effect* 
this combination was renewed immediately upon the ©aspiration 
of the five year term originally agreed upon#^ With oc­
casional exceptions* the prosperity of the industry lasted 
until the close of World War I#
Thus* the earlier combinations were unsuccessful In 
bringing stability to the industry# They had, at times* 
brought temporary benefits to producers* but for no signifi­
cant period could the downward price trend be halted# Un­
doubtedly, that trend created unfavorable conditions for the 
industry which could be ameliorated only by the imposition 
of permanent production controls# This fact was seen as 
early as 188^ when a Chilean economist explored the various 
ways of achieving stability# As h© foresaw then* the di­
vergent Interests of the government and producers and the
^The combination was not renewed* however* in 1910#
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existence of a large number of nitrate operators were obsta­
cles that virtually precluded the establishment of effective 
controls#^ Th® achievement of an organisation that had the 
necessary permanence, however, came with the formation of th© 
fourth combination* hater on in th© history of the industry 
the formation of a nitrate trust was more widely suggested 
and eventually, brought into being**^ Yet that development 
required not only the co-operation but the leadership of the 
government of Chile#
aides Vergara, Crisis aalitrera, pp* 13-26*
^Bertrand, Crisis aalitrera, pp* 70, 53ff* Fora review of the history of the nit rat e industry in the twentieth century see Karl Falk, "Chlle^s • white gold1 Stages A Comeback”, Foreign Commerce Weekly, VIII, Ho* 10 (Sept* 5, 19^2), 3-7, 30-Sl#
CHAPTER VII
THE LABOR FORCE
The enlargement and expansion of operations by
nitrate producers in th© period following i860 attracted In-
creasing numbers of workers to the nitrate provinces# They
came from th© agricultural areas in the neighboring countries
of Peru and Bolivia as well as from Chile* In i860* th©
majority of laborers in the fields of Tarapaca were Peruvians*
1In the fields to the south Chileans comprised th© majority#
However, this relationship was considerably altered as the
size of the labor force increased# The number of Bolivians
and Peruvians working in the nitrate fields grew slowly in
comparison to the number of Chileans; thus, by 1902, Chilean®
accounted for seventy-one per cent of the labor force#
Together, Peruvians and Bolivian® comprised one-quarter of
the workers# As had been the case in i860, th© preponderance
of Chilean labor increased according to the proximity of th©
2field to the center of the country*
^Guillermo E# Billlnghurst, Condjcion Legal de log Peruanos Nacldos en Tarapaca {Santiago: El IProgreso, x8BYT, pp* Bulnes, chile and Peru* p* 43*
%imon B# Rodrigue®, Eatadlatloa del Trabajo (Santiago: Cervantes, 1908^1909), it, Appendix" "No# C, p. 28#
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Nitrate producers found a permanent source of cheap 
labor in the populous central region of Chile# There , an 
agricultural economy existed in which the immense haciendas 
of the Chilean aristocracy constituted the characteristic 
economic unit# The peons, or inqulffnos* who worked on these 
large estates were poorly paid and had almost no opportunity 
to improve their status by becoming independent farmers*^
They were, therefore, attracted by the higher wages obtain­
able in the mining regions of northern Chile, especially in 
the nitrate districts# Many of th© peons who left their 
haciendas to work in the industry did 00 with the intention 
of remaining only a few years5 however, some settled pemm- 
nently in the nitrate region* Others eventually returned to 
their homes with their savings* Because of this practice 
there occurred a constant shuffling of laborers between 
central and northern Chile#
The supply of labor was sufficient to meet the normal 
requirements of the industry* Occasionally, however, th© 
bargaining position of the workers was enhanced by a tempo­
rary scarcity of manpower* This condition existed several 
times before the turn of th© century# The first recorded 
shortage occurred in 188? and during the early months of
^Robert E# Mansfield, Progressive Chile (New Yorks T* Y# Crowell Co*, 1913), PP# 93-Ilifc* 'inquffllSo is the name given to an illiterate agricultural worker in dliile« The word roto is used to describe inqulllnos who have left th© rural areas to work in industry, particularly in the mining region of northern Chile# However, the two words are fre­quently used interchangeably*
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1888# Th© shortage was attributed to two ©auseef an in* 
crease in th© demand Tor workers in the copper industry which 
attracted some nitrate laborers * and an epidemic of cholera 
along the west coast of South America#̂ * Although a slight 
Increase in wages resulted# nitrate producers were not ad­
versely affected* Their prosperity was ©aid to have been 
promoted by th© shortage since it prevented an excessive ex­
pansion of production*
Nevertheless# with the beginning of the nitrate boom 
late in the year 1888# a serious need for more workers did 
occur* Promoters of nitrate companies being organised at 
that time were predicting Immediate profits for their enter­
prises* For that reason and because nitrate was bringing a 
high price in the European markets# the promoters felt 
obliged to hasten the process of bringing new oficinaa Into 
production* To do this it was necessary to import into the 
region a large number of additional laborers* In their rush 
for results nitrate promoters sent agents to central Chile 
who offered attractive inducements to the agricultural 
workers there* An Englishman described the situation and 
its outcome as follows s
It was necessary to show dividends with the least possible delay* Labour on th© spot being all employed# it was obligatory to obtain men from any quarter and at any price# The 60 or 70 cents per day labourers of the south leaped at the
^South American Journal* XXV (April 28# 1888)# 230| Grt* Br*# Consular Reports * Misc * Series# (I889)# No# 122#
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enhanced offers from th© sunny north, idxer© the price of labour rapidly advanced with the increasing demand of the new companies, until $ dollars, and even as high as 7 dollars, per day was paid in their desperate need and rush for results.5
Peons from central Chile flocked to th© nitrate
provinces in numbers sufficient almost to double the sis© of
the labor force by 1890# But with the collapse of the boom
in that year, the demand for labor began to decline.
In 1691* a few oficinaa found it difficult to maintain
a full crew of workers, because the revolution drew some of
them into the army* Even so, no benefits were gained by
workers. The market for nitrate was depressed and a cutback
in production with a consequent reduction of th© number of
employed, would have been inevitable. Finally, toward th©
close of the 18901 s it was reported that th© revitalization
of the copper industry was giving ” the nitrate producers a
good deal of anxiety,” since they saw many of their workers
leave for jobs in th© copper Industry and feared the comp©**
tit Ion for labor would necessitate wage increases. After
I89O, however, nitrate workers did not realize much to-
provement in wages or working conditions as a result of these
temporary scarcities of labor.
Actually, the presence of an excessive supply of
labor had more effect on the well-being of th© nitrate
^W. Anderson Smith, Temperate Chile# A Progressive Spain (London! Adam and Charles Black, 1899J pV 5>'3.
^South American Journal. XLVI (June 17, 1899), 667•
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workers# The over-supply of labor was most apparent daring 
the periods when producers formed combinations# These organ­
isations curtailed production; and that* naturally* limited 
employment opportunities and caused distress among the 
workers# At these times* efforts were made by the government 
to re-settle unemployed nitrate workers in the country * s 
agricultural areas* but the results of this policy were 
slight#7 nevertheless* the flow of labor both to and from 
the nitrate fields had an important affect upon th© labor 
situation in central Chile#
Statistics presented in Table XIII below Illustrate 
the affect these combinations had on the size of the labor 
force# As a result of th© formation of th© first combination* 
one-third of the workers lost their Jobs# While th® effect 
of the second period of restriction Is difficult to assess* 
since It coincided with the advent of the Revolution of I8 9I* 
It probably retarded the expansion of th© labor force* The 
most serious and precipitous decline in th© employment of 
nitrate workers set in with the organization of the third 
combination# Over six and a half thousand workers lost their 
jobs between 1895 and 18 98# However* some unemployment at 
this time would have been unavoidable even without th© for­
mation of a combination Inasmuch as the depression in the 
nitrate Industry during these years was quit© severe and a
7Ibid.. XLI (Sept. 1 9, 1 8 9 6), 307* 
“Smith, Temperate Chile, pp. 531•
number* of ofieima ceased operating#
TABLE XIII 
The Orowth of the Nitrate Labor Force*
1880-1903*
 ifamber ~o£.....   T~..1 ~ .... r... Wumfcer..c2f
2SS£_______ Workers Year
2,8L8 1892 13*5X0
k »906 1893 lk*?56
7*12k 189k 1 6 *0 9 2M il ^95 f2*|8|5*505 I896 19*Jip4*571 189? 16,7 Zlk*534 1698 15*95
7 *2 0 1 1899 1 8 *9 1
9 *1 8 0 1966 19*67
1 1*1*22 1901 20*26]
13*060 1902 21**^
11,675 1903
^©legacion Fiscal de Salitreras, Megoria op,1901^ pa 86# Figures for th© years 1961^X903 Sere taken from Semper and Michels* Industrie del aalltre* 
p# 333* likewise, based on later report s ro f t h o  ' 
Delegaelon*
Even though the wages of labor In the nitrate fields
exceeded wages paid workers in the agricultural areas* all
reports and observations made concerning the status of the
nitrate workers indicate that their way of life was con**
aider ably degraded* Shortly after he visited the nitrate
region, Reginald Enoch* an Englishman familiar with most
countries in Latin America* reported the following*
• • • It cannot be said that • • • /Eh© Chilean 
nitrate worker/ represents any growing standard of 
civilisation* His work Is hard* his life semi** 
bestial and Illiterate* his dress and habitation 
primitive* his customs semi ••savage* his surround­
ings dreary* sterile* and lacking in amenities which might make for social betterment; and he is
a hard drinker* due largely to the arduous nature of the work*9
Thus* for nitrate workers the cost of Hiring was high* 
living conditions were poor* and working conditions left much 
to be desired* No apparent difference in this regard existed 
between Chilean and foreign producers; and with a few ex­
ceptions* reported after 19OO* the situation was general*"^ 
Basically* the high cost of living in the nitrate 
region was caused by the lack of a near-by agricultural 
region and the consequent necessity of importing all food­
stuffs as well as other supplies and merchandise* But* the 
situation was aggravated by the practice of the nitrate 
companies of seeking to monopolise the sale of food* liquor* 
and other products consumed by the workers* The method em­
ployed to obtain this end was known as the truck system*
Each oficina established a company store for the purpose of 
selling goods to its workers* and rules prohibiting sales by 
peddlers and other merchants on company property were 
strictly enforced*-*'* Except in a few sections of Tarapaca^ 
most ofielnag were sufficiently isolated from one another
9c* Reginald Enoch* The feepubHcg of Central and South America (London: J• M* Dent Sons * 19IJ) * P* •
10Comejo* El Sal it re* p* II4.7 * Among the few firms that provided better working conditions one was German* another Peruvian* and a third a Chilean enterprise managed by an Englishman*
i1^* W* Merriam to Dept, of State* Ho* 310* April 8* 1886* Iquique* XX* p. l*£f Theodore Child* The D anish- Arable an Republics (Hew York: Harper* IO9 1J* p* ITS*
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ana from other villages to assure the effectiveness of the 
monopoly# As a result # workers spent at least sixty per 
cent or their earnings in such establishments# Because of 
this system and the high prices charged by the company 
stores# each oflcina was able to regain a portion of the 
wages paid to workers# It has been estimated that on the 
average# one and two-tenths pennies of the cost of producing 
& quintal of nitrate was restored to the companies from the 
profits of their stores#*^
In spite of the attraction the nitrate Industry had 
for agricultural laborers in central Chile# th© wages# hours 
of labor# and other working conditions in the oflcinas were 
at a low standard# It is impossible to present an accurate 
account of wage levels in th© industry before 19 00# because 
of the differences existing between ofieinaa# th© lack of 
reliable statistics# and the varied mode of wage payments# 
Some worked on an hourly basis while others were paid accord* 
ing to the task system#^ There were at least fifteen 
different types of jobs— -blasters# miners# cart drivers# 
blacksmiths# common laborers# etc#— and the remuneration for 
each varied#^* Moreover# higher wages were paid in Tarapaca^ 
than in the other nitrate districts#
12Semper and Michels, Industrie del aalltre. p. 9 2.
•̂ rbld., ppa 103-10 6.
-^Rodriguez, Eatadistlca del I’rahajo, II, Appendix 
Ho. C, PP- 3of.
Nevertheless, there appears to have been a gradual 
increase in money wages* It was reported that wages in 1886 
varied between $0*75 and #2 *G0| in X89I, from #3*00 to #S*O0j 
and after 1900, from $4*00 to #6*00 per dsy*3̂  With these 
increases, however, there was a simultaneous decline in the 
value of the Chilean paper peso, the monetary unit in which 
workers were paid* For ins tame, the average annual value 
of the Ghilean peso in 1890 was l/16th pence; by X89I4., 
the peso was worth only 12 9/16th pence; during the remainder 
of the century, the value of the peso fluxuated between 
17 9/l6th pence and llj. j/ 2  pence *^ In th® light of this 
development, the money wage increases gained by the nitrate 
workers, perhaps, were sufficient only to offset the depr©cit­
ation of the peso* In any case, the increase in real wages, 
if any, was slight*^
Many nitrate workers, it seems, experienced an added 
disadvantage because some oficlnaa issued wages in company 
tokens* Since the tokens could be spent only at the company 
store, the practice was designed to aid operators in
^Ibid* t Child* South American Republics* P* 1731 G-aldames, JTeograf la de ChiXe* p# lHo| jTWeMerriam to Dept* of State, tfo* 3l(J, April 8, 1886, Iqulque, IX, p* 1|5*
^Fetter, Monetary Inflation in Chile, pp* 13f*
^South American Journal* XXIX (Nov* 8, I89O), 580f * This report" observes that the decline in the rate of exchange of the Chilean paper peso meant lower wages for labor and benefits for the producers*
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malnta.itd.ng that monopoly* Wei11® workers could redeem their 
tokens Tor cash at the end of every month, the system un~ 
doubtedly served the end for which It was contrived*1^ me  
practice was severely criticised by the titrate Commission 
established by the government early in the twentieth century 
on th© grounds that it limited the economic freedom of the 
workers and because the tokens constituted an unauthorized 
currency* Th© Commission*© recommendation that th© use of 
tokens be declared illegal# like many of its other enlightened 
reeoifflaend&tions, was ignored by the government**^
Working conditions were also at a low standard* The 
usual work-day began at six A*M* and ended at six P.M. A 
lunch period of an hour or less was allowed all workers# 
and some oficinas also permitted a short rest period in th© 
afternoon. Variations in working hows, however, did exist 
sine© th© task system prevailed in a few types of employment 
and because th© processing schedule required th© completion 
of certain tasks regardless of th© length of time it took* 
Safety devices were inadequate and slow in being adopted*
While medical care was available for the worker and his 
family (and this was probably a great advance over medical 
opportunities for Chilean agricultural laborers)# only
W. Merriajn to Dept* of State* No* 310* Iqulque*ix, p. 1*6.
*ys&mpar and Michels* Induatria del aalltre. AppendixNo. 29, p. M>2.
routine treatment was given# One doctor would serve several
oficinaa* and Cor his services he received weekly from each
20worker a required payment amounting to several pence#
Until the development of the nitrate industry* the 
region in which it is located was considered so inhospitable 
that Tew people resided there# When the pricings were built* 
rows of small dwellings constructed of corrugated Iron were 
erected by the companies as housing for th© workers* These 
crude structures housed from on© to three thousand persons* 
Together with the manager*© hous© and the company store* they 
formed a little village whose existence depended upon the 
near-by nitrate plant#^* Life in the nitrate region has been 
aptly described by a British journalist who travelled in the 
area shortly after th© turn of the century*
Profitable though the working of nitrates may be* it is a deadly dull occupation • • * * There is nothing more depressing or gloomy in appearance than a nitrate-fie Id, the whole country in which it is situated being of the most dreary nature-^sand* sand* sand everywhere, except where the bare* brown* cruel** looking mountains intervene* Most people who go up to the nitrate-fields feel at first the greatest depression of spirits* and invariably look forward to the time when they are to be released from their voluntary but trying imprisonment#22
20Ibid# * pp* 103**106$ Percy F# Martin* Through Five Republics of South America (Londons Vfta* Heinemami, I906T* 'raakes the following comments The attitude of the average nitrate worker was Hthat he would require neither medical advice nor medicine if he had nothing to do with nitrates#”
2iChild* South American Republics* p* 177*
22Martin, Ttoflaggi Five Republics, p. 32+2.
These people had no recreational facilities for none 
were provided by the nitrate companies* Neither did th® few 
scattered hamlets in the area offer the workers much in the 
way of diversions* Only th® port cities of Iquiqu© and 
Fisagua provided entertainment facilities in the nitrate 
region* and they were not accessible to the nitrate workers 
except occasionally*
Thus* there were no wholesome activities available 
for relieving th© monotony of life in the nitrate desert* A 
reknowned Chilean historian* noting th© status of the nitrate 
workers* has written that among them "gambling and alcohol 
consume all of the time dedicated to rest*"^ while others 
have recorded the presence of these vices among the nitrate 
workers too, it is nonetheless true that "the propensity of 
Chileans for getting blind drunk every pay-day" prevailed to 
an equal degree in other areas of the country**^
In criticising* on on© occasion* the demand for 
higher wages made by the nitrate workers* an Englishman ob«* 
served that it would be foolish to grant their requests sine® 
"they don*t have restraint, decency* /or knowledge^ about 
how to liv©*" and a Chilean asserted that "the worker is not 
able to save and the high wages com© to be for most a
2^Galdames* JeoCTafia de Chile* p* 120.
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temptation rather than a benefit*"*^ However true that 
might have been, the poor living conditions made even more 
unsatisfactory by the oppressive climate, were major obsta­
cles for the development of such desirable qualities* I'hose 
who denounced the type of life led by the nitrate workers, 
however, did nothing to alter or improve the environment in 
which they worked.
In this regard both the producers and the government 
of chile were negligent in their responsibilities* Since 
capitalists the world over during this period failed to 
recognize an obligation toward labor, nitrate producers need 
not be singled out for special criticism* However, the 
Chilean government --whose major source of revenue was derived 
from nitrate exports— was seriously remiss in providing 
public services for the people of the northern provinces* 
After 1900, a growing recognition of the distressing con- 
dltlon of these people led to the establishment of a few 
schools, hospitals, and entertainment facilities by the 
government in the nitrate region* But even then it could 
"not be said that much benefit accrues to the immediate com- 
munlty that produced this wealth* *
Beginning in I89O, journals and newspapers which 
followed nitrate developments periodically noted "labour
2̂ South American Journal* XXXVI (Jan* 13, I89I1J * 36fs 
aa ld a m e s , ? e ^ a f ^ ^ e ^ I Y e ;  pT  128*
^Enock, Central and South America, p* 325*
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outbreaks” or ”labour riots” occurring in the nitrate field©# 
Nitrate workers were considered much more unruly then any 
other type of laborer in Chile* According to Percy F*
Martin# an English historian and traveller in South America# 
th© ”wretchedly desolate” way of life of the nitrate workers 
was the major reason for their "feeling of unrest and dis­
quiet*”^  However# the strikes engaged in by nitrate workers 
in the nineteenth century did not achieve permanent success# 
because there was no organization to protect and preserve 
the few concessions occasionally won from producers*
The most successful and widespread effort of nitrate 
labor to obtain higher wages before the twentieth century 
was made in I89O* Sine© it occurred shortly after the nitrate 
boom had collapsed# the fundamental cause of the ©trike lay 
in the circumstances attending that event* The ©scansion of 
nitrate production during the boom# it will be remembered# 
led to wholesale additions to the labor force and an Increase
oAin wages# However# the subsequent decline in th© price of 
nitz»ate reduced the amount of profit for producers and re­
quired a lowering of production costs#**9 producers generally 
reduced wages in their effort to cut costs* They achieved 
this in cm indirect manner— by increasing the prices of
^Martin# Through Five Republics* p* 3kk>*
*^Smith# Temperate Chile* pp# 2-3# 53#
29see Table XX, Chapter V# p# 15$ • The average price of nitrate from I889 to I89O declined from 9/3d to 0/2|d*
articles sold at the company s t o r e s * ^ ®  por the workers* this 
unexpected rise in the cost or living not only seemed unfair 
hut also meant a decline in real wages# with inflation 
undermining their standard of living simultaneously* the 
workers felt acutely the affects of th© rise in prices*^
While this was the basic grievance of th© strikers* their 
animosity - toward foreigners was probably a factor of second* 
ary iâ portanoe#^2
The walk-out in I89O extended from Antofagasta through 
Tarapaca and affected the port cities as well as th© oficinas# 
In effect the workers asked for a sixty per oent Increase in 
wages when they demanded that they be paid in silver currency 
instead of in the depreciated paper m o n e y * T o  support 
their demands demonstrations were organised in the oficinas* 
These degenerated into riots* however* and in several nitrate 
establishments th© workers sacked the company stores* pro-* 
vision depots* and the house of the manager*^ In th© port 
cities the stevedores and boatmen joined in th© strike* Be­
cause of their demonstrations many foreign residents took
•^Chilean Times as quoted In the South American Journal* XX (Sept* 6*" 1890)* 279*
^Fetter* Monetary Inflation in Chile* PP* 75f*
^2South American Journal* XXIX (July 19* I89O)# 65*See also JT W ,Kerri am to Dept* of State, No* 507 * July 23* I89O, Iqulque* II,
33South American Journal. XXIX (July 19, 1090), 65.
3H-Ibld.. July 12, 1890, p. 34.
refuge on the ships in the harbor#
Th© produeers, naturally, strongly opposed the demand 
for higher wages made by the workers and called upon th© 
Chilean government to provide adequate protection for their 
lives and property *-^6 Since th© Intendsunt had too few troops 
to attempt the suppression to the strike, he advised ac«* 
eeptance of the strikers* terms* While that advice was ac** 
eepted reluctantly, the consular corps in Iquiqu© protested 
and the British minister in Santiago urged that adequate 
protection be given to British interests*’5*
The Chilean Times# a British newspaper published in 
Valparaiso, blamed President Balmac&da for instigating the 
riots, while the complaint of nitrate manufacturers was 
voiced by the South American Journal which said* wAssuredly 
the Chilean government which benefits so largely by the 
nitrate industry might spare some troops to protect life and 
property* ”3® in an editorial published by the same source,
^J* W* Merriam to Dept* of State, Ho* $07, July S3, IS90, Iquique, II*
^Tiie American consul in Iquique denied that the workers had legitimate complaints, stating that there was no need for wage increases* His reasons for holding this o»* pinion were as follows: the workers were improvident* their houses were small and had little furniture* their clothing was cheap* the climate mad© heating unnecessary* Thus, since the workers had relatively nothing, they dldn*t require much in wages to live on I See J* W* Merriam to Dept* of State,No. $07, July 23, 1890, Iquique, II.
37Xblg.: South American Journal* XXIX (July 19, 1890), 6$; See also F* 0* to Kennedy, Tel* ¥0. 11, July 9, I89O,F. 0* 16/259.
38Chilean Times as quoted in South American Journal* XXIX (Sept. 67189377^79J see also JCTTTC’IBW;' PpT35?f
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it was stated that ”th© owners of the nitrate pricings are 
well entitled to some compensationsw to obtain this# the 
government "might fairly be expected to reduce their present 
excessive impost on nitrate*”39
Th© established policy of th© Chilean government in 
regard to labor disturbances in the nitrate region was to 
use troops to quell disorder and to coerce workers into r©» 
turning to their jobs* The basis for this policy rested 
mainly in the understandable desire of the government to 
assure a steady flow of revenue into its treasury from the 
nitrate export tax* Although only a few soldiers were 
stationed in the nitrate region at the outset of the strike 
of I69O, it was not long before re enf or cements arrived* They 
quickly restored order, but not without some bloodshed* When 
protection was assured, producer® planned to withdraw most 
of the wage advances won by the strikers#^®
Intervention on behalf of th© producers was th© major 
type of action taken by the Chilean government in regard to 
the nitrate workers before the twentieth century* Sporadic 
disturbances and strikes occurred following X89O, but none 
reached as serious a stage as that attained by the strike of 
1890* Actually, the stationing of troops at oficlnas seems 
not to have been an unusual occurrence* A description of a 
representative incident Is provided by a report originally
39X b M ». July 19, I89O* p. 77* 
^X b id .. p. 65.
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published in the Chilean Time si
The North hagunas Nitrate Works was the scene or a serious riot on the 2nd instant ̂ August 2/#
100 or more of the workmen having made a demon* stratlon in front of the manager1© residence* Missiles* and even it is ©aid dynamite cartridges* were freely used against th© building* Th© ring leaders were arrested* and brought here* and a» « force of cavalry remains on duty at the works *Z4J*
While efforts were made to form unions among the
workers in the oficinas* on the railways * and in the port
cities* little was accomplished toward this end before the
turn of the century* There is one exception to this state*
ment* A government-sponsored union of stevedores* called th©
Gremio de Jornaladoa* existed until I890* This group had
been organised while Peru still ruled Tarapaca^ and was con*
tinned in operation by the Chilean government*^ By X89O*
it was composed of some three hundred laborers who worked
ten hours a day and were paid by the task system* The rules
and practices established by the union were in effect decreed
by the government* The issue of reforming th© Gremio d£
Jomalados was precipitated in I8S3 by th© Jefe Foljftioo of
Tarapaca* Francisco Valdes Vergara; but according to his
statement* action was prevented by the opposition of th©
nitrate producers who wanted to abolish th© union#^ In
spite of this opposition* the Jefe Politico did carry out
^Chilean Times as quoted in South American Journal* 
XXXIX (Oct. iCltf95TtjJ¥> •
^Valdes Vergara* AdmlnistracIon de Tarapaca'. p. 91,
telbid.. p. 9 5.
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a few changes in the union*© organization designed to permit
Gremio continued in operation until X89O when it was 
abolished, probably because it cooperated in the strike oc~
among workers in the nitrate region* The strikes they en­
gaged in, while frequently marked by violence, were con­
sistently fought by nitrate producers* merchants, and th©
r
owners of the railroads# Employers relied upon strike­
breakers , the lockout, and probably government troops to 
resist the advance of unionism among their workers#^
ployment of trained engineers to maintain and operate the 
processing machinery and chemists to conduct the necessary 
analysis of the nitrate solutions# ‘These technical positions 
and the managerial staffs as well were filled almost entirely 
by Europeans, most of whom were Englishmen# By 1900, ap­
proximately one thousand Europeans were employed by the 
nitrate producers#^
the workers to retain a larger proportion of their earnings
currlng in that year#^
After 1900, labor unions began to achieve strength
The operation of a nitrate plant required the ©m-
^Ibid*. p# 9 2m
^llartner, Polltlca comercial de Chile# XI,
^See Semper and Michels, Industrie del salitr©» p# 105l A* F# Brodle James# Nitrate Facts TaneO?Xf?ure&# pp# Ilfs U* I* Cons# Reports, hXVlT S 7“̂ o7 ̂ p p ^ W :
^Delogacion de Salitreras, Memoria on 1901# p# 21#
CHAPTER VIII
THE NITRATE INDUSTRY AND THE REVOLUTION OP 1891
While th© significance of th© territory acquired by 
Chile during th© War of th© Pacific rest© in part upon th© 
changes it effected in the Chilean economy and In the organ­
isation of her public finances, the acquisition of th© 
nitrate region also hastened, perhaps even made possible, 
her first successful revolution in over half a century* This 
was the Revolution of I89I, and its outcome determined a 
constitutional question of fundamental significances whether 
presidential power would be preserved or whether Congress 
would enforce the parliamentary principle of ministerial 
responsibility#
For several decades preceding 1 8 9 1, the presidents 
of Chile had striven to maintain the powers of their office* 
These powers, granted by the Constitution of 1833» made it 
possible for the chief executive to choose and elect his 
successor and to dominate the legislature* This 11 autocratictt 
power remained intact until l86l; but thereafter, sentiment 
in favor of limiting presidential power began to grow# The 
feeling was reflected in Congress,uihIeh gradually assumed a
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more influential and independent role in the government#3, 
Chilean presidents opposed this trend hut they could not 
stop it#
During the presidency of Joae Manuel BaXmaceda (1886- 
1 8 9 1 )4 th© relationship between th© executive and congress 
was considerably altered* Rampant factionalism within th© 
President *s own Liberal party, along with hie attempt to 
maintain an harmonious relationship with Congress by choosing 
ministers acceptable to it* led to cabinet instability and
ppolitical confusion# Moreover, presidential interference 
in elections could no longer assure a tractable Congress#
In fact, Congress criticised governmental acts with uncon­
trollable persistence•
As in the past, Congress represented the dominant 
landholding aristocrats* By I89O the majority had turned 
against Balm&cedaf because in spite of his many concessions 
to congressional wishes, he planned to name his successor in 
I89I*^ In the eyes of Congress this constituted a perpetu­
ation of presidential power which it was unwilling to accept# 
In addition, many aristocrats feared BaXmaceda * a democratic 
electoral reforms might result In thoir loss of political 
power* So to them, the establishment of congressional
^Galdames, History of Chile * pp# 2lfO-2l0* 2J>5ff ♦
2Ibid., pp. 342, 344.
^Ibid.. p. 3 4 5,
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control over the government became a pressing necessity* 
Congress used its power over appropriations in an 
effort to compel BaXmaceda to give up his attempted perpetu­
ation of presidential power* After much controversy a tempo­
rary compromise was arranged* A ministry acceptable to 
Congress was appointed and th© appropriations bill for IB90  
was passed* But no action was taken on the appropriations 
bill for 1 8 9 1* Then, following the adjournment of Congress 
in October, I89O, BaXmaceda replaced th© cabinet of compro­
mise with on© of his own choosing* On January 1st, he an­
nounced that th© appropriation bill for the previous year 
would b© enforced in 18 9 1* Congress considered this an
unconstitutional act and deposed BaXmaceda on January 7th*
6With this event a revolution was started*
The revolution was organised by the congressional 
majority and it received th© support of the Chilean navy*
The army, however, remained loyal to th© President, who was 
thereby able to preserve his authority in th© populous 
sections of the country where the majority of the troops were 
stationed*^ Meanwhile, th© revolutionists took to th© sea. 
Being deprived of the opportunity to organize a resistance
5Ibid* * pp* 3l|iff; Some historians consider BaXmaceda the champion of a more popular government in Chile* See Osgood Hardy, "The Itata Incident,” Hispanic American His­torical Review, V (May, 1922), p* 200 ana notes*
AOaldames, History of Chile« pp* 3k$£f *
?Ibld*, p* 3^6 *
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force la th© major province® and with only a small contingent 
of soldiers at it® command* Congress saw that its future 
success depended upon the establishment of a base in Chilean 
territory where an array could be formed and trained free 
from the danger of harassment* Since the nitrate region was 
virtually inaccessible by land* it provided an ideal nest 
for the revolutionaries » They quickly imposed their rule 
there* The navy won control of the nitrate ports in Tarapaca* 
Revolutionary forces drove B&lmaceda*s small garrisons
Ainland* and after a brief struggle ©merged victorious*
Possession of northern Chile gave Congress not only 
an ideal base of operations* but also access to the immense 
revenues derived from the tax on nitrate exports* This be-* 
came their chief source of funds for th© support of the war* 
Another important aspect of the relationship between the 
nitrate industry and the Revolution of 1092- lies in the aid 
given that movement by the British nitrate capitalists* 
Without these advantages* it Is highly improbable that the 
Congressional forces would have won the struggle in which 
they were engaged*
There are indications that foreign economic interest® 
in Chile* especially th© British nitrate capitalists* were 
involved in the political conflict preceding the revolution 
as partisans of the aristocrats* The open hostility of 
Balmaceda toward the British nitrate Interests provides the
8 Ibid
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major reason why they identified their welfare with the
Congressional party*
3almaeeda*s statements and actions pertaining to the
nitrate industry were leading him to the formulation of a
Chilean nitrate policy*^ There is no doubt that he hoped
to return the industry to Chilean control* The President
considered combinations the work of the British enterprises;
and early in 1889* he proposed the prohibition of these
organisations as a means of protecting Chilean interests*
His influence may have been an Important factor in forestall*
ing the organisation of the second combination in I689 and
I890* At the same time* the President suggested that the
expropriation of the Nitrate Railways Company and the nation*
alization of the entire nitrate industry might be necessary
10to achieve his goal. Balmaceda*s opposition to Nitrate 
Railways rested upon his belief that the high rates it 
charged were detrimental to the welfare of the industry* 
Consequently* he sought to destroy the monopoly position that 
siade these rates possible**^* He also deplored the wholesale 
incorporation of large companies on the London stock exchange 
during the boom years* According to the President* corporate
^Cornejo* El 5alltre« p* 133*
10Chlle, Pomenfco de la Industria salltrera, pp. Billinghurafc, LoacapTEaXBs aalitreroa, p. 113*
11The British government supported Nitrate Railways before the government of Balmaceda* 111 hope*11 wrote the British Minister to Chile* "after some settlement of the
enterprises, unlike personally owned nitrate works, did not
t2promote either public or private interests# His policy, 
in the words of an American consul, was to encourage "small 
and independent companies19 in order to erect an "obstacle 
to the formation of a trust of English companies#"^
While Balmaceda did not relent in his opposition to 
British domination of the nitrate industry, he did come to 
the conclusion that nationalisation was not a practical course 
of action* "It is true," the President said, "that we should 
not exclude the free competition and manufacture of nitrate 
in Tarapaca; but we cannot consent that this rich and ex«* 
tensive region should become simply a foreign factory*"^ 
Opposition from Chilean nitrate capitalists and the expense 
involved were, in all probability, the chief obstacles to the 
nationalization of the industry*
Although Congress, apparently, failed to echo 
Balmaceda1 s ideas concerning the nitrate industry, his view
Nitrate Railways question to get on a friendlier footing with the President for he really governs the country. So far he looks upon me as a disagreeable person because I bothered 
him in regard to Peruvian Bond-holders, thwarted his ©ml** gr at Ion designs upon Britishers and now attack him in regard to Nitrate Railways*" Kennedy to Sanderson, May 27$ 1 8 9 0,F# 0* 16/259* See also Chapter IV*
^Comejo, El Salltre, pp# 131-133#
1% .  S* Cons* Repts*, XXXII {IB8 9), I4.O8#
^Russell, A Visit to the Nitrate Fields * p* 312$ See also Billinghurst, %oa caplValeo aalltroros, p* 120 where 
Balmaceda Is report ed to have cit ed the ant I-trust law of th© 
United States as an example of what he wanted#
2ll±
received popular support*^ A newspaper published in
Santiago, the hlbertad Electoral, voiced the fear that the
entire nitrate region was In danger of being dominated by
the British nitrate capitalists* The article containing
this view* entitled "Tarapacat Its Nor this at ion,u noted with
great apprehension the monopolistic activities of Col*
North* In addition, a leading West Coast writer on nitrate
affairs Guillermo Billlnghurst, gave hi® support to Balma-
cedars ideas when he declared that
these floatations in London, have (1) not increased the public riches of Chile, nor (2) the industrial riches with small exceptions, and they will produce bad effects upon the industry# More important Is the effect on state revenues, especially their contraction due to the efforts of the combination# ■
Moreover, In pointing to the Important political and 
financial effects foreign ownership of the nitrate Industry 
could have on Chile in the future, Billlnghurst posed the 
question which many Chileans considered of fundamental im­
portance* He wrotes
Is it prudent, for the state, whose principal financial resources come from the tax on nitrate exports, to remain passive, seeing that this industry is being concentrated in the hands of a determined group of foreigners?1,0
^Cornejo, El Sailtre, p# ll|l*
^Quoted In the Nitrate Craze, pp* l£f# 
^Billlnghurst, Los cap!tales salitreros, p* 113# 
^Xbld*, p* I).#
Balmaceda continued his opposition to the British 
nitrate interests throughout the year lOgO# and in the fall 
of that year he conducted a speaking tour during which he 
consistently evinced a hostile attitude toward British inter* 
ests#^ He voiced his antipathy to British control over an 
industry that had been won by the shedding of Chilean blood 
and through the sacrifices of her citisens# Moreover# 
nitrate capitalists claimed that the president instigated 
labor riots in the oficlnas and that he supported and was 
largely responsible for the successful demands mad© by the 
workers for higher wages*^ On© of Col* North*© friends# 
the journalist William Russell# coimnented that he "found 
the foreign communities much exercised by the declarations 
he ^falmacedja^ had made in the course of his official 
journey* "
This anti*Balmaceda sentiment among British nitrate 
interests was essentially the outcome of the refusal of the 
President to make an agreement satisfactory to the English 
capitalists* An opportunity had been afforded him when the 
leading nitrate Investor# Col* Horth# visited Chile in 
1889*22 The British entrepreneur# apprehensive about the
^9rh© Times (London)# Jan* 19* 1891# P» 5*
^South American Journal* XXXX (July 12# I8 9 0)# 3i|4 Sept# 6# lBgtf# p*"2Y 9#
^Russell# "The Troubles in Chile#" p* IjSlj,*
^Other implications of North*© voyage to Chile in IO89 are discussed in Chapter III# pp* 106ff*
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security of hi® investments, declared that the purpose of hi® 
voyage to Chile was 11 to solidify and extend /Kijl? interests/1 
and perhaps, even to conclude an agreement with the Presi-
ported to the pres® that his conversation with Balmaceda had 
been successful, his optimism was totally unfounded# Col# 
North*s proposals received scant consideration, and the gifts 
that he had brought for the President were refused* The 
President went so far as to single out for attack North*® 
most powerful company, the Nitrate Railways# He obtained a 
court decision nullifying that firm*® monopoly privilege, 
and he granted concessions to others which led to the 
building of competing rail lines The unsatisfactory re* 
lations between Balmaceda and Col# North were confirmed by 
a consul of the United States, who happened to be in Santiago 
at the time# The latter described a ^large and imposing 
representation” which had come to Chile from Great Britain 
to obtain ^such concessions and changes in nitrate regu* 
lations as would render them masters of the situation and 
give them a virtual monopoly of the nitrate trade*” The 
consul1 a conclusion regarding the result of the encoimter is 
a precise summatipn of the reception that the delegation*® 
requests r e c e i v e d * ^  f,I am convinced,” he wrote, ”that the
0 3dent# -' But hi® journey proved fruitless# Although he re*
^Russell, a Visit to the Nitrate yields * p# 81#
Budd to Sanderson, Jan* 11, 1894,
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impolicy of strengthening th© hands of the would-be monopo­
lists was fully appreciated at Santiago#”2^
The continued estrangement between the government and 
the English nitrate capitalists is indicated by Col# North*s 
close association with members of the Congressional oppo­
sition to Balmaceda# One leader of the opposition gave the 
visitor a banquet, and Col# North *3 chief legal advisor in 
Chile was Julio Zegers, a prominent member of the anti-
26Balmaceda group, isho sided with the revolutionists in 1891»
Balmaceda*s supporters both directly and indirectly
identified British nitrate capitalists with the Congressional
party# In a speech Julio Banados Espinosa declared1
The • • # true source of the revolution • # # is that of personal Interests, • • # # What has been the influence of the Tarapaca nitrate kings in our parliamentary wrangling©, and In our political affairs, for the last five years? • • • • The same interests, which have contributed to throw us into a revolution are, at the present time, knocking at every door in foreign countries to bring us 27into discredit, and to dishonor our foreign affairs# ‘
More direct testimony Is rendered by the special 
correspondent of the London Times,Maurice Hervey, one of the 
few Englishmen in Chile who favored the cause of the Presi­
dent#
2£u« S» Cons# Rents#, XXXII (I8O9 ), lj.08#
^Creat Britain, Foreign Office, 0orrespondence Respecting the Revolution In Chile (Londont Harrison "and Sons* It»9 2 ), !no7 P 7  pV ^outE",‘American Journal, XLIV {March 26,
1 8 9 8), 353$ Russell, A visit io 'k\ie"titrate Fields« p# 9 5#
Julio Banados Espinosa was a writer and professor#He became an outspoken supporter of President Balmaceda# II©
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Without quoting names, soma or which are as well known upon the London Stock Exchange as the cardinal points or the compass, the fact remains, beyond the possibility of contradiction, that the instigators, the wire-pullers, the financial supporters or the so-called revolution were, and are, the English or Anglo-Chllean owners of the vast nitrate deposits of Tarapaca « • . # The fact further remains that outside certain portions of these nitrate districts (and mostly of course, Iquique and PisaguaJ^ghe revolutionary appeal ha® proved a total
The link between the British nitrate capitalists and 
the opposition prior to the revolution was strengthened after 
the revolt began# In the spring of I89I and before the 
Congressional forces achieved any notable success outside 
their stronghold in the nitrate region, Col# North e&pressed 
his wholehearted support of the revolution and his belief 
that the "political difficulties" in Chile would soon be 
settled in such a manner that Nitrate Hallways would attain 
a position more advantageous than heretofore#^ in th© 
columns of almost every English newspaper, periodical and 
journal, the revolutionists received unquestioned support# 
There are two major reasons for the prevalence of this atti* 
tude In the English press# In the first place, the welfare 
of English economic interests w<as identified with the cause 
of the revolutionists; and secondly, since the Congressional 
party favored the establishment in Chile of a parliamentary
held posts in cabinets during Balmaceda*s presidency# See V#, Figueroa Pleolonario# II, 99*101#
2®South American Journal# XXX (May 23, I89I), 65l|*#
^9The Time® (London), May 6 , I89I, p# 11,
form of government similar to the British political system*
Englishmen naturally sympathised with their objective#^
A few of the articles published in English periodicals were
written by men Identified with the nitrate interests, and
they were uniformly pro-revolutionlst in sentiment; and the
London Tlaaea recalled its special correspondent in Chile#
Maurice Hervey, because his dispatches were favorable to 
31Balmaceda# When the civil war ended with the triumph of 
the revolutionists, the South American Journal, a consistent 
champion of the nitrate capitalists, stated editorially8
It is with great satisfaction that we have to record the realisation, not only of our hopes, but of the expectations we have throughout ventured to express, in the complete overthrow of BALMACEDA and his servile supporters#32
While the charges that the British nitrate capital­
ists contributed heavily to the financial resources of the 
revolutionists cannot be unreservedly substantiated, availa­
ble evidence, however, points in that direction# One accu­
sation, published by the San Francisco Daily Evening 
Bulletin, asserted that between three and four million pesos 
were contributed to the revolutionary regime by the nitrate
3°Hardy, "British Hltrates and the Balmaceda Revo­
lution,* pp# 165ff»
^Russell, "Troubles In Chile," p# l81f| Edward Manby "A Note on Chilean Affairs," The Fortnig^t ^  Review (London) Hew Series, L (July-Dee#, 1 6 9 1), 10I-1Q5; South American Journal, XXXI (Aug# 8 , I89I), 1^7#
32ibid•, Sept# 6, 1891, p#
capitalists.^* Although no source was cited# the allegation 
might be ascribed with probable validity to a Balmaceda 
supporter and a former Chilean consul in San Francisco named 
C&ssanova. He believed that)
It will be found that British money is the mainstay of the insurgents against our government.The British want to obtain control of the nitrate deposits and President Balmaceda wished them to be worked for the benefit of the Chilean govern* ment.34
The English Journalist Hervey declared that the 
"English or Anglo-Ciiilean owners of the vast nitrate deposits 
in Tarapaca" are the "financial supporters of the so-callod 
revolution. "35 Hervey was well-informed on the subject of 
Chilean politics# and his opinion was not only derived from 
his contacts with government officials of the Balmaceda 
administration but also through his association with members 
of the British community resident in Chile. That M s  deela* 
ration was sincere Is indicated by the fact that he main* 
tained his point of view even when it became evident that It 
would result in M s  recall.
The American Minister to Chile# Patrick Egan# was 
another who charged the British nitrate capitalists with 
aiding the revolutionists. In a dispatch to Secretary of
^ The San Francisco Pally ffveMng Bulletin# as quoted In Hardy, "British nitrates and the Balmaceda Revolution,"
p. 18 0.
York Daily Tribune. May 8, 1891), p. 1.
3i?South American Journal. XXX (May 23, I89I), 65I4..
State James g# Blaine he wrote on one occasion the followingt 
nI may mention as a feature of much interest the fact that 
the revolution has the undivided sympathy, and in many cases 
the aetlve support, of the English residents in Chile*19 He 
continued, ”it is known that many English houses have sub* 
scribed liberally to the revolutionary fund* Among others, 
it is openly stated by leaders of the revolution, Mr* John 
Thomas North contributed the sum of h 100,000#11 Egan also 
recorded a report from Balmaceda*s eoamaander in Tarapaca 
that claimed the English managers of oflelnaa in the nitrate 
district were urging their workers to Join the revolutionary 
army by offering bounties to them if they did, and threat* 
ening to fire them if they did not#
While Patrick Egan*s career as American Minister to 
Chile has been the subject of much controversy, he, never* 
theless, appears to have performed his duties with con* 
slderable ability#^ Although h© was undoubtedly in favor 
of the President fs party in the revolution and believed they
^^United States, Department of State, Papers to the Foreign Relations of t M  United S t f ( ton: Government Printing Office, 1 0 9 2} , P# 107• Col# North, referred to by Egan as a contributor to the revolutionary fund, had ample resources and could well have given fi* nancial aid to the revolution# Not only was he © wealthy nitrate investor, but between the years 1387 and 1696 he ex* pended & 250 ,0 0 0 for expenses incurred in the attempt to maintain the monopoly of the Nitrate Railways company# A full accounting of these expenditures was never made#
^Osgood Hardy, ,fWas Patrick Egan a •blundering m inis ter * * ” . Hispanic American Mjgtorical Review* VIII (Feb*, 1928), PP* 6^*81#
would be the ultimate victors , Egan1 s record shows that ho 
maintained, as he was expected to do, the officially neutral 
policy of the United States* In spite of this, however, the 
revolutionists considered him hostile to their Cause, and the 
Balmacedists sought to identify the United States as one of 
their supporters*3® the large and important English
community in Chile and Egan were hostile toward each other, 
his testimony regarding English aid to the revolutionists 
must be evaluated with this relationship in mind, Still, his 
reports should be accepted as generally correct, even though 
the details may be in error# In Balmaceda1 s friendly atti­
tude toward the United States, Egan saw an opportunity to 
promote American economic interests at the expense of the 
British* But though h© talked with the President on the 
subject of employing American capital as a means of dimin­
ishing English preponderance in the nitrate industry, the 
victory of the revolutionists nullified his efforts#*^ it 
should be noted, however, that economic and financial con­
ditions In the world and in the United States in particular 
at that time were not rip© for American investment on a 
large scale in Chile*
The interests of the English and the Insurgents were
3%©nry Clay Evans, Chile and Its Relations with the united States (Durham Duke tfniversliy"Press," l^S?), pp«T38-T£l.
^Hardy, "Was Patrick Egan a ‘blundering Minister,»"
P« 7k»
related in a manner similar to the connection existing be* 
tween the Balmaceda government and the United State©! and 
because English interests in Chile were stronger than those 
or the North American republic, they had a more important 
effect In determining the course of the revolution# W© have 
already seen how the English identified themselves with the 
revolutionary movement • In their turn, leaders of the revo­
lution urged the English to give them support because the 
success of their party would be, they claimed, advantageous 
to British interests* This does not mean, of course, that 
the revolutionists were fighting for British interests*
Rather, the welfare of the latter, especially those interested 
in Chilean nitrates, was Incidentally furthered by the at­
tempt to overthrow President Baimacedaj and need for foreign 
assistance required the cultivation of those who could render 
aid in obtaining necessary supplies and arms*
British diplomatic reports record the attitude of 
leading insurgents towards the English* In reporting to the 
Foreign Office that many revolutionists had urged him to 
request British recognition of the revolution, the English 
Minister in Santiago remarked that they
* * * look to are at Britain for money and ships, manufactured goods, and all necessities of life! that they had relations with British capitalists and desired to encourage the Investment of foreign capital in Chile,4°
bpQrtm Br*, Correspondence Respecting the Revolution 
in Chile* P« 185*
2*%
Th© point of view expressed in this dispatch would 
undoubtedly appeal to the English nitrate capitalists who 
were anxious for an opportunity to make additional in­
vestments in new nitrate properties* They knew* as th© 
insurgents had reminded the British minister* that Balmaceda 
was opposed to th© introduction of additional English capital 
in th© nitrate industry*^* Revolutionary ©gents in Europe* 
likewise* made direct representations to the Foreign Office* 
The British Foreign Secretary informed his minister in 
Santiago that Agustin Ross* one of th© most important revo­
lutionary agents in Europe* had told him that^
hche policy of selling state-owned nitrate properties was resumed after the revolution# See Chapter XX* pp# 6lf# This action has been interpreted as a redemption of th© pledge made during the revolt to promote foreign investments in Chile* {See Hardy* "British Hit rates and th© Balmaceda Revolution*" pp* 179i*«) However* such was not the case*The real reasons for the sal© were® (!) the need of ad­ditional funds to support th© monetary conversion scheme|(2) the desire to increase Chilean investments in nitrates; and (3) th© plan of undermining th© nitrate combination by creating new producers* Apparently after achieving power* the congressional Party was no longer so anxious to stimulate British investments in th© nitrate industry* As an English­man wrote a few years later, " • • • th© *parvenus foreignnitrate adventurers1 have lost cast© as well as influence with all parties • ♦ • • " Smith, Temperate Chile* p* 2*
^Agustin Rosa was a Chilean banker. He wrote nu­merous articles about the economic problems of Chile* Rosa was in Europe when the revolution began* H© became an agent for the Congressional Party; and with th© triumph of hi© cause* Ross was appointed Minister to Croat Britain* As a revolutionary agent* Ross worked with August© Matte* Matte was also a banker and diplomat* Both men had served in the Chilean Senate* See V# Figueroa, Diccionario* IV-V, pp*
221f, 1067.
it la very important to English eomereial interests that the Congressional party should be speedily successful# and /$§/ stated that President Balmaceda was under the influence of Mr* Egan# the United States Minister# and hostile to British merchants*h3
This quotation shows how the revolutionists expanded 
their request for British support by associating the President 
with Horth American economic interests and by inferring that 
English and insurgent interests were in harmony with one an* 
other* According to Times correspondent Hervey# wstill more 
indiscreet was th© oft-heard boast of the revolutionists 
that they had the whole nitrate interest at their backs , as 
well as th© moral support of th© British Government , and of 
th© British navy**^*
British policy during the revolution reflected the 
attitude of the English press# the English nitrate capital** 
ists, and the English coiamunity in Chile* VS/hen Balmaceda 
issued decrees prohibiting exports of nitrate and closing the 
nitrate ports to all trade, tho British refused to recognise 
their validity*^
The British fleet cruised off the Chilean coast and 
protected British ships from molestation} however, their 
action was followed by the United States,■which also sent a
U3art* Br., Correspondence Respecting the Revolution in chile* p# 157*
^Hervey, Dark Days in Chile, pp* 108f*
^Grt* Br*# Correspondence Respecting the Revolution in Chile# p.
5 2nd Congress, Vol« 3̂ *i «o* p* 21*
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naval squadron to Chilean waters* The major difference* 
apparently# was that the United States did not protest the 
action taken by Balmaceda 'while Great Britain did* it one 
time or another* both the British and American navies were 
accused of acting as messenger boys* the British for the 
revolutionists and th© American lor Balmaceda*^
In addition* the British materially aided th© in- 
surgentgj cause by refusing to give more than nominal support 
to Balmaceda *s agents in England* Moreover# revolutionary 
agents were permitted to procure supplies and ship them from 
English ports without hindrance from the government* The 
ability of the Congressional party to obtain munitions and 
war materials in England (and elsewhere) was a determining 
factor in th© revolution* Th© Insurgents were in desperate 
need of arms and ammunition for until those supplies were at 
hand* no attack on Balmaceda could be made*
Efforts to procure war materials were made by revo­
lutionary agents in th© United States* England# and on the 
continent* In the United States th© Chilean revolutionary 
agent Ricardo Trumbull obtained a large quantity of rifles 
and ansnunition from a factory in New York*^ These were
M >ibid«» pp* 6lf| Evans* Chile and the United States*
p .  li|2«
^Ricardo Trumbull was an excollent choice as th© revolutionary agent In the United States* He not only spoke English well but was also a distant relative of a well-known 
American* Lyman Trumbull* Hardy# f,The Itata Incident”# p* 
202.
transported to California* then transferred to a schooner 
which finally delivered them to the insurgent A* vessel* the 
Xtatm* ^  In obtaining this cargo Trumbull was probably aided 
by the New York commercial firm of w* B# Grace and Company* 
although proof of this Is lacking# Nevertheless* Grace and 
Company admitted sending non«*ailitary supplies to the revo­
lutionists* while his ooirqpetitor* Charles B# Flint and 
Company* was shipping supplies to B a l m a c e d a *  ̂ 9 George A* 
Burt* sho had charge of the Itata1© cargo in California* 
denied that "the credits used to purchase these arm© were 
from Europe* At any rate* the arms carried by the Itata 
were not a decisive factor In the Chilean revolution because 
the United States forced the return of the ship with Its 
cargo until the legality of the shipment could be determined, 
judicially#
When a similar incident involving Great Britain oc­
curred* the Foreign Office acted quite differently* The 
chief revolutionary agents In Europe* Agusto Matte and 
Ague tin Ross* dispatched military supplies from the important 
nitrate commercial center of Liverpool aboard the English 
vessel Aconcagua# Labelled as a cargo of screws* these 
munitions were transferred to the insurgent*© vessel Maipu
^See Ibid* for the details of the Itata controversy*
4-9Mew York D a lly  Tribune. May 10, 1891* p» 1.
June 2 6* I6 9 1* p* 1#
in the Straits of Magellan#*^ Information to this ©ffect w  
given tn© Foreign Office by the government of Balmaceda# but 
no action ims taken to prevent the supplies reaching Xquiqu©*^ 
According to a United States HavaX Intelligence report# the 
Congressional army was at last adequately equipped as a result 
of th© receipt of these supplies#^
In one other instance th© plans of Balmaceda to 
frustrate th© efforts of the opposition aroused discord be** 
tween his government and that of Croat Britain# Early in 
the war# Balmaceda perceived the possibility of the Congres­
sional forces establishing their rule in the nitrate region#
In an attempt to prevent them from gaining control over the 
revenues derived from nitrate exports# the President ordered 
the destruction of the nitrate establishments# When the 
British# and German Minister too# entered a vigorous protest 
to this order# they received only th© promise that compen­
sation would be forthcoming for all damages Incurred#^ 
Balmacedafs project# however# was prevented from being carried 
out by the swift capture of the nitrate region by the revo­
lutionaries#
^Grt# Br## Cor re spondenc e Respecting the Revolution 
In Chile# p# 2 6 9#
5 2ibid., pp# 1$2£ % Jos© M# Santa Cams# “Chile and Her Civil war#Ir Worth American Review# Chill (Oct## I89D #  lp.2#
^UWted States# Office of Haval Intelligence# The Chilean Revolution of 1891. War Series Ho# IV (Washington! Government Printing Office# 1 8 9 3)# p# 26#
^Cornejo, S£ Salltre. pp. 139f.
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The conclusion that th© English nitrate capitalists 
were an important factor in determining th© outcome of the 
revolution seems valid* They had sufficient reasons for 
desiring the victory of the Congressional forces; their 
sympathies were clearly with the insurgents! and influential 
members of their group were closely associated with parties 
ipants in the struggle* The extent of their aid* ©specially 
that of money or credit advanced, is impossible to estimate 
precisely* Even though the nitrate revenues probably 
afforded most of th© funds needed by the Congressional party, 
at least on© well-informed British nitrate investor wrote 
that these duties would not provide adequate support for the 
revolutionary cause*^ In th© light of that statement, the 
numerous indications that contributions were forthcoming 
from the foreign nitrate capitalists must be given serious 
consideration* Fur the rmore, It should be emphasised that 
th© revolutionists never denied th© charges that they r©~ 
ceived financial aid from this source*
^Maaby, nA Hot© on Chilean Affairs#ff p* 101*
CHAPTER IX
THE IMPACT OF NITRATES ON NINETEENTH CENTURY CHILE
It can be seen from a recapitulation of the previous 
chapters that the nitrate industry had an important afreet 
on the course of Chilean history in the late nineteenth 
century. Many political and social trends as well as the 
Chilean economy were either directly or indirectly shaped by 
nitrate developments.
Even before Chile acquired complete control over the 
industry, nitrate affairs everted an important influence on 
her economy, which was expanding and prosperous between the 
years 1866 and l87lj-« This prosperity was promoted in part 
by Chilean capitalists who developed valuable mining interests 
In territory belonging to Bolivia and Peru# Th© working of 
nitrate deposits was one of these enterprises. After 1873, 
the mining boom collapsed, and Investors suffered serious 
losses. Moreover, the difficulties of Chilean nitrate ©ntr©** 
preneurs were increased by th© nationalization policy of Peru
^Toward the close of this period of prosperity a Chilean economist observed that most Chileans believe the country1 a "life is tied up only with the development of riches, stock exchange dealings, mining ventures, and specu^
1 at Ion in securities and corporation©*" Marelal Gonzales,"Las Negooioa y las crisis," El Ferrocarrll, July 5, 1873, as quoted in Fetter, Monotary^nflation in Chi 1©. p. 16.
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pand by the hostile attitude of Bolivia# As a result# 
Chilean nitrate interests in Tarapaca/ declined# and those in 
Bolivia operated In an atmosphere of uncertainty* A few 
Chileans who had lost their properties in T&rupaea trans- 
ferred their activities to th© Chilean fields of Aguas 
Blancas and Taltal* But even with the encouragement of the 
government# they failed to establish themselves as important 
producers because th© deposits they worked were inferior and 
adequate transportation facilities were lacking*
Meanwhile* a depression hit Chile in 1673* The 
landholding aristocracy faced serious financial problems*
They were heavily in debt; and sine© the markets for their 
products were depressed* the future outlook was dim* In 
addition* commerce was severely restricted; th© banks were in 
a precarious status; and th© government did not receive suf­
ficient revenues to cover its expenses* The world-wide 
economic crisis of the 1870*8 added to Chile *0 difficulties*^ 
By I8 7 8# hard times affected every significant section of 
the Chilean economy# and hope of recovery in th© foreseeable 
future was small* Because of this situation# specie payments 
were suspended in 1878# With th© outbreak of the War of the
2Gulllermo Subercaseaux# Monetary and Banking Policy of Chile* Ed* by David Klnley (O^ordT Slar©ndon Press# T922) p7 857 ""Actually# developments in copper and silver mining were more important than nitrates in producing th© depression During the depression* th© price of copper declined by fifty per cent while the price of silver fell fifteen per cent*
^Fetter# Monetary Inflation in Chile* pp* 17* 26.
3 Of $ oaldames# His^QCT^of Ctiil © *T pp * j 15 *3^Qf *
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Pacific a few months later, th© government began issuing 
paper money *̂ “
During the period "when economic distress in Chile was 
most acute, serious diplomatic differences between Chile and 
Bolivia were renewed* It is quite possible that the depress 
slon in Chile significantly influenced the outcome of the 
diplomatic crisis* The hostile action taken by the Bolivian 
government against Chilean nitrate Interests near Antofagasta 
produced & firm protest from Chile* The controversy that 
ensued resulted in the revival of Chilean expansionism* 
Chilean statesmen were undoubtedly aware of the economic 
advantages to be gained by annexing th© Bolivian littoral*
In the first place, existing interests would be provided 
protection; secondly, new groups would have an opportunity 
to establish themselves there; and thirdly, new sources of 
revenue for the government would be opened up* Annexation of 
the littoral would mean war with Bolivia; and because of the 
alliance between Bolivia and Peru, the latter probably would 
be drawn Into the struggle*
From the standpoint of the expansionists of Chile, 
war with Peru would provide the welcome opportunity to ac­
quire the rich province of Tarapaca* Thus, through terri­
torial expansion, th© depression might be alleviated* The 
determination expressed by Chile on th© first day of th© war
^Fetter, Monetary Inflation in Chile* pp* 28-10* 
^See Chapter I, pp* 27f#
to retain Antofagasta# and her obvious annexationist designs 
on Tar&paca# constitute evidence supporting the view that 
the depression strengthened the Chilean expansion movement#^
In any event # the victory of Chile In the War of the 
Pacific solved her major economic problems# with the con­
quest of Tarapaea, revenues obtained from th® nitrate indus­
try replaced issues of paper money as the main source for 
funds to carry on the war# In fact, there was no need for 
further issues of paper money at all# At the same time the 
distress of the landholding aristocracy was turned into 
prosperity by the opening of markets In the mining region for 
the products of the Chilean haciendas#^ In addition, Chilean 
capitalists and merchants benefited from Chilean control of 
the nitrate region#
Prom 1880 onward the nitrate industry continued to 
contribute to the economic growth of Chile# The rapid ex­
pansion of production facilities in Tarapaea^ and later in 
the other nitrate fields, gave Chilean agriculture increasing 
markets for its produce# Services required by the industry
^Dennis# Taena-Arlca Dispute* pp# 83ff#
7Subercaseaux» Monetary Policy of Chile# p# 97# By the end of the war, writes SuDercaseaux# wthe economic and financial situation of the country had undergone a notable Improvement • • • # The debtors were able to take advantage of the altered situation for th© purpose of converting their old obligations into new ones carrying a lower rate of Interest# The price of rural and urban properties rose con­siderably# so that many landowners# infoo shortly before would have been unable to pay their debts by selling their holdings# afterwards found themselves with a considerable balance in their favour#*1
gave rise to smaller businesses and stimulated the building 
of additional railroads* Moreover* the large volume of 
nitrate exported to Europe again gave Chile a favorable 
balance of trad© and did much to provide her with a sufficient 
supply of foreign exchange*®
Th® large revenues collected by the government from 
the tax on nitrate exports gave Chile the means to restore 
her currency to a metallic basis* However* Chilean leaders 
failed to take advantage of the favorable situation* Instead* 
they gave priority to an extensive program of public works*9 
For the most part the schools* public buildings* railroads* 
and harbor improvements constructed under this program were 
located in the central valley* where th© politically dominant 
aristocracy lived* While th© nitrate region benefited little 
from the program* the improvement of transportation f&eili** 
ties aided the growth of both domestic and foreign trade*
This and the commerce In nitrates promoted th© development 
of a wealthy commercial class that eventually exerted a 
strong Influence in th© Chilean government*
Possession of the nitrate fields also led to a growth 
of foreign investments in Chile* Th© trend can be discerned 
from statistics showing th© amount of British capital placed 
in Chilean enterprises and securities* From i860 to I89O
®Fett©r* Monetary Inflation in Chile* pp* 22f list 
Chilean Imports and exports from l̂ TO' to 'TP$2§•
9ibld* * pp* 145-4̂ 7*
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the total British investments in Chile rose from h 8 .If 
millions to & 2l|, millions*^ Of this latter sum nitrate 
producing companies and the major allied enterprises ac­
counted for & 9*8 millions or two-fifths of the total* For 
the next twenty years investments continued to increase 
substantially# Although these investments promoted economic 
development, th© dominance of British capital in th© nitrate 
industry was one reason for rise of anti-foreighlsm in Chile# 
As had been pointed out in Chapter Six, th© policy of re­
stricting nitrate production was largely a British scheme 
and was considered by the government detrimental to the 
interests of Chile*
The attitude taken by the Chilean government toward 
restriction points to one of the chief influences of nitrates 
on Chile# The revenues of the government, indeed the pros­
perity of the country depended upon the status of nitrate 
affairs# Depressions in the nitrate industry adversely 
affected all other phases of the economic life of Chile#
Fortunately, in the nineteenth century nitrate depressions
11were relatively short-lived#
Finally, the nitrate Industry had an important influ­
ence on political developments in Chile* Luis Galdames, a
10J# Fred Hippy, "Century of British Investments in Chile,” Pacific Historical Review, XXI (Nov#, 1952f\* 3i|l*
^However, after the first World War a prolonged depression in Chilean nitrates did occur# The development of processes for th© manufacture of synthetic nitrates was responsible for this#
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leading Chilean historian* points out that the history of 
Chile in the late nineteenth century was largely determined 
by two events* the War of the Pacific and the Revolution 
of 1891* in both events * nitrate played a significant 
role*
*%©© Galdames, History of Chile* pp# 336* 3&1, lfl&
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